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ABSTRACT  
Large-scale money laundering (ML) schemes contain cross-border elements, which require 
crossborder international response to the problem. A number of initiatives have been established 
for dealing with the problem at the international level. This includes a growing array of cooperative 
techniques designed to create a platform for harmonisation and approximation of domestic and 
international anti-money laundering law. These techniques, aimed at creating an environment for 
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law enforcement and international cooperation, are intended to address the problem of ML, 
irrespective of the particular predicate criminal activity to which they may be applied.   
However, given the nature of the problem of ML and the intended legal response, the 
traditional approach to international law-making is limited and less effective as a method of 
creating the needed platform and atmosphere for effective law enforcement and international 
cooperation. The consequence of the combination of a non-traditional subject matter with the 
limitations of traditional international law instruments has meant that lawmakers, seeking 
international solution to the problems of ML, have had to innovate. This innovation has found 
expression in particular with soft law.  
A range of opinion exists on the theoretical and practical desirability of soft law. Some 
authors have long rejected formal distinctions between international law and policy; others 
acknowledged that the contemporary international law-making process is complex and deeply 
layered that there is a ‘brave new world of international law’ where “transnational actors, sources 
of law, allocation of decision function and modes of regulation have all mutated into fascinating 
hybrid forms. International Law now comprises a complex blend of customary, positive, 
declarative and soft law”.1  
Adopting a comparative study and drawing on the work of existing literature, the thesis seeks  
to distinguish itself from others by assessing the role of soft law as a technique to repress and 
prevent ML. The thesis addresses two fundamental issues in the context of existing international 
and domestic response to the problem of ML that remain largely uncovered by the other literature: 
the nature of the treaty obligations to criminalise ML and the role of soft law as a technique to 
repress and prevent ML. The thesis concludes that, international legal harmonisation and 
approximation of domestic antimoney laundering law through soft law remains useful to 
addressing the problem of ML.   
  
                                                     
1
 Koh, H., ‘A World Transformed’ (1995) 20 Yale J. Int’L. P.1x.  
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INTRODUCTION  
I. The significance of an International Anti-Money Laundering Control and the Challenges  
The aim of this thesis is to provide an assessment of soft law as a technique for repressive and 
preventive anti-money laundering control (hereinafter AMLC). The term repressive and 
preventive AMLC refers to the importance of an international response to money laundering 
(hereinafter ML), which centres on formal treaty obligations on state parties to criminalise and 
confiscate the proceeds of crime in their national law, followed by an informal non-treaty response 
to prevent it, through the regulation of financial and non-financial institutions. The use of the word 
‘repressive’ in the context of this thesis means to subdue or supress criminal ML activities by the 
use of penal legislation. However, before elaborating the precise research questions, it is necessary 
to introduce the significance of having an international response to ML, challenges with such an 
undertaking, and the concept of soft law.  
The term ML describes graphically the process by which dirty money (money obtained 
through crime) is cleansed so that it is, or at least appears to be legitimate money with no taint of 
its criminal origin.1 ML as a legal concept and legislation to combat ML is barely 25 years old, 
currently most states in the world now have legislation that criminalises ML and facilitates the 
recovery of the proceeds of crime. Criminal law has traditionally been the sovereign preserve of 
individual states and the global development of AML law and standards has been rapid and 
remarkable.  
Large-scale ML schemes, by its modus operandi, contain cross-border element. Since ML 
is an international problem, international co-operation is a critical necessity in the fight against it. 
A number of initiatives have been established for dealing with the problem at the international 
level. International organisations, such as the United Nations2 or the Basel  
                                                      
1
 R. Booth et al Money Laundering Law and Regulation (New York: OUP, 2011) p. 1.   
2
 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
(hereinafter Vienna Convention 1988), 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (hereinafter Palermo Convention), 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (hereinafter 
UNCAC).  
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Committee on Banking and Supervisory Practices3, took some initial steps at the end of the 1980s 
to address the problem. Following the creation of the Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter 
FATF)4 in 1989, regional groupings (e.g the Council of Europe5, and Organisation of American 
States6 etc) established AML standards for their member states. The Caribbean7, Asia8, Europe9 
and southern Africa10 have created regional AML task force-like organisations.  
The foregoing international AML initiatives (as would later be seen) are founded on two 
legal techniques: an initial formal treaty based criminal/repressive technique, followed by an 
informal preventive response.  Repressive and preventive AMLC is now referred to as the twin-
track approach11 to AMLC.   
Thus, with the advent of globalisation and the transformation in the structure of 
international law and politics, there is the demand for new governance structure to handle global 
challenges –like ML. The legitimacy of traditional inter-state, consent-based international law is 
increasingly being challenged by the newly emerged international legal landscape. Especially its  
                                                      
3
 See the History of the Basel Committee and its Membership in ≤www.bis.org/bcbs/history≥ last 
visited 23 September 2014.   
4
 What is FATF? Available at ≤http://www.fatf-gafi.org/≥ last visited on the 9 October 2014. The 
FATF have other regional or international like bodies, which perform similar functions for their 
members. These are Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Caribbean Financial Action 
Task Force (CFATF), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), 
Financial Action Task Force for South America (GAFISUD).  
Convention n 141 of 1991 from the Council of Europe (1990 Money Laundering Convention)  on  
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of 
Terrorism (2005 Council of Europe Convention against Money Laundering) available at ≤www.coe.int≥  
last visited on 2 October 2014; and EC Directive 91/308/EEC, OJ L166, 28.6.1991; EC Directive 
2001/97/EC, OJ L344, 28.12.2001; and EC Directive 2005/60/EEC, OJ L309, 25/11/2005.  
6
 The  Inter-American  Drug  Abuse  Control  Commission  (CICADOAS) 
 available  at  
≤www.cicad.oas.org/main/default_eng.asp≥ last visited on 10 September 2014.   
7
 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) available at ≤www.cfatf-gafic.org/≥ last visited 
on 10 September 2014.   
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) available at ≤www.apgml.org/≥ last visited on 
10 September 2014.   
  The Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) ≤www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/≥    visited on 
10 September 2014.  
10
   Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) available at  
≤www.esaamlg.org/≥.  Similar  bodies  are  now  available  for  West  Africa  available  at  
 
   For more on this concept see the works of T. Buranaruangote ‘Money Laundering Controls:  
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Evolution and Effective Solution to Organised Crime’ The London Institute of International Banking, 
Finance and Development Law Ltd. ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL & ECONOMIC LAW 
No.46 2003 at 37 and G. Stessens Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model 
(Cambridge: CUP 2008) p. 108.  
general principles such as in the differentiation between international and domestic affairs, the 
principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality and the certainty of hard law, are called into 
question, as they are not applicable to the newly emerged actors, which consequently often act 
within a sphere of legal uncertainty.2  
The thesis argues that the traditional approach to international law theory as a system of 
rules can no longer be sustained nor captured by the subtlety of the processes by which 
contemporary international law is created.3 The traditional link between state consent and legal 
obligation has largely been replaced by non-consensual norm-making. Treaty mechanisms, for 
example, are including more ‘soft’ obligations, such as undertakings to endeavour to strive to 
cooperate, 4  and non-binding instruments in turn are incorporating supervisory mechanisms 
traditionally found in hard law texts.5  
                                                     
2
 M. Wilke ‘Emerging Informal Network Structures in Global Governance: Inside the Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime’ NJIL 77(2008) at 509.  
3
 One of the leading conjectures for a positivist basis for international legal obligation is consent. Under 
this theory, the rules of international law become positive law when the will of the state consents to being 
bound by them either expressly or by implication. The doctrine of consent generally teaches that the 
common consent states voluntarily entering the international community gives international law its validity. 
Dionisio Anzilotti explained that, the duty to respect the obligations otherwise consented to was an absolute 
postulate of the international legal system. See Dionisio Anzilotti Corso di Diritto Internazionale (Lectures 
on International Law) in D. J. Bederman supra n 12, p 15. The notion of consent is supposed to be 
applicable, irrespective of the particular source of an international legal obligation. However, consent 
positivists have sharply disagreed on this point. Alf Ross, for example, observed that the “positivist theory 
takes it for granted that all International Law is conventional [treaty] law. . . and that all validity of 
International Law is in the last instance derived from a union of the wills of sovereign state” – Alf Rose  A 
Text-Book of International Law (London: Longmans, 1947) p. 94. However, the majority of view, dating 
as back as Vattel and Bynkershoek, is that state consent to international law norms need not be made in 
reference to written treaties but may be also manifested in regard to customary obligations. According to 
the proponents of this approach, because consent can be either express or tacit, a broader range of 
obligations can be made binding on states –See Emmerich de Vattel, “Law of Nations 316(1758) [Joseph 
Chitty trans., Philadelphia, 1863]. Consent certainly has been regarded as the most intelligible of positivist 
theories of obligation in international law. Nevertheless, it suffers from many of the same analytic failings 
its competitor. See Bederman supra p.14.  
4
 Article 2 Vienna Convention 1988 similarly calls on parties’ co-operation in the fight against drug related 
money laundering.   
5
 Environmental soft law is quite often important for this reason, setting standards of best practice or due 
diligence to be achieved by the parties in implementing their obligations These ‘ecostandards’ are essential 
in giving hard content to the overly-general and open-textured terms of framework environmental treaties. 
See P. Contini and P. H. Sand ‘Methods to Expedite Environmental Protection: International Ecostandards’ 
66 (1972) American Journal of International Law 37.   
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The legal nature of soft law, and equally its relationship with treaties, is far from clear. In 
particular, the expansion in recent years of certain types of treaties (for example, in the field of 
environmental protection) has given rise to international agreements that contain not only  
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specific obligations, but also vague provisions of an ambiguous nature which do not impose  
‘hard’ (absolute) obligations on states. As Boyle explains, some treaties may generate only 
principles but not rules, which do not have the strength of hard law. Such a treaty “may be 
potentially normative, but still ‘soft’ in character, because it articulates ‘principles’ rather than 
‘rules’”.6  
The study is thus, considering two interrelated issues: (1) the nature of the international  
AML treaty obligations, (2) the role/function of ‘soft law’ as a technique for preventive and 
repressive AMLC. This is because soft law signifies one of two things: informal obligations or 
principles and not rules.  The point on ‘soft law’ is relevant to this enquiry, since Shelton has 
suggested that, “recent inclusion of soft law commitments in hard law instruments suggests that 
both form and content are relevant to the sense of legal obligation”.7 The focus of the enquiry is 
therefore on the role of soft law as a technique for repressive and preventive AMLC.  
I.I.  The rule versus principle debate in legal discuss  
The thesis conceives rules as specific prescriptions, principles as unspecific or vague, and 
therefore soft law. The distinction is important, as the theory advanced in this thesis is that, AML 
treaty obligations are legal principles and not rules. A central reason for this is that the obligations 
to criminalise ML, under relevant conventions8 are expressed broadly and only refer to the process 
of laundering and not to a specific act of ML. It is argued that consistency in a complex domain 
like ML can be better realised by an appropriate mix of formal and informal obligations, than by 
                                                     
6
 A. Boyle ‘Some Reflections on Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, in V. Gowland-Debbas  
(ed) Multilateral Treaty-making: The Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in the 
International Legislative Process (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) p. 32. The 1992 Convention on 
Climate Change provides a good example of such principles explicitly included in a treaty. (for example 
Article 3 (Principles): ‘in their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its 
provisions, the parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following: 1) The Parties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities; 2) The Parties should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effect; 
3) The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development).  See also A. Boyle and C. 
Chinkin The Making of International Law (New York, OUP 2007) p. 221.  
7
 D. Shelton Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal 
System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 4.  
8
 Articles 3 of the Vienna Convention and 6 of the Palermo Convention.  
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treaties alone. A key choice here is between formal treaty obligations expressed as principles and 
non-binding informal obligation.    
For some influential lawyers, law means quite simply decisions according to rules. One 
is United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia: “A government of laws means a 
government of rules. Today’s decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive power is 
ungoverned by rule and hence ungoverned by law”.9 Philip Selznick conceives the crux of the rule 
of law in a more complex way to be the restraint of state power by “rational principles of civic 
order”.20 Principles are important on this view that “the proper aim of the legal order, and the 
special contribution of legal scholarship, is to minimise the arbitrary element in legal norms and 
decisions”.10   
Since Aristotle, it has been understood that precision in this pursuit can be selfdefeating: 
“our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of, for 
precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions”.11  
Ronald Dworkin sees rules as “applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion” when they are 
crafted to exhaustively include all their exceptions. According to him, “If the facts a rule stipulates 
are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it 
is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision”.12 Dworkin, in contrast, sees legal 
principles, as not setting out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions 
provided are met. A principle states a reason that argues in one direction, but it does not prescribe 
a particular decision. Since principles have less specificity in this way, unlike rules, principles can 
conflict. Decision makers assigning weight to principles resolves such conflicts: “it is an integral 
part of the concept of a principle that it has this dimension, that  
                                                     
9
 Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) cited in J Braithwaite ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal 
Certainty’, Australia Journal of Legal Philosophy, 27 (2002) pp. 47-82.  
P. Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice 11 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1969) cited in 
Braithwaite above.  
10
 Ibid at 3.  
11
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, (W. Ross trans., 1940), Bk. 1, ch 3 at 10946.  
12
 R. M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules 35 (1967) U. CHI. L. REV. 25. 24  
 Ibid, at 27.  
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it makes sense to ask how important or how weighty it is”.24 Joseph Raz25 and Frederick 
Schauer 1314  have attacked Dworkin’s basis for the distinction. They argue that the logical 
difference between rules and principles has nothing to do with the possibility of conflict or the 
ways such conflicts are resolved.15 For Raz, “rules prescribe relatively specific acts; principles 
prescribe highly unspecific actions”.16   
The specificity of rules is fairly common ground among leading positivists. For example, 
Campbell emphasises that rules “must not be general in the sense of being vague or unspecific”.17 
Specificity, clarity and mutual consistency are seen as things that automatically go together. Hart 
points out that rules have a core meaning and a penumbra where their meaning is more uncertain. 
The more complex and changing the phenomenon being regulated, the wider that penumbra is 
likely to be.18 According to the learned author, principles are relatively to rules, broad, general, or 
unspecific, in the sense that often what would be regarded as a number of distinct rules can be 
exhibited as the exemplifications or instantiations of a single principle.19   
According to Braithwaite, a principle of environmental regulation like ‘continuous improvement’ 
can imply an infinitely creative range of action possibilities; a rule preventing the dumping of 
chemical X relates only to that action.20 This much is common ground between Raz,  
Schauer and Dworkin and is also a conception “which accounts for the non-legal use of these 
terms”.33    
For the purpose of this thesis, we focus on this common ground, which is that rules are 
specific and principle less specific or vague, and therefore soft law. I would want to persist with 
this claim for the rest of the thesis, and this means restating the key claim in my introduction, 
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 J. Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, (1972) 81 YALE L. J. 823.  
14
 F. Schauer, ‘Prescriptions in Three Dimensions’, (1997) 82 IOWA L. REV. 914.  
15
 Braithwaite supra note 21 at 5.  
16
 Raz supra note 25, at 838. Hart alluded to this point in p 29.  
17
 T. Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) cited in Braithwaite 
above ft 22.  
18
 Hart The Concept of Law in J. Braithwaite ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’, (2002) 
27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, at 10.  
19
 H. L. A. Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2ed, 1994) p. 259.  
20
 Braithwaite supra note 27 at 6. 33  
 Raz supra note 25 at 834.  
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which is that certain treaties may generate only principles but not rules, which do not have the 
strength of hard law. Such a treaty “may be potentially normative, but still ‘soft’ in character, 
because it articulates ‘principles’ rather than ‘rules’”.   
The scholarly writing that some treaties may generate only principles but not rules, which 
do not have the strength of hard law, has piqued the above interest in the choice between rules 
and principles in the rule of law. Such a treaty, as earlier noted by Boyle, “may be potentially 
normative, but still ‘soft’ in character, because it articulates ‘principles’ rather than ‘rules’”.21 I 
exemplify the reason for this by suggesting that soft law, in the form of principles, can function 
as vehicle for focusing consensus on the treaty obligations to criminalise ML and for mobilising 
a consistent general response for repressive and preventive AMLC. The reason for this is that it is 
not possible to capture every predicate offence22 of ML in a single-rule based treaty obligation, as 
most states would prefer a situation where the law can be individuated to reflect their domestic 
AML legislation. Moreover, the policies and strategies against ML have as one of their prime 
objectives: the creation of an atmosphere of consensus regarding the AML measures to be 
implemented. This is in view of the fact that, the international AML law is not a universal 
homogeneous bloc, but is composed of several layers, some of which are universal and other 
regional.  
I.I.I.  The Research Question for the Thesis  
The phrase ‘ML’ brings to mind thoughts of an intriguing but reprehensible underworld.23 It 
conjures up images of the Italian and Russian Mafia, the Colombian Cartels, terrorist groups, 
illegal gambling operations, and white-collar crime. The phrase, however, does not portray the 
sophistication, the breadth, and incongruities of the legal regime in the area.  
ML law is a complex legal field. It is a junction point for criminal law, regulatory law, 
banking law, international criminal law and administrative and criminal procedure. Each of these 
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 Boyle supra note 16.  
22
 The predicate offence for the Vienna Convention is Drug Trafficking, whilst for that of the Palermo 
Convention, is Organised Crime. This is also different in the various domestic legislations of member states.  
23
 H. Shams Legal Globilisation: Money laundering law and Other Cases (BIICL, 2004) p. 1.  
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branches has its own concepts, problems, theories, and methods. In approaching the subject matter 
of AML law, one can be viewed as having two choices: either to treat the subject as a sui generis 
law or to approach it from within one of the areas of the law that it touches upon.24The first 
approach tends to generate technical studies that are useful for their purposes.25The second 
approach tends to produce technical or in depth analysis of certain aspects of the law in terms of 
the field concerned.26  
While these approaches to the study of the subject remains useful, current analyses of an 
AML law falls short of providing the conceptual framework that permits a better understanding 
of a twin-track approach that is based on repressing laundering offence and preventing it from 
entering into the legal economy. The twin-track approach to AML control represents a repressive 
technique that is based on criminalisation and a preventive technique that is based on obligations 
of financial and non-financial institutions to undertake certain measures to disclose ML operations 
and to identify the ‘beneficial ownership’ of the object of crime. Both techniques are currently at 
the heart of recent international efforts to combat ML, as the initial attempt to criminalise ML 
through international treaties, has gathered momentum through an international collaborative 
effort to identify both the perpetrators and beneficiary/beneficiaries of the crime.      
In the absence of such conceptual framework, the study of AML law will remain 
fragmented and limited to the individual subject areas that it touches. This thesis is thus an attempt 
to fill this gap in the study of AML law. It endeavours to provide a theoretical explanation that 
helps to identify the nature of the international AML treaty obligations and highlights the 
relevance of soft law as a technique for repressive and preventive AMLC. It is only through such 
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 Ibid.   
25
 See R. Booth et al supra note 1.  
26
 For the criminal justice perspective including substantive criminal law, criminal law enforcement, and 
international criminal cooperation see G. Stessens supra note 11. For a corporate and commercial law 
perspective see P. B. H. Birks (ed) Laundering and Tracing (Oxford OUP, 2003). For a discussion from an 
international law angle see B. Simmons International Efforts against Money Laundering in D. Shelton (ed) 
supra note 17, Shams supra note 36. For practitioners and regulators see R.  
Fox et al A Practitioner’s Guide to UK Money Laundering Law and Regulation: A Practical Guide (London 
Thomson Reuters, 2010). See also J. DʼSouza Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion 
(Florida CRC Press, 2012), J. Blum et al Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering 
available at ≤www.caerdydd.ac.uk/socsi/resources/levi-laundering.pdf≥ last visited on 9 of October 2014 
and Hatchard et al Corruption and Misuse of Public Office (2nd ed. OUP, 2011).  
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theoretical analysis that the role of soft law as a tool for legal harmonisation and approximation 
of domestic AML law in the fight against ML can be better examined.  
The thesis will focus on the role of soft law as a technique for repressive and preventive 
AMLC. Based on current analyses of the role of soft law as an alternative to hard law or as a 
complement to hard law, (leading to greater cooperation) it attempts to outline the possible 
advantages and disadvantages that soft law could have in the context of AMLC. For example, the 
use of soft law promotes harmonisation of international AML standards through the FATF, while 
the role of the FATF remains unclear in international law. This is important for the purpose of 
responsibility, as the law on state responsibility clearly states when a State is responsible, in the 
event of a breach, and the consequence in international law.27   
The thesis also seeks to identify factors specific to AMLC that might be important for the 
role of soft law. For example, it is suggested that, the internationalisation and supranationalisation 
of ML have been driven by the belief that only through legal harmonisation and approximation of 
national law can the legal and regulatory loopholes be closed against the exploitation by 
transnational criminals. In the light of the foregoing, soft law is seen as a tool for legal and 
regulatory AMLC, given the territoriality of the criminal and sovereignty of nation.    
At the end, based on the assessment of soft law as a technique for AMLC, the thesis will 
propose a unification and progressive development of AML law under the aegis of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. It is hoped that by bringing the law under the aegis of 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, attempt would be made at progressive and 
systematic development of the law, which could then be used to address the current imbalance 
between what is classified as existing and emerging ML threats. This is important as current 
arrangements only highlight the danger of ML in such areas, as drug trafficking, corruption and  
certain transnational organised crime, with less emphasis on the peculiar needs of the individual 
state. Besides, the current work of the FATF is limited to the mandate given to it at any given 
time, and prioritises only certain typologies. A global AMLC should not only prioritise ML 
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 See M. N. Shaw International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 694.  
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typologies from Europe and America but should accommodate typologies from other regions of 
the world.   
I.V.  Methodology  
In addition to assessing the role of soft law as a tool for preventive and repressive AMLC, this 
thesis focuses heavily on understanding the nature of international AML law-making process. The 
approach toward this question is interdisciplinary and looks at the treaty and non-treaty AML 
obligations through a prism of two theoretical lenses (Legal positivism and liberal/legal process 
theory) in order to explain the role of soft law in the area. The approach suggested is that, whereas 
positivists take a narrow view of law as rules that regulate and constraint state behaviour, legal 
process scholars see law as facilitating and enabling international relations by providing modes 
of cooperation and legitimation, which is crucial to regulating ML.28  Legal process theory seeks 
to situate law in the political context, thus law is not simply a system of rules to regulate state 
behaviour, but rather it is part of international policymaking processes. As Rosalyn Higgins, 
formerly of the London School of Economics and now judge of the International Court of Justice 
puts it: “[t]his view rejects the notion of law merely as the impartial application of rules. 
International law is the entire decision-making process”.29 This view therefore recognise the role 
of soft law in the decision making process; i.e., as a form of quasi-legal technical and policy 
agreements that prescribe behaviour for states, bureaucracies and private actors, but which are 
not, strictly speaking binding.43  
The literatures considered in this thesis therefore provide two interdisciplinary lenses 
through which to view the nature of the international AML treaty obligations and the role/function 
of ‘soft law’ as a technique for preventive and repressive AMLC. In generating each lens, we first 
conjure sources listed in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, and from these identify the points of 
agreement that form that interdisciplinary approach to the study of soft law, and in effect AMLC. 
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 D. Armstrong et al International Law and International Relations (New York: 2nd ed. CUP 2012) p. 97.  
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 R. Higgins, ‘Policy, consideration and the international judicial process’, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 17 (1968), 58 cited in D. Armstrong et al p. 93. 43  D. Armstrong supra p. 99.  
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We employ the foregoing interdisciplinary approach to develop our concept of soft law by taking 
the formal and informal divide to explain our framework type of soft law and a further evaluation 
based on certain characteristics that vary along a continuum to amplify this concept.       
In addition, since the research question of the thesis aims at assessing the role of soft law 
as a technique for repressive and preventive AMLC, the research will generally involve two 
different areas of law, namely, international law and ML. The primary focus is, however, on the 
assessment of soft law arguments raised in the field of international law scholarship to a particular 
area of law – the treaty AML obligations and informal AML arrangements.   
A theoretical literature review concerning soft law from the perspective of international 
law is important not only for defining the scope of the subject matter, but also for setting out a 
conceptual frame-work for an assessment of soft law as a technique for AMLC in later chapters. 
With this in mind, the thesis takes the view that international law performs a broad range of 
functions. Whereas, positivists take a narrow view of law as rules that regulate and constraint state 
behaviour, legal process scholars see law as facilitating and enabling international relations by 
providing modes of communication, legitimation, cooperation etc. This resonates with the rest of 
the thesis and restates the earlier claim that the international AML law is not just a universal 
homogeneous bloc, but is composed of several layers, some of which are universal and other 
regional.   
After examining available literature on soft law, the thesis develops a framework type of 
soft law largely based on binary categories between formal/treaty and informal/non-treaty based 
AML obligations. The framework makes it clear what category of soft law (formal or informal) 
elements utilised in the area of AMLC will be examined in relation to its assessment as a technique 
for regulating ML.   
 The literature will cover all major international and regional AML instruments that are relevant. 
Besides existing AML instruments in force, the study will also examine the possibility of 
including other AML typologies that are currently not included in the existing formal and informal 
AML instruments. The limited time and resources available also leads to a methodology that 
confines the research work to drawing out relevant factors purely based on analysing the formal 
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and informal AML obligation rather than empirical study of a particular typology or jurisdiction. 
As a result, the research is limited owing to the absence of quantifying the role of soft law in 
domestic AML perspective.  
  
Outline of the Thesis  
Besides the introduction and the conclusion, the thesis will be divided into three parts and six 
chapters.  
 The first part is Chapter 1, which mainly involves a theoretical analysis taking the perspective 
formal and informal divide to explain our framework type of soft law. This part includes not only 
a definition of ‘soft law’ and an analysis of the concept, but also it sets out a background for 
studying the role of soft law for the rest of the thesis.   
 The second part of the thesis comprises Chapters 2-6. This part examines the current international 
AML initiatives and focuses on the repressive and preventive AMLC.   
 Chapter 2 examines the history and development of the international AML regime, and its 
emergence from an initial treaty obligation to criminalise ML, the later internationalisation of ML 
and supranationalisation through the work of the FATF.  
 Chapter 3 examines the nature and role of existing repressive AML instruments: the Vienna 
Convention 1988, the Palermo Convention, the 1990 Money Laundering Convention, the 
UNCAC and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention against Money Laundering. It conceives 
the role of repressive AMLC in light of the obligations to criminalise the offence and confiscation 
of the proceeds of crime.  
 Chapter 4 also examines the nature and role of the preventive AML instruments: the FATF, the 
Basel Committee on Banking and Supervisory Practices, the various EC Directives and other 
initiatives in the area. It elaborates on the informal nature of the preventive AML arrangements 
and their role.  
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 Chapter 5 highlights the role of Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as a tool for informal 
cooperation under existing arrangements. It demonstrates the new and emerging method of 
international evidence gathering through soft law, and the role of the FIU in the prevention and  
repression of ML.    
Chapter 6 is concerned with the internationalisation of ML and the jurisdictional 
consequences. The chapter explore this development by looking at the relative importance of 
criminalisation as a treaty-based initiative and the subsequent development of the law as the legal 
basis for asserting jurisdiction.  
 The third part is the conclusion. The conclusion examines the role of soft law as a tool for legal 
harmonisation, and the relevance of this to the prevention and repression of ML. The conclusion 
also proposes a unification and progressive development of AML law under the aegis of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law and suggests a new Hague type convention for ML.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CHAPTER ONE  
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I.  Identifying Soft Law  
As formulated in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ),30 
the Court should decide an international dispute primarily through application of international 
conventions and international custom. This remains the same under Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ)45. Even though the Statute is directed at the 
Court, it represents a general text in which states have articulated the authoritative procedures by 
which they agree to be legally bound to an international norm. Treaties and custom must therefore, 
be recognised by scholars and other non-state actors as the means states have chosen to create 
international legal obligations for themselves.  
However, the question is whether it is possible to explain the product of contemporary 
international law-making processes within the terms of Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
The greater number of multilateral instruments containing compulsory or optional dispute 
resolution clauses has ensured that judicial tribunals have had greater opportunity both to amplify 
the understanding of how international law derives from the sources listed in Article 38(1) of the 
ICJ Statute and to have developed substantive rules and principles.31 For example, the political 
processes involved in the creation of international courts and the negotiation of dispute settlement 
clauses in treaties significantly affect the discretion left to adjudicate in determining the 
substantive law they are to apply. The widest discretion is accorded by Article 38(2) of the Statute 
of the ICJ, which envisages that with agreement of the parties the Court may decide a case ex 
aequo et bono – in effect a decision not necessarily based on legal rules.  
Although the above choice has never been exercised, states have sometimes agreed that a 
dispute will be adjudicated on the basis of rules that are not yet law. Thus in the Tunisia–Libya 
Continental Shelf case the compromise provided that the Court would apply international law 
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 Available at ≤www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2≥ visited on 2 October 2014. General principles 
of law are a third, more rarely used, source of international law, with judicial decisions and teachings of 
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 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin The Making of International Law (New York OUP, 2007) p. 272.  
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including the recent trends admitted at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.32 The 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS) makes reference for 
this purpose to “generally accepted international rules and standards established through the 
competent international organisation or general diplomatic conference”.33The applicable law here 
include related treaties and soft law instruments, which set standards with which the parties to the 
principal treaty are required to conform.   
This is perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the ICJ’s reference to 
sustainable development in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam. 34  Even if 
sustainable development is not in the nature of a legal obligation, it does represent a policy goal 
or principle that can influence the outcome of litigation and the practice of states and international 
organisations, and it may lead to significant changes and developments in the existing law.35 In 
the foregoing sense, international law appears to require states and international bodies to take 
account of the objective of sustainable development, and to establish appropriate processes for 
doing so. What these examples show is that subtle changes in the existing law and in existing 
treaties may come about through the application of non-legal measures.  
The legal positivist,36 seeking rules deriving from state consent will tend to adhere to 
recognisable sources of authority, treaties and custom, and will give weight to those other sources 
identified in the Statute of the ICJ, Article 38(1). However, the adherent to the New Haven (Yale) 
policy science approach to international law focuses not on rules but explicitly on the processes 
by which legal decisions and policies are made.37Unlike the positivist view, under  
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 Article 211 (2). See also Article 207, 208, and 210.  
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 Hungary v. Slovakia (1997) ICJ Reports 7, para 140.  
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the New Haven approach the decision-making process that generates international law is not 
limited to states or the actions of states officials. Instead, it looks at “the aggregate actual decision 
process, comprised, as it is, of governments, inter-governmental organisations, nongovernmental 
organisations. . . [a]ll the actors, who assess, retrospectively or prospectively, the lawfulness of 
international actions and whose consequent reactions shape the flow of events, now constitute, in 
sum, the international legal decision process.”38  
In 2004, in its Report on the United Nations (UN) Reform, 39the High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change called for the development of international regimes and norms, 
and of new legal mechanisms where existing ones were deemed inadequate for responding to the 
threats to collective security that it had identified. In this thesis, we commence our discussion by 
examining soft law as a form of international law-making process, in response to the particular 
threat of global ML. However, before examining the role of soft law in the context of international 
AMLC, it may be helpful to identify the subject of soft law in international law.   
According to Dupuy the term ‘soft law’ was coined by McNair, and since the 1970’s has 
become relatively widespread and controversial at the same time.40 Opinions, however, abound 
on the legal nature of soft law in international law, and jurists have come up with different 
interpretations of soft law. Some restrict the term soft law to norms in legally binding form, 
usually created by treaties but with vague content or weak requirements,56 while others 
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concentrate on the non-legal form of the instrument, such as declaration,4142 resolutions,58 codes 
of conduct43 and recommendations.44   
In addition, there is a considerable disagreement in the existing literature on the definition 
of soft law. Positivist legal scholars tend to deny the very concept of ‘soft law’ since law by 
definition, for them, is ‘binding’. According to Klabber “law cannot be more or less binding, so 
that the soft law concept is logically flawed”.45 Weil takes a normative approach, arguing that the 
increasing use of soft law represents a shift pursuant to which international law norms vary in 
their relative normativity, and he finds that this trend “might well destabilise the whole 
international normative systems and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its 
purpose”.46  
Positivist legal scholars find that soft law is inferior to hard law because it lacks formally 
binding obligations, which are interpreted and enforced by courts, and it thus fails to generate 
jurisprudence over time.47 For this reason, these scholars view soft law as a secondbest alternative 
to hard law, either as a way station on the way to hard law, or as a fall back   
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when hard law approaches fail.48 John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock, for example, in a volume 
regarding the use of hard and soft law in global trade, environment, and social governance, found 
“strong support for the familiar feeling that soft law is a second-best substitute for a firstbest hard 
law, being created when and because the relevant hard law does not exist and the 
intergovernmental negotiations to produce it have failed”.49  
 Rational institutionalist scholar’s response was that, “the term binding agreement [in international 
affairs] is a misleading hyperbole”. 50  They nonetheless find that the language of ‘binding 
commitments’ matter because through it states signal the seriousness of their commitments, so 
noncompliance entails greater reputational costs.67 Guzman opined that, “an agreement is soft law 
if it is not a formal treaty”. 51He finds that states rationally choose soft law because they wish to 
reduce the cost to their reputation of potentially violating the soft law in light of uncertainty.69  
Abbott and Snidal, taking a rational institutionalist political economy approach, focus on 
varying states interests in different contexts. They contend that, states sometimes prefer hard law 
and sometimes prefer soft law to advance their joint policy aims. In their work on ‘pathways to 
cooperation’, they nonetheless define three pathways, two of which explicitly involve the 
progressive hardening of soft law.52 The three pathways are the use of a framework convention, 
which subsequently deepens in the precision of its coverage; the use of a plurilateral agreement, 
which subsequently broadens in its membership; and the use of a soft-law instrument, which 
subsequently leads to binding legal commitments.53  
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 Constructivist scholars, in contrast, focus less on the binding nature of law at the enactment stage 
and more on the effectiveness of law at the implementation stage, addressing the gap between the 
law-in-the-books and the law-in-action. They note how even domestic law varies in terms of its 
impact on behaviour, so that binary distinctions between binding hard law and nonbinding soft 
law are illusory.54 However, constructivist, like legal process theory, acknowledge the broad 
functions of international law and consistent with legal process theory, international law is 
conceived in terms of a process involving transnational networks of governmental and non-
governmental actors.73This view permits the role of soft law in authoritative decision-making 
process.  
There are, thus, scholars who evaluate hard and soft law in terms of a binary binding/non-
binding distinction and those who evaluate it based on characteristics that vary along a 
continuum.74 The difference between these scholars depends on whether they address 
international law primarily from an ex post enforcement perspective or an ex ante negotiating one. 
From an ex post enforcement perspective, legal positivists are right when they state that, to a 
judge, a given instrument is either legally binding or non-binding. However, from an ex ante 
negotiation perspective, actors have choices that, in practice, can render agreements relatively 
more or less binding in the ways Abbott and Snidal note.55   
In this thesis, we take an interdisciplinary approach to the study of soft law. First, we take 
the positivist perspective (binding and non-binding) to highlight the difference between hard and 
soft law. However, we employ the term formal and informal to explain our framework type of 
soft law, building on Abbott and Snidal evaluation (based on certain characteristics that vary along 
a continuum) to amplify this concept. The reason for such an interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of soft law is that resort must be taken of the various ways in which soft law can be captured 
in international agreements. In examining the role of soft law, attention must be given to the 
                                                     
54
 D. Trubek et al ‘Soft Law, Hard Law and EU Integration, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN 
THE EU AND THE US’ cited in Shaffer and Pollack supra note 65  at 713. 73   D. Armstrong et al 
supra note 41 pp. 109-110. 74   Shaffer and Pollack supra at 715.  
55
 K. W. Abbott et al ‘The Concept of Legalisation’ (2000) 54 INT’L ORG cited Shaffer and Pollack. See 
below p. 27 for more on this concept.  
      39  
  
interaction between different types of instruments as well as between hard law and soft law 
instruments. In agreement with scholars from legal process theory, we acknowledge the fact that 
international law fulfils a broad range of functions permitting states and other actors to 
communicate and cooperate thereby situating law in broader socio-political context beyond rule-
based obligation.   
Thus, hard law in this thesis refers to formally binding rules that create definitive rights 
or obligations on the parties. This definition only applies to international agreements56 and not to 
customary international law or general principles of law. Norms in these latter categories are either 
international law or not, depending on whether the norm in question meets the relevant mark of 
identification.57 Soft law, in comparison to hard law, is defined as rules of conduct formulated in 
formal or informal instruments, which lack certain core elements of hard law. As rules of conduct 
formulated in informal instruments, they are characterised as non-binding, emanating from bodies 
lacking international law-making authority, directed at non-state and are of a voluntary nature 
with no corresponding theory of responsibility in international law. However, the reverse is the 
case with soft law formulated in formal instruments, as the distinguishing mark between soft law 
in this category and hard law is the fact that they contain vague and imprecise terms.58   
An obligation is, therefore, soft law in the sense that either it adopts an 
informal/nonbinding form or it contains vague, imprecise or ambiguous provisions embodying 
merely a language that is hortatory, aspirational or promotional in character. The foregoing 
definition of soft law underscore the type of instruments employed in the preventive and 
repressive AMLC. The chapter will thus, develop a framework type of soft law along the 
foregoing line, which will then be employed when assessing the type of instrument in the 
international AMLC, in later chapters. Apart from developing a framework type of soft law, the 
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chapter will also examine the reason for the choice of soft law to hard law in international 
commitments. The aim here is to demonstrate the inappropriateness of hard law in certain 
situations. For example, soft law may be preferred to hard law, where the latter is inappropriate 
or an effective response to the issue is not yet identified in the area.   
Lastly, the chapter will address the benefit of soft law as a tool for compromise, since the 
adoption of soft law instrument will help to ease some of the problems associated with hard law 
obligation. This section will therefore illustrate the benefits of soft law to hard as a technique for 
international AMLC.   
  
Formal Soft Law  
  
The concept of formal soft law refers to treaty provisions that do not tend to create definitive 
obligations, despite their legally binding form, but are rather imprecise or flexible in character. 
This was the point noted by Baxter when he argued that some treaties are soft in the sense that 
they impose no real obligations on the parties.59 Boyle is more poignant on this point when he 
stated that clear and reasonably specific rules are hard law, while ‘norm’ or ‘principle’, which are 
open textured or general in their content and wording, are seen as soft law.80 Scholars holding 
such view persist that “the conclusion of an agreement in treaty form does not ensure that a hard 
obligation has been incurred”.60 Treaties with imprecise, subjective, or indeterminate language 
have been termed ‘legal soft law’ in that they fuse legal form with soft obligations.61  Some writers 
however, reject this claim arguing that the treaty form is conclusive binding obligation.62 Opinions 
like this would find support in Article 26 of the VCLT, 1969, where the legal form of a treaty 
under the convention is conclusive of its binding nature upon the parties.63 A compromise position 
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is that a treaty with soft provisions creates an obligation of good faith performance,64 although 
this is barely borne out by state practice.   
  The foregoing observation is represented in a growing number of treaty provisions.   
The framework Convention on Climate Change provides a good example. Adopted at the Rio 
Conference in 1992, this treaty does impose some commitments on the parties, but its core articles, 
dealing with policies and measures to tackle greenhouse gas emissions, are so cautiously and 
obscurely worded and so weak that it is uncertain whether any real obligations are created.65 
Moreover, whatever commitments have been undertaken by developing states are also conditional 
on performance of solidarity commitments by developed state parties to provide funding and 
transfer of technology.66 More of a political bargain than a legal one, these are ‘soft’ undertakings 
of a very fragile kind. They are not normative and cannot be described as creating ‘hard rules’ in 
any meaningful sense.67 This is a point recognised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Case when it specified that one of the conditions to be met before 
a treaty could be regarded as law-making is that it should be so drafted as to be ‘potentially 
normative’ in character.89  
 There is, however, a second and more significant sense in which a treaty, like a nonbinding 
resolution or declaration, may be potentially normative, but still ‘soft’ in character, because it 
articulate ‘principles’ rather than ‘rule’. Here, it is the formulation of the provision which is 
decisive in determining whether it is hard or soft, not its form as a treaty or binding instrument. 
An example of a soft formulation, which nevertheless has binding form is, Article  
87(2) of the 1982 UNCLOS, providing that high seas freedoms “shall be exercised by all states 
with due regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas”.  
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What is meant by ‘due regard’ for the interests of other states will necessarily depend on the 
particular circumstances of each case and in that sense the provision is more of a ‘principle’ than 
a ‘rule’.68  
  The Convention on Climate Change once again provides other good examples of such  
principles explicitly included in a major treaty. Indeed, given how week the rest of the treaty is, 
the principles found in Article 3 are arguably the most important ‘law’ in the whole agreement 
because they prescribe how the regime for regulating climate change is to be developed by the 
parties. The main elements of this provision provides thus:  
  “In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, the  
parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:  
1. The Parties should protect the climate systems for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities . . .   
2. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimise the 
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects . . .  
3. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. . .”  
These elements of Article 3 are not expressed in obligatory term: the use of ‘should’ 
qualifies their application. The obligations are open-textured in the sense that there is considerable 
uncertainty concerning their specific content and they leave room for interpretation and 
elaboration. They are not like rules requiring states to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment, or to prevent harm to other states.69  
 In addition, certain treaties whereby states enter into alliance, agree to co-ordinate their military 
action, declare the neutrality of an area, or lay out their agreed policies for the future have 
sometimes been characterised as ‘political treaties’.92 They are referred to as soft law, as  
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they are merely political agreements and concluded with no expectation of effective enforcement. 
The most quoted in this category are the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Yalta Agreement.70  According to Dupuy, 
that an agreement is soft or hard law does not refer to the formally binding character of the 
instrument. Here the ‘softness’ of the instrument corresponds to the ‘softness’ of its contents.71  
Informal Soft Law  
Apart from the above classification of soft law, states may deliberately eschew the form of legally 
binding treaty form and reach agreement in diverse non-treaty form, such as memoranda of 
understanding, joint communiqués, minutes, or gentlemen’s agreements.72 A variety of motives 
influences the choice of form in this context. Participants may choose informal or nonbinding 
agreement to avoid national legal requirements for the incorporation of treaties, or international 
provisions relating to treaties, such as registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, Article 
102. The choice also may reflect the need for ease of amendment and terminations,73 or a desire 
simply to buy time.   
Soft law under this category is represented in several agreements. For example, the 
Helsinki Final Act74  was deliberately drafted as a legally non-binding document,75  although 
reliance upon it through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),76 and 
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especially by non-state actors, far exceeded that accorded to binding instruments. In this example, 
the Heads of State a77nd other ‘High Representatives’ of thirty-five countries signed the texts, 
covering sixty printed pages, after declaring in the last paragraph “their determination to act in 
accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts”.100 Another paragraph, among the 
final clauses, requests the Government of Finland to transmit to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations the text of the Final Act “which is not eligible for registration under 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations”.78 This clause was further clarified by a letter 
sent by the Government of Finland to the Secretary-General of the United Nations stating that the 
Final Act is not eligible for registration under Article 102 “as would be the case were it a matter 
of a treaty or an international agreement, under the aforesaid Articles”.79 Statements by delegates 
during the Conference, notably by the United States and other Western delegations expressed their 
understanding that the Final Act did not involve a ‘legal’ commitment and was not intended to be 
binding upon the signatory powers.   
An important observation, in relation to the Helsinki Act, is that the parties did not intend 
for the agreement to be formally binding, as would a treaty. Put more formally, a treaty or 
international agreement is said to require an intention by the parties to create legal rights and 
obligations or to establish relations governed by international law. If that intention does not exist, 
an agreement is considered to be without legal effect.80  
 Of similar importance in this category is the 1993 Middle East peace process, reactivated by a 
political agreement between Israel and the PLO. Although the Declaration of Principles on Interim 
Self-Government Arrangements in many ways mirrored a Peace Treaty, the lack of Palestinian 
statehood ensured the Declaration’s non-treaty status.81  
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 During the 1990s, a multiplicity of non-binding instruments in the form of declarations, agendas, 
programs, and platforms for action emanated from global conferences.82 The subject matter of 
83these conferences – human rights, population, environment, development, human habitation, the 
empowerment of women – could suggest that issues of social justice are deemed by states perhaps 
too intrusive into domestic jurisdiction to be the subject of binding obligations. Despite high 
governmental participation in the conferences and preparatory meetings, the normative weight of 
the final conference documents were uncertain.84 Usually, they have been adopted only after 
heated negotiations, and have been subject to reservations and interpretive statements, a 
development somewhat inconsistent with their non-binding character. 85  The texts are both 
declaratory and programmatic, targeting governments, international organisations, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) for future actions.   
They cut across established legal categories in ways that may shape future international legal 
discourse. 86  NGO fora have been held parallel to each of these conferences, attended by 
representatives of international NGOs, ensuring maximum publicity for the official proceedings.   
Perhaps the most controversial claimants to international soft law status are those that 
emanate neither directly or indirectly from states but are nonetheless intended to modify 
transnational behaviour. Private norm-making initiatives such as the MacBride and Sullivan 
Principles, statements of principles from individuals in non-governmental capacity, 87  texts 
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prepared by experts groups,88 the establishment of ‘people’ tribunals,89 and self-regulating codes 
of conduct for networks of professional peoples90 and multilateral corporations come within this 
category. The use of the non-legal form is dictated by lack of formal law-making capacity and the 
impact of a non-binding text depends upon the political and economic interests of the relevant 
players.  
Soft Law as Continuum between Hardness and Softness of Norms  
Allied to the foregoing categorisations of soft law is Abbott, Keohane, Moravesik, Slaughter and 
Snidal definition of legalisation in international relations.91 The approach adopted was to illustrate 
the wide variety of international legal arrangements by developing a typology that characterises 
different instruments in terms of their precision, binding legal obligation and delegation along a 
continuum.    
Legalisation is thus, defined as varying across three dimensions – precision of rules, 
obligation and delegation to a third party decision maker – which taken together can give laws a 
‘harder’ or ‘softer’ legal character.92 In this respect, hard law “refers to legally binding obligations 
that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed 
regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law”.93  
In contrast, to this ideal type of hard law, soft law is defined as a residual capacity: “the 
realm of ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the 
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation”.116 Thus, if an agreement is not formally 
binding, it is soft law along one dimension. Similarly, if an agreement is formally binding but its 
content is vague so that the agreement leaves almost complete discretion to the parties as to its 
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implementation, then the agreement is soft along a second dimension. Finally, if an agreement 
does not delegate any authority to a third party to monitor its implementation or to interpret and 
enforce it, then the agreement again can be soft (along a third dimension). This is because there is 
no third party providing a ‘focal point’ around which parties can reassess their positions, and thus 
the parties can discursively justify their acts more easily in legalistic terms with less consequence, 
whether in terms of reputational costs or other sanctions.  
Overall, it is possible to conclude that the formal and non-formal categorisation of soft 
law is neither absolute nor exempt from objections. Nor does this categorisation intend to draw a 
sharp distinction between those soft law instruments that create legal rights and/or obligation and 
those which do not create any legal rights and/or obligation. The emphasis is rather on the often-
present gradual continuum between lesser and higher degrees of normative specificity.94  
In sum, the criteria used to identify ‘soft law’ cannot solely be based on the formal character of a 
legal instrument in which the norm at issue is integrated, but on the nature and specificity of the 
obligation that the state parties undertake.  
I.I.  Reasons for the Choice of Soft Law  
Soft law is often explained based on the shortcoming of the ‘traditional sources’ of international  
law to respond to the needs of a rapidly changing world, that requires fast, flexible, 
adaptable/effective, and participatory ‘normative’ solutions.118 Formal international instruments, 
such as treaties, are often more detailed and time-consuming due to the complexities of formal 
international instruments. Moreover, after the final approval of a treaty, there is often additional 
procedure of incorporating the treaty into the national legal system, as national constitutions often 
require the ratification of the treaty by parliament. Besides, if the government cannot obtain the 
necessary majority, this would prevent the state concerned from becoming a party to the treaty 
completely. On the other hand, it is rare that the domestic legal systems require nonlegal 
international agreements to be submitted for parliamentary approval. It is not surprising therefore, 
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that governments, in certain circumstances, would prefer legally non-binding soft law 
instruments, over which they have a conclusive control without the risk of domestic legislative 
interference. This then makes the case for the choice of soft law, in such situations, the more 
compelling.  
The origin of soft law is context-specific and different actors are likely to promote binding 
or non-binding instruments in different circumstances according to their political, economic, and 
military leanings.95 Inevitably, the focus among the participants will be on what is politically 
possible or desirable. Economically and militarily powerful states may favour binding/hard 
obligations that they can impose and enforce. However, when the duties imposed are not deemed 
in their interest, such states might still favour a legally binding treaty to which they can refuse to 
adhere, or they may become parties with appropriate reservations.  
Alternatively, international or domestic pressure might convince such states of the 
political desirability of participating in the drafting of a soft law instrument that allows them to 
present a co-operative attitude while requiring no formal steps of adherence. Weaker states might 
promote a soft law instrument on matters of concern to themselves, realistically accepting it as the 
best they can politically achieve and in the hope that it might gain greater force in time.   
Accordingly, growing diversity in the geo-political and economic circumstances of those 
states that gained independence after 1945 means that common interests can no longer be assumed 
and that there is a more nuanced approach to the desirability of law-making through soft 
instrumentalities.96 Disparate concerns may mean that a soft law instrument is the best that can be 
accomplished, acknowledging that changed behaviour is required without making concrete 
concession. In this section, we explore how soft law provide alternative and often more desirable 
means to manage many interactions by providing some of the benefits of hard law with less 
implication. We consider these benefits by looking at some of the reasons for the choice of soft 
law to hard law, in a globalised international system.  
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Contracting Cost  
A major advantage of soft law is the lower contracting costs.97 First, the costs and risks of national 
ratification procedures led the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to modify its legalisation 
strategy. Throughout its history, the ILO has acted primarily by adopting draft conventions. In 
recent decades, however, states have been ratifying ILO conventions at a low and declining rate. 
Believing that this phenomenon was damaging the prestige of the organisation, two successive 
directors-general called for the ILO to emphasise non-legally binding instruments, such as 
recommendations and codes of conduct, at the expense of binding treaties in order to reduce the 
costs of national ratification. Although labour representatives resisted this change, the ILO has 
begun to adopt some new rules in softer legal form.98  
Second, contracting costs were used as a delaying tactic in the negotiations that led to the 
1997 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convention restricting 
foreign bribery in international business transactions.99 In those discussions, the United States 
hoped to reduce the commercial disadvantage created by its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by 
supporting a legally binding treaty, requiring all OECD members to adopt equivalent regulatory 
limits. As negotiations proceeded, however, the very states that had resisted any action on the 
issue came out in favour of a binding treaty. These nations hoped to use the high contracting costs 
of hard legalisation to impede agreement.  The United States responded by supporting a non-
legally binding OECD recommendation. The two sides eventually compromised by setting a short 
deadline for treaty negotiations and agreeing a recommendation if the deadline was not met.  
 Additionally, the costs of hard law are magnified by the circumstances of international politics. 
States, jealous of their sovereign autonomy, are reluctant to limit it through hard law 
commitments. Security concerns intensify the distributional issues that accompany any 
agreement, especially ones of greater magnitude or involving greater uncertainty. Negotiations 
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are often multilateral. The scope of bargaining is often not clearly delimited, since the issues 
themselves may only become clearer as the negotiations progress.  
Soft law mitigates these costs. For example, states can dampen security and distributional 
concerns by opting for escape clauses, imprecise commitments, or political forms of delegation 
that allow them to maintain future control if adverse circumstances arise. These institutional 
devices protect state sovereignty and reduce the costs and risks of agreements while providing 
some of the advantages of formal law making. 100  Furthermore, soft law offers states an 
opportunity to learn about the consequences of their agreement. In many cases, such learning 
processes will lower the perceived costs of subsequent moves to harder forms of obligation  
The international nuclear regime illustrates these advantages. Although fundamentally 
non-proliferation obligations are set out in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other legally 
binding agreements, many sensitive issues – such as the protection of nuclear material – are 
regulated predominantly through recommendations from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Recommendations deal with technical matters, such as inventory control and 
transportation, at a level of detail that would be intractable in treaty negotiations. They also 
address issues of domestic policies, such as the organisation of national regulatory agencies and 
the supervision of private actors that states might regard as too sensitive for treaty regulation. 
When a high level of consensus forms around an IAEA recommendation, member states may 
incorporate its provisions into a binding treaty– as occurred with rules on the management of spent 
fuel and radioactive was– but even these treaties must usually be supplemented by 
recommendations on technical issues.101  
 Overall, states face trade-offs in choosing either a soft or a hard law obligation. Hard law 
agreements reduce the costs of operating within a legal framework– by strengthening 
commitments, reducing transactions costs, and the like– but they are hard to reach. Soft 
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agreements cannot yield all these benefits, but they lower the costs of reaching consensus in most 
cases. Soft law will thus, appear to be more attractive to states as contracting cost increase.   
Sovereignty Costs  
Accepting a binding legal obligation (in the form of hard law), especially when it entails 
delegating authority to a supranational body, is costly to states. The costs involved can range from 
simple differences in outcome on particular issues, to loss of authority over decision making in 
an issue-area, to possible fundamental encroachment of state sovereignty.102  Key aspects of 
sovereignty have been codified in a variety of legal instruments, including the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 2 of the UN Charter, and the  
UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations Among States. Regional level arrangements like the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) provide much-needed support for state sovereignty. Chapter IV of the OAS Charter 
promotes the independence and sovereign equality of member states regardless of power 
differentials and protects internal sovereignty through principles of non-intervention.   
Sovereignty costs emerge when states accept external authority over significant decisions. 
International agreements may implicitly or explicitly insert international actors (who are neither 
elected nor otherwise subject to domestic scrutiny) into national procedures. These arrangements 
may limit the ability of states to govern whole classes of issues – such as subsidies or industrial 
policy– or require states to change domestic laws or governance structures. Their significance is 
reflected in European concerns over the ‘domestic deficits’ and complaints of American activists 
regarding the ‘faceless bureaucrats’ in the WTO. Nevertheless, the impact of such arrangements 
is tempered by states’ ability to withdraw from international agreements.  
Sovereignty costs are at their highest when international arrangements impinge on the 
relations between a state and its citizens or territory. For example, an international human rights 
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regime circumscribes a state’s ability to regulate its citizens. Similarly, the United States has 
correctly been concerned that an International Criminal Court (ICC) might claim jurisdiction over 
United States soldiers participating in international peacekeeping activities or other foreign 
endeavours. Agreements such as the Law of the Sea Convention both redefine national territory 
(for example, the delineating jurisdiction over a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and 
continental shelf) and limit the capacity of states to restrict its use (for example, by establishing a 
right of innocent passage). Here, too, individual states retain the capacity to withdraw, but doing 
so may actually diminish their sovereignty, risking loss of recognition as members in good 
standing of the international community.   
Delegation of sovereignty provides the greatest source of unanticipated sovereignty costs. 
The best example is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), where the ECJ rulings transformed the 
preliminary ruling procedure of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome 103  from a check on 
supranational power into a device through which private litigants can challenge national policies 
as inconsistent with European law.128 In addition, the United States opposition to autonomous 
international institutions like the ICC reflects the special concern that delegation of sovereignty 
raises. Even in North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where its political influence is 
paramount, the United States resisted delegating authority to supranational dispute settlement 
bodies for interstate disputes; only the Chapter 19 procedure for reviewing anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty rulings creates significant delegated authority.129 Congress also explicitly 
provided that the agreement would not be self-executing in domestic law, limiting delegation to 
national courts.   
The notion of sovereignty costs is more complicated when competing domestic and 
transnational interests affect the development of international legalisation. Certain domestic 
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groups may perceive negative sovereignty costs from international agreements that provide them 
with more favourable outcomes than national policy. Examples include free-trade coalitions that 
prefer their states’ trade policies to be bound by WTO rulings rather than open to the vagaries of 
individual legislatures, and environmental groups that believe they can gain more from an 
international accord than domestic politics. For similar reasons, although a  
government that anticipates staying in power may be reluctant to limit its control over an issue, a 
government less certain of its longevity may seek to bind its successors through international legal 
commitments.  
 States can, however, limit sovereignty costs through arrangements that are non-binding or 
imprecise or do not delegate extensive power. Most often, states protect themselves by adopting 
less precise rules and weaker legal institutions. The international AML regime provides a good 
example. Beginning in the 1980s, the United States led an effort to control the international 
laundering of criminal profits. Many nations resisted efforts to criminalise ML or to require 
greater scrutiny of financial transactions, fearing interference with legitimate business dealings 
and with the division of domestic authority between prudential regulators and prosecutors. Part 
of the method to address this concern was the creation, in 1989, of the FATF by the member states 
of the OECD. The task force has issued policy recommendations, administers a system of peer 
review, and can even impose mild sanctions.104  
 The FATF guidelines are not as tightly constraining as hard legal commitments and are more 
difficult to ‘enforce’. Yet they provide a common basis for domestic implementation (with enough 
flexibility to accommodate national differences), guide behaviour, and create expectations that 
violations will bring political costs. The FATF guidelines legitimise participation in national 
decisions by international actors and by concerned domestic bodies. The FATF, since inception, 
has fostered a significant degree of convergence around the principles contained in the 
recommendations.  
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 Accordingly, as this example demonstrates, soft law provides a means to lessen sovereignty costs 
by expanding the range of available institutional arrangements along a more extensive and finely 
differentiated trade-off curve. How states evaluate these trade-offs depends on their own 
characteristics and the circumstances of particular issue-areas.105  
Uncertainty  
Many international issues are new and complex. The underlying problems may not be well 
understood, and so states cannot anticipate all possible consequences of a legal arrangement. One 
way to deal with such problems is to delegate authority to a central party (for example, a court or 
international organisation) to implement, interpret, and adapt the agreement as circumstances 
unfold. This approach is thought to avoid the costs of having no agreement, or of having to 
renegotiate continuously, but it typically entails unacceptable high sovereignty costs. Soft law 
provides a number of more attractive alternatives for dealing with uncertainty.  First, states can 
reduce the precision of their commitments; uncertainty makes precision less desirable as well as 
less attainable.106 The argument is that, when circumstances are fundamentally uncertain – that is, 
when even the range and/or distribution of possible outcomes are unknown – a more precise 
agreement may not be desirable. In particular, actors are ‘ambiguity averse’107 they will prefer to 
leave agreements imprecise rather than face the possibility of being caught in unfavourable 
commitments. For example, unfamiliar environmental conditions like global warming provide 
good illustrations: because the nature, the severity, and even the very existence of these threats – 
as well as the costs of responding to them– are highly uncertain, the imprecise commitments found 
in environmental ‘framework’ agreements108 may be the optimal response.  
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 A second way to deal with uncertainty is through arrangements that are precise but not legally 
binding, such as Agenda 21 109  and other hortatory instruments adopted at the 1992 Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development. These allow states to see the impact of an 
instrument in practice and to gain their benefits, while retaining flexibility to avoid any unpleasant 
surprises that commitments in the instrument might hold.  
 Third, moderate delegation – typically involving political and administrative bodies where states 
retain significant control – provides another way to manage uncertainty. UN specialised 
agencies136 and other international organisations, play restricted administrative roles across a wide 
variety of issues, and a small number of (mainly financial) organisations have more significant 
autonomy.137 These organisations have the capacity to provide information (and thus reduce 
uncertainty) and some capacity to modify and adapt international commitments or to initiate 
standards  
 The relevance of soft law in this area is that, the obligations offer flexibility and protection for 
states to work out problems over time through negotiations shaped by normative guidelines, rather 
than constrained by precise rules. Thus agreements that are precise but nonbinding, like the 
Helsinki Final Act, often include institutional devices such as conferences and review sessions 
where states can potentially deepen their commitments as they resolve uncertainties about the 
issue.  
 In this section, we have thus argued that soft law provides a rational adaptation to uncertainty. It 
allows states to capture the ‘easy’ gains they can recognise with incomplete knowledge, without 
allowing differences or uncertainties about the situation to impede completion of the bargain. Soft 
law further provides a framework within which states can adapt their arrangements as 
circumstances change and can pursue harder forms of obligation through  
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further negotiations. Soft law avoids the sovereignty costs associated with centralised adjudication 
or other strong delegation and is less costly than repeated renegotiation in light of new information 
or discovery.  
I.I.I.  Soft Law as a Tool of Compromise  
Soft law can ease bargaining problems among states even as it opens up opportunity for achieving 
mutually preferred compromises. Negotiating a hard, highly elaborate agreement among 
heterogeneous states is a costly and protracted process. It is therefore more practical to negotiate 
a softer form of agreement that establishes general goals but with less precision and perhaps with 
moderate delegation.   
 Soft law allows states to adapt their commitments to their particular situations rather than trying 
to accommodate divergent national circumstances within a single text. This provides for 
flexibility110 in implementation, helping states deal with the domestic political and economic 
consequences of an agreement and thus increasing the efficiency with which it is carried out.  
Accordingly, soft law should be attractive in proportion to the degree of divergence among the 
preferences and capacities of states, a condition that increases almost automatically as one move 
from bilateral through regional multilateral negotiations.111  
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 Soft law also prepares states with different degrees of readiness and preparation, towards their 
commitment to one another. Those whose institutions, laws, and personnel permit them to carry 
out hard commitments can enter agreements of that kind; while those whose weaknesses in these 
areas prevent them from implementing hard legal commitments can accept softer forms of 
agreement.   
 The 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement for national controls on exports of conventional weapons and 
dual-use technologies illustrates the use of soft law to facilitate compromise.  
Wassenaar is a successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control, the 
informal institution through which the West coordinated controls on exports to the Soviet bloc. 
The United States pressed for a new institution to address post–Cold War security threats like 
terrorism, regional conflicts, and arms build-ups by rogue nations like Iraq. However, it faced 
several barriers to agreement, as nearly twice as many nations would have to take part.  
Moreover the ‘common enemy’ of the Cold War no longer existed, participating nations had very 
different attitudes towards particular countries and conflict (coupled with the economic costs and 
export controls that could fall unevenly across countries), and some states were more technically 
prepared than others to operate a sophisticated export control system.  
  Non-binding soft arrangement overcame these barriers by incorporating substantial flexibility. 
The core of the arrangement is the exchange of information on past exports of agreed upon 
products to buyers in agreed target markets. This information alerts members to suspicious 
acquisition patterns and focuses peer pressure against commercial undercutting. The arrangement 
operates by consensus, and member countries implement its requirements in domestic law.112 The 
United States yielded on a number of issues, such as prior approval of export sales. In return, 
however, it obtained inclusion of both conventional arms and dual-use goods, specific lists of 
controlled items, designation of some specific target nations, and a degree of transparency that 
allows it to respond in serious cases.   
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  However, these advantages of flexibility do not come without cost. Soft law compromises make 
it harder to determine whether a state is living up to its commitments and therefore create 
opportunities to shirk.113 They also weaken the ability of governments to commit themselves to 
policies by invoking firm international commitments and therefore make it easier for domestic 
groups, including other branches of government, to undo the agreement. Thus, states face a trade-
off between the advantages of flexibility in achieving agreement and its disadvantages in ensuring 
performance in this kind of arrangements.    
I.V.  Interaction of Hard and Soft Law as Complements  
Although the respective costs and benefits of hard and soft law as alternatives remain subjects of 
contention, legal and political science scholars have moved increasingly towards a view that hard 
and soft international law can interact and build upon each other as complementary tools for 
international problem solving. These scholars contend that hard and soft law mechanisms can 
build upon each other in two primary ways. First, non-binding soft law can lead the way to binding 
hard law, through soft-law instruments.114 Second, soft law is considered to provide a low-cost 
and flexible way to elaborate and fill in the gaps that open up when a standing body of hard law 
encounters new and unforeseen circumstances.115 In both cases, hard and soft law instruments 
serve as complements to each other in dynamic processes of legalisation, leading to greater 
international cooperation and coordination over time.116  
  In their examination of hard and soft law acting as complements, scholars can be  
divided into three camps. First are positivist legal scholars who find that soft law is inferior to 
hard law but should not be discarded because it can potentially lead to hard law. Second are 
rationalist scholars who view soft law as a complement to hard law which serves state interests in 
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many contexts, including because the hard law option is not initially available because of its costs. 
Lastly, the constructivist scholars who view soft law as a complement to hard law that can 
facilitate dialogic and experimentalist transnational and domestic processes, which transform 
norm, understandings, and perceptions of states’ interests.117   
 As earlier observed positivist legal scholars argue that soft law is inferior to hard law because it 
lacks formally binding obligations, which are interpreted and enforced by courts, and it thus fails 
to generate jurisprudence over time.118 For this reason, these scholars view soft law as second-
best alternative to hard law, either as a way station on the way to hard law, or as a fall back when 
hard law approaches fail.119John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock, for example, in a volume 
regarding the use of hard and soft law in global trade, environment, and social governance, find 
strong support for the familiar feeling that soft law is a second-best substitute for a first-best hard 
law. The argument is that soft law is created when and because the relevant hard law does not 
exist and the intergovernmental negotiations to produce it have failed.120  
Francesco Sindico likewise writes, “soft law, and voluntary standards in particular, are a 
stage in the creation of international legal norms. It is as a pioneer of hard law that soft law finds 
its raison d’être in the normative challenge for sustainable global governance”.121  
These scholars tend to view soft law solely in terms of its relationship to a hard law ideal. 
In a special volume on soft law organised by the American Society of International Law, for 
example, Christine Chinkin categorises soft law in the following five ways, each of which is linked 
to positivist conceptions of hard law:   
i. Elaborative soft law, that is principles that provide guidance to the interpretation, elaboration, 
or application of hard law (either soft law which builds from hard law); ii. Emergent hard law, 
that is principles that are first formulated in non-binding form with the possibility, or even 
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aspiration, of negotiating a subsequent treaty, or harden into binding custom through the 
development of state practice and opinion juris (either soft law which builds to hard law); iii. 
Soft law as evidence of the existence of hard obligations (either soft law which builds to hard 
customary international law); iv. Parallel soft and hard law, that is similar provisions articulated 
in both hard and soft forms allowing the soft version to act as a fall-back provision;  
v. Soft law as a source of legal obligation, through acquiescence and estoppels, perhaps against 
the original intentions of the parties.150  
Wolfgang Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte likewise 122stress how soft law agreements “can and 
often do represent the first important element in an evolutionary process that shapes legal 
relationships among and between multiple actors, facilitating and ultimately enhancing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of transnational policy-making”.123 Similarly, Kirton and  
Trebilcock conclude “. . . at best, soft law is a complement”.152  
 Abbott and Snidal, in contrast, take a rationalist institutionalist political economy approach and 
are thought to be agnostic as to whether hard or soft law is preferable. Given that they focus on 
varying state interests in different context, they contend that states sometimes prefer hard law and 
sometimes prefer soft law to advance their joint policy aims. In their work on ‘pathways to 
cooperation’, Abbott and Snidal nonetheless define three pathways, two of which explicitly 
involve the progressive hardening of soft law.124 The three pathways are:   
i. The use of a framework  convention which subsequently deepens in the precision of its 
coverage; ii. The use of a plurilateral agreement which subsequently broadens in its membership 
and; iii. The use of a soft-law instrument, which subsequently leads to binding legal 
commitments.125  
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They note how these three pathways can be ‘blended’ and ‘sequenced’, once more resulting 
in a mutually reinforcing, evolutionary interaction between hard and soft law mechanisms.155  
Constructivist-oriented scholars also focus on hard and soft law as complements. David 
Trubek and his co-authors, for example, contend that soft law instruments can help to generate 
knowledge (through the use of benchmarking, peer review, and exchange of good practice), 
develop shared ideas, build trust, and, if desirable, establish “non-binding standards that can 
eventually harden into binding rules once uncertainties are reduced and a higher degree of 
consensus ensues”.126  
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos address the role of modelling as a key mechanism for 
the creation of global business law, often involving epistemic communities of like-minded actors 
who work with both hard and soft law instruments.127128 Janet Levit, working in a legal pluralist 
framework, finds that international soft law instruments generate normativity that affects both 
subsequent hard law enactments and judicial decisions.158She finds that hard and soft law regimes 
engage in going interactions in which each is reconstitutive of the other.129 These authors contend 
that neither hard nor soft law provisions should necessarily be privileged because states and non-
state actors need flexibility to address situations that involve uncertainty and require 
experimentation.130 Scholars working in an experimentalist ‘new governance’ tradition sometimes 
go further, arguing that soft law approaches should generally be privileged to promote responsive 
governance.131  
Collectively, these scholars, coming from different traditions, theorise the various ways 
in which hard and soft law serve as alternatives and complements to each other.   
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Conclusion  
Opinions abound on the legal nature of soft law in international law, and jurists have come-up 
with different interpretations. Some restrict the term to norms in legally binding form (usually 
created by treaties but with vague content or weak requirements), while others concentrate on the 
non-legal form of the instrument. Furthermore, there are those who evaluate soft law based on a 
characteristic that vary along a continuum. In this thesis, we take the perspective binding or  
non-binding divide to highlight the differences between hard and soft law, and the term formal 
and informal to explain our framework type of soft law. We support the claim for our framework 
type of soft law looking at different kinds of instruments and the concept of legalisation by Abbott 
and Snidal.  
Therefore, in order to assess the role of soft law as a technique for AMLC, the thesis will 
limit the concept of soft law to a framework type that incorporates and captures a simply binary 
formal and informal categorisation. This framework type of soft law will then be used in 
subsequent chapters to explain the role of soft law in this area.  
Apart from identifying soft law, the chapter also examined the reasons for the choice of 
soft law. The chapter examined how soft law offer alternative and often more desirable means to 
manage many interactions by providing some of the benefits of hard law with less implication. 
These benefits were considered by looking at some of the reasons for the choice of soft law to 
hard law as it relates to contracting cost, sovereignty cost and uncertainty. These together with the 
section on ‘Soft Law as a Tool of Compromise’ demonstrate the role or flexibility of soft law in 
divergent national circumstance. It thus highlights the benefit of soft law to hard law in such 
situations.  
Lastly, as noted in the last section, despite the respective costs and benefits of hard and 
soft law as alternatives, legal and political science scholars have moved increasingly towards a 
view that hard and soft international law can interact and build upon each other as complementary 
tools for international problem solving. The relevance of this is captured by the way soft law 
obligation is incorporated into domestic legislation of states in the fight against ML.   
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CHAPTR TWO  
I.    Money Laundering: Nature of the Problem and the Legal Response   
The source of the term ML could be said to have originated from the nature and character of the 
process of ML, than of any singular act in question. ML, clearly understood, connotes a compound 
word that mainly replicates the underlying motive behind the actual act of laundering and the 
effect on the legalised economy.132 The difficulty placed with capturing a single act as ML is 
perhaps part of the reason for an international response to repress and prevent the crime through 
soft law. Soft law in the context of AMLC refers to the substance of formal and informal 
obligations, which includes both treaties and informal arrangements. The international response 
to ML –repressive and preventive AMLC– should then be seen in this light.   
This chapter will accordingly examine the definition of ML, nature of the problem and 
the legal response to ML. The current chapter will confine its analysis to sources of formal and 
informal AMLC and the origin of the law from initial domestic legislation to an international 
undertaking that includes a repressive and preventive response. The aim therefore, is to highlight 
the nature of the problem and the origin and development of the legal response that followed 
thereafter.   
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 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the use of the word launder emerged out of the Watergate 
inquiry in the United States in 1970-4. Either “to transfer funds of dubious or illegal origin, usually, to a 
foreign country and then later to recover them from what seem to be ‘clean’ (legitimate) source”. The 
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to hide the origin and receipt of anonymous campaign contributions and to sever the financial ‘paper trail’ 
between the CRP and the intruders that broke into the Democrat’s campaign headquarters at the Watergate 
office building. See J. Robinson The Laundrymen: Inside the World’s Third Largest Business (London 
Pocket Books 1994) p. 6.  
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Of importance in this respect are the obligations to repress ML through international 
conventions, under Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 1988 and Articles 6 1990 Money 
Laundering Convention.133 These instruments (together with the definition given under Article 6 
of the Palermo Convention) gave a broad definition of ML (binding soft law) by highlighting three 
categories of criminal conduct that are only distinguished by the extent to which their nexus with 
the predicate offence can be established.134 Together with the FATF and other informal bodies, 
(referred to as non-binding soft law) they form the body of international and regional instruments, 
ratified and enforced through domestic AMLC. However, an initial undertaking will be to define 
the term ML. I.I. What is Money Laundering?  
The origin of ML, while traceable to the practice of the New York Mafia in the 1920s when they 
opened Laundromats as facades for their criminal activities, owes much prominence to activities 
in the 1970s when ML suddenly became part of everyday speech and journalistic reporting.135 
The legal usage of the term itself is traceable to a 1982 United States (US) Supreme  
Court case concerning the civil forfeiture of two large sums of money.136 In that case, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the financial transfer that took place constituted more likely than not a ML 
process. These words by the US Supreme Court is regarded to represent the first recorded use of 
the term ‘ML’ in a primary legal document and heralded the birth of the  
subsequent international legal regime.   
ML is thus defined as a process of manipulating legally or illegally acquired wealth in a 
way that obscures its existence, origin or ownership for the purpose of avoiding law 
enforcement.137 ML therefore describes a deliberate, complicated and sophisticated process by 
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which the proceeds of crime are camouflaged, disguised or made to appear as if they were earned 
by legitimate means.138 The person who has received some form of ill-gotten gains will seek to 
ensure that they can use these funds without people realising that they are the result of 
inappropriate behaviour. To do this they will need to disguise the proceeds such that the original 
source of the proceeds is hidden and therefore the funds themselves appear to be legitimate.139  
According to a World Bank Study, in most definitions that are officially used by 
international organisations, ML will not happen through the financial system but with money that 
is already within the financial system.140 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the  
World Bank thus defined ML as the “process in which assets obtained or generated by criminal 
activity, are moved or concealed to obscure their link with crime”.171  
The FATF, an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion 
of policies to combat ML at both national and international levels, defined ML as the  
“processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin”.141 According to the FATF, “the 
goal of a large number of criminal acts is to generate a profit for the individual or group that 
carries out the act. ML is therefore the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their 
illegal origin. The process is of critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy these profits 
without jeopardising their source”.173  
Legal definitions of ML that many jurisdictions have adopted are even wider. Most states 
subscribe to the definition adopted by the Vienna Convention 1988 and the Palermo Convention. 
According to this definition, even the possession, and all use, of illegally obtained money, is 
labelled as ML, regardless of whether people are trying to hide the source.142 Having illegally 
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obtained money in a bank safe or hidden it under a mattress is also ML, including using it for 
consumption or other spending purposes.175   
Two central notions from these definitions are that: first, the money is derived from crime 
and second, that there is concealment of the criminal source. In the commission of acquisitive 
crime, criminals seek to make significant profit from their unlawful activities by concealing the 
origin of their crime. This may include such conduct as drug trafficking, bribery and corruption, 
organised crime, commercial fraud, tax evasion. The list is not exhaustive as there are many other 
crimes that may give rise to a gain for the criminal, which constitute what would later be known 
as a predicate offence for ML143  
In his book The Laundrymen,144 Jeffrey Robinson noted thus:   
“ML is called what it is because that perfectly describes what takes place – illegal, or dirty money 
is put through a cycle of transactions, or washed, so that it comes out the other end as legal or clean, money. 
In other words, the source of illegally obtained funds is obscured through a succession of transfers and deals 
in order that those same funds can eventually be made to reappear as legitimate income”.  
The above observation of ML as the deliberate washing clean of dirty money accords 
quite closely with the nature of the ML offence that FATF recommends states to incorporate in 
their criminal law. The wording of that offence is derived from the Conventions Vienna, 1988,145 
and Palermo Convention.146 ML is accordingly a process by which one conceals the existence, 
illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear 
legitimate. The ultimate goal of ML is therefore two-fold: to conceal the predicate offence from 
which the proceeds are derived and to avoid the detection in a legal economy.147  
Cash was identified as a major form in which illegal funds are generated (‘criminal 
cash’). 148  However, it should be recognised that although the ‘perpetrators’, whose illegal 
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activities generate large amounts of cash, will need to attempt to ‘recycle’ the proceeds,149 
Criminals will look to exploit any means possible in order to achieve their objective to concealing 
the criminal origin of such cash. This disguise might mean the exchange or transfer of property 
(both real estate and intellectual), the use of loans, alternative remittance systems (Hawala)150 and 
any opportunities presented by new technology.151 In addition, ML can also involve sophisticated 
activities such as blending illegal with legal businesses, creating legal facades, or externalising 
proceeds of crime of foreign tax havens in ‘no questions asked’ banking systems.152  
The United Kingdom (UK) recognised the harm that may be caused to the economy and 
well-being of the financial system as a result of ML. The introduction of the Proceeds of Crime  
Act in 2002 (POCA) thus confirmed the UK Government’s intention to enable Law Enforcement 
Agencies to investigate, disrupt and dismantle the criminal enterprise that sought to make money 
from criminal conduct. POCA also provided new powers to those Law Enforcement Agencies, 
financial investigators that assist them in locating and recovering criminal assets as well as to 
investigate ML, including those that facilitated the activity.153  
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing  
This section would proffer insight into the link between ML and terrorist financing (TF).  
The section underscores the dynamics of the putative Anti-Money Laundering/ Countering of 
Terrorists Financing (AML/CTF) framework. This framework is made up of diverse AML/CFT 
regimes that have evolved at various institutional levels. Some of these regimes, as would later be 
                                                     
149
 The use of couriers is thought to be a popular method for terrorists to move funds.  
150
 Hawala is an ancient underground banking system. It is rooted in family businesses, which have often 
operated as hawaladars for generations. The system is based upon trust and ethnic or familial ties, which 
allow debts to be carried for extensive periods. Thus, cash does not necessarily need to cross borders. 
Moreover, in the Middle East and South Asia, the cash economy is much more prevalent than in Europe or 
the US, so that hawaladars can avoid official scrutiny or regulation. Cited in L. Holmes infra note 209 p. 
82.  
151
 M. Simpson et al supra note 181 p. 2.  
152
 S. Yikona supra note 170 p. 2.  
153
 Supra.  
      68  
  
seen, have evolved under similar UN treaties, regional-based initiatives and ad hoc based 
arrangements.154  
 The shock of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centres, New York, led quickly to the widening 
of FAFT’s Recommendations to counter TF and the promulgation of the 2005 Council of Europe 
Convention against Money Laundering. The earlier Special Recommendations bring to TF a 
similar approach to that of the 40 Recommendations on ML. They cover criminalisation of the 
financing of terrorism and associated ML, the freezing and confiscation of terrorist assets, and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions related to terrorism. There were also provisions to enhance 
international co-operation and specific Recommendations on alternative remittance systems, wire 
transfers and the abuse of non-profit organisation: all of which have now been incorporated into 
the new FATF Recommendations for 2012.188  
TF is very different from ML and the differences make it harder to detect. ML is 
essentially about the cleaning of dirty money, turning the proceeds of crime into apparently 
legitimate money and assets, which can be freely used and traded in the normal way. Terrorist 
offences, however, are not crimes committed for the purpose of financial gain, and the motivation 
of terrorists, ideological rather than material is very different from that of drug or fraud-related 
type of laundering crime. TF is about the misuse of clean– or dirty– money for terrorist purposes. 
The aim of counter-terrorist financing measures is, as far as possible, to cut off ‘the life-blood of 
terrorism’.189  
  Terrorism is not necessarily an expensive enterprise. Maintaining a terrorist  
organisation over time requires significant funds, but individual acts of terrorism may cost little.  
The cost of the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 has been estimated at only about GBP 
7,223.190 The monetary cost bore no relation to the cost in human suffering that the terrorists 
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inflicted. The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 required more elaborate 
and lengthy preparations, but the report of The National Commission on Terrorist  
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Attacks Upon the United States155concluded that: “Bin Ladin and his aides did not need a very 
large sum to finance their planned attacks on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent 
somewhere between USD 400,000 and USD 500, 000 to plan and conduct their attacks”.  
Although terrorist organisations often rely partly on criminal activities to generate funds for their 
activities, much terrorist financing involves legitimate funds that can be transferred and used 
through the banking system and normal channels in amounts that do not give rise to suspicion and 
in ways that are otherwise normal. What keeps the global terrorist networks running are funds 
from a variety of sources. The FATF has identified the major sources of terrorist funds, which 
include drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping, robbery, fraud, gambling, smuggling and 
trafficking in counterfeit goods, sponsorship from certain governments, contributions and 
donations, sale of publications (legal and illegal), and funds derived from legitimate businesses.156  
Accordingly, measures to those designed to combat ML are now applied to counter 
terrorist property and terrorist ML.193 TF covers a wide range of proscribed activities157 relating 
to the funding of terrorism and the use and possession of terrorist property, as well as terrorist 
ML.158 Terrorist offences are not offences by which, other than incidentally, property are obtained. 
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The ML offence in section 18 of the UK Terrorism Act 2000 may appear to be very similar to the 
arrangement offence in section 328 of POCA, but in reality, it is quite different because terrorist 
property159 is mainly about resources likely to be used for terrorist purposes, not about proceeds 
of crime, in relation to ML.   
The relevance of TF to the ML is based mainly on the similarity between the efforts to 
combat ML and those of the financing of terrorism. The similarity is clearly demonstrated in the 
uniform definition of ML (as would later be seen) under the 2005 Council of Europe Convention 
against Money Laundering and the other conventions on the repression of ML. In addition, the 
recent 2012 FATF Recommendations for the prevention of ML now includes the prevention of 
terrorist financing as part of the Forty Recommendations. The earlier nine recommendations are 
now merged into the Forty Recommendations, which makes the new sets of recommendations on 
AMLC the same as those for the control of the financing of terrorism.  
Understanding the Process of Money Laundering  
ML as a process generally highlights three stages: ‘placement’160, ‘layering’161, and  
‘integration’.162   
Placement Stage  
The placement stage is where cash derived directly from criminal activity is initially placed in a 
financial institution or used to purchase an asset. Placement is the removal of the illegal cash from 
the location of acquisition to avoid detection by the authorities, such as:  
• transforming it into assets such as travellers cheque, postal orders and bankers drafts;  
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• spreading the money into multiple accounts, each involving small sums just below levels 
which might trigger a ‘suspicious transaction report’163;  
• putting the cash into legitimate businesses such as pubs, clubs, casinos, jewellers, auction 
houses and bureaux de change, which can then filter the money into the system even if 
extra tax has to be paid on the money in question.  
Placement thus describes the process of introducing large cash proceeds of crime into the 
banking and financial system. Over the years, this has become necessary because the use of cash 
for large purchases is increasingly difficult and regarded with suspicion in many states. It has also 
become harder to introduce large amounts of cash because banks, as would later be seen, have 
become more vigilant about ML and more wary of large cash deposits.   
One method involves the use of ‘smurfs’.164 The money launderer gives a sum of cash to 
an individual known as a ‘smurf’. The ‘smurf’ deposits the cash in small amounts into a number 
of different bank accounts, probably held at several different banks. The deposit amounts are small 
enough that they do not attract attention or suspicion. Once the money is deposited, the placement 
stage is complete.202   
A second method involves the use of ‘front companies’. The launderer selects companies 
and business bank accounts belonging to apparently respectable, high net worth individuals. The 
money launderer gives a much larger sum of cash to these people. The cash is then paid into their 
accounts and, with the support of forged documentation, is explained as a legitimate receipt from 
the sale of property or the sale of an interest in a business for example. Once the cash is deposited 
and the purpose of the transaction successfully explained, the placement stage is complete.  
Any business that is cash intensive is useful, since it already handles large amounts of 
legitimate cash, and the criminal cash can be mingled with this and banked as if it were the 
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legitimate proceeds of the business. Examples of cash intensive businesses include supermarkets, 
restaurants and jewellery shops.203  
Yet another method involves the purchase of different types of insurance and investment 
policies for cash, through independent financial advisers or brokers who have persuaded 
themselves that the cash is of legal provenance. At a selected moment, the policy is surrendered 
and a redemption cheque or funds transfer is received from the issuer.  
Ultimately, amounts so ‘placed’ in apparently legitimate accounts held by other people 
may then be transferred to a single account which acts as a conduit for the money as it is moved 
on elsewhere, as part of the layering process described below.  
Layering Stage  
The layering stage is where there is the first attempt at concealing or disguising the source of 
ownership of the funds. Layering is thus a term given to hiding the origin of the money by passing 
it through different accounts, shell companies and trusts (particularly in jurisdictions that still 
permit a substantial degree of anonymity) so that any audit trail is lost or difficult to follow. This 
may take many forms, but the motives and purposes are always the same: to obscure the criminal 
origin of the money and, as far as possible, to distance the funds and the beneficial owner of those 
funds from their source, and to make it difficult for an investigator to trace the funds back to that 
source.   
Layering may be done in part through repeated transfers of money between accounts with 
financial institutions in different jurisdictions, especially ones with a low level of AML 
compliance and poor law enforcement co-operation with other countries.165 It may involve the use 
of a variety of transactions and the use of corporate structures as cover to hide details of beneficial 
ownership. Whatever techniques are used, layering is central to the process and purpose of ML. 
With each transfer or transaction, the intention is that the dirty money is washed cleaner and the 
taint of crime becomes fainter.  
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The following are possible examples of the layering stage of ML:  
• investment in financial products which have good liquidity and which can be bought and 
sold easily(e.g. unlisted stocks and shares);  
• purchase and sale of real estate– apartments, houses, flats, commercial premises;  
• transfer of the money to a business, ostensibly as a ‘loan’ with documents such as loan  
agreements and receipts to support the illusion that the loan is real;  
• transfer of the money overseas or to other accounts under the guise of money destined for 
a specific purpose (e.g. education overseas of a family member);  
• using fictitious business transactions to move money around (e.g. giving money to 
suppliers against invoices raised for goods that were never issued; or raising invoices to 
customers in respect of sales that never took place);  
• transferring money to companies overseas in payment for non-existent shipments of 
imported goods;  
• use of shell companies and shell banks, i.e. entities that have no real function, no real 
place of business and no real business operations, but which exists in name only as a 
conduit for the receipt and distribution of money;   
• use of the international financial markets to buy and sell securities and move money 
across international borders.166  
Integration Stage  
The integration stage is where the money is integrated into the legitimate economic and financial 
system and is assimilated with all other assets in the system. The stage thus completes the process 
of ML by moving the now apparently clean funds into reputable banks and financial institutions 
from which the criminal can draw funds or invest and use the criminal proceeds freely within the 
legitimate economy.206   
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The conventional way of describing the process of ML has explanatory value, but ML is 
not a rigid and defined process. A complex series of conversions and transactions to obscure the 
true source of criminal proceeds is only necessary and practicable where large sums are involved. 
The placement stage may be necessary for cash proceeds of drug trafficking or people trafficking, 
but will not generally be necessary for fraudsters perpetrating financial scams, where the proceeds 
of crime may be received by transfer directly into the fraudster’s bank account.167   
Moreover, the particular methods by which ML is carried out are changing all the time. 
Increasing sophisticated AML measures may prevent some ML and detect instances of ML, but 
it is likely that it often merely displaces ML activity, leading criminals and those who assist them 
in the cleaning of dirty money to find and exploit new ways of doing so. Creating an international 
response, through repressive formal soft obligations and preventive informal soft instruments, 
remains the only legitimate way of tackling the problem of ML.  
Evaluating the Impact of Global Money Laundering  
Estimating the amount of ML has been recognised as problematic (if not impossible) because of 
the covert nature of the crime. However, some estimates have been developed which give the 
rough magnitude of the problem.   
In 1987, the UN estimated the value of drug trafficking worldwide at USD 300 billion, 
much of which would be laundered.168 However, the extent of ML worldwide is vast: using 1996 
data, an IMF study estimates that the amount of money laundered annually is between two and 
five percent of global GDP (USD 800 billion– USD 2 trillion).169 The IMF also estimates that 
between 2 and 28 percent of the GDP of OECD economies is underground. In the Middle East 
and Asia, the figures are in the range of 13–71 per cent, while in Africa, the underground economy 
can account for 20–76 percent.170  
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According to a survey by ‘The State of the Future, 2010,’171 international organised crime 
continues to grow in the absence of a coherent global strategy to counter it and then lists some of 
the statistics. The best estimate for the annual value of counterfeiting and intellectual property 
piracy is about USD 300 billion to USD 1 trillion. For the global drug trade, about USD 386 
billion; for the trade in environmental goods, about USD 63 billion; for human trafficking and 
prostitution – USD 141 billion; and for the weapons trade, about USD 12 billion.  
It goes on to report the FBI’s estimate that online fraud cost US businesses and consumers alone 
USD 560 million in 2009, up from USD 265 million in 2008. It points out that the overall 
organised crime figures do not include extortion or its part of USD 1 trillion in bribes that the 
World Bank estimates is paid annually, nor its part of the estimated USD 1.5–6.5 trillion in 
laundered money that exists.   
Reasons for Fighting against Money Laundering  
Over the last twenty years, the international community has significantly stepped up its efforts to 
prevent, detect, and deter money flows related to criminal activities and TF. Since the early 2000s, 
this drive has extended to developing countries, with most of them introducing AML policies.172 
ML is the first serious crime whose existence can be directly related to global economic concerns, 
rather than those of individual jurisdictions. This makes the crime transnational and across 
national borders and jurisdictions. Combating the crime therefore requires an equal response both 
in magnitude and in scale.   
 As studies have demonstrated, crime is bad for economic development.173 The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has, for example, conducted a study on the 
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internationalisation of crime. The UNODC stresses the economic relevance of anti-crime efforts 
for developing countries: “Crime is fuelling corruption, infiltrating business and politics, and 
hindering development”. It is also “undermining governance by empowering those who operate 
outside the law”.174 In its report, UNODC highlights the globalisation of crime and the need for a 
transnational anti-crime approach.  
According to the earlier survey by ‘The State of the Future, 2010’,175 about 2.5 million 
people from 127 different countries are being trafficked around the world, out of which 
approximately 70 per cent  are women and girls and up to 50 per cent  are minors. There are more 
slaves now than at any time in human history; estimates are that as many as 27 million people are 
forced to work without pay and are not free to leave– more than at the height of the African slave 
trade in the first half of the 19th century.  
 The survey further cites the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report that between 1993 and 
the end of 2009, the Illicit Trafficking Database recorded 1,784 nuclear trafficking incidents (up 
from 222 during 2009–a startling 700 per cent increase), ranging from illicit disposal efforts to 
‘nuclear material of unknown provenance’. There are approximately 1, 700 tons of highly 
enriched uranium, and 500 tons of separated plutonium that could produce nuclear weapons, all 
needing continued protection and a global regulation.  
  
Below are therefore some of the reasons for fighting global ML.  
Reputation of the Financial Sector  
The major economic contention resounding through the literature is that ML has a detrimental 
effect on the operation of markets.176 One of the basic premises behind AML framework is that 
the abuse of the financial system for ML purposes is harmful to the financial sector, its reputation, 
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and the people’s confidence in it. A reputation for integrity is one of the most valuable assets of 
a financial institution and of the financial sector as a whole. Consequently, ML is harmful to the 
welfare of entire economies, since trust in financial institutions is generally seen as a basic 
requirement for long-term economic growth.217   
Bartlett argues that this is especially relevant for developing countries, with the immature 
or developing financial systems and a reputation for being highly corrupt.177 Strong developing-
country financial institutions are critical to economic growth. Bartlett emphasises that trust in the 
financial sector is not only a domestic necessity but that it is also essential to attracting foreign 
capital and investments.   
 As noted above, ML has a detrimental effect on the operation of markets. Some argue that the 
protection of the financial sector against corruption is the major motive underpinning global AML 
measures.178 An IMF economist, Tanzi, argues that the resources that go into illegal activity might 
otherwise be directed legally.179 ML allocates dirty money around the world not so much on the 
basis of expected rates of return but on the basis of the ease of avoiding controls, and this is 
inefficient.221 As a consequence, the world allocation of resources is distorted, first by the criminal 
activities themselves, and then by the way the dirty money is allocated.222  
Capital Flight  
The internationalisation of crime and the internationalisation of ML are two sides of the same 
coin. It is often stated that ill-gotten money tends to flow to jurisdictions that are economically 
more advanced, financially more sophisticated, fiscally attractive, or that have a more permissive 
environment toward ML.  Walker and Unger, for example, assume that ill-gotten money seeks 
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states with attractive banking regimes (that is, advanced banking systems, tax havens, and ‘no 
questions asked banking’) and states with stable economies and low political  
risks.180  
This is especially relevant for developing countries where corruption in recent decades 
has led to massive capital flight to financial centres elsewhere.181 The well-recognised problem of 
illicit capital flight from developing countries is typically facilitated by either domestic financial 
institutions or by foreign financial institutions in foreign offshore centres or major financial 
centres such as London, New York, Singapore, and Tokyo. Baker argues that the outflow of ‘dirty 
money’ from developing countries to advanced economies is ten times larger than the inflows of 
foreign aid.225  
Spill-Over Effect into Crime and Corruption  
ML can also facilitate and even stimulate criminal activity. It is stated to provide criminals with 
apparently legitimate money, which they can use to subsidise, continue, diversify, and expand 
their criminal activities.182 ML therefore can be a link between crime and even more crime, 
because ample ML opportunities will make crime and corruption easier and more profitable. In 
addition, ample ML opportunities within a jurisdiction can attract foreign criminals.  
Masciandaro has labelled this the ‘spill-over effect’.  
Preference for ‘Sterile Assets’  
Criminological studies and asset forfeiture policies have shown that proceeds of crime and 
corruption are often placed in so-called ‘sterile assets’,227 that is, assets that generate limited 
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productivity for the broader economy, such as antiques, art, auto-mobiles, luxury goods, and real 
estate. This is the case in high-income economies, but also in developing economies.  
 The preference for sterile assets is especially problematic for developing economies, since this 
might divert valuable foreign reserves to the importation of luxury goods instead of basic 
necessities. Financial leakages from the national budget might also result in price distortions in 
other areas, like the real estate market.183  
Unfair Competition  
Ill-gotten money might also undermine fair competition. Walker, for example, has argued that 
criminals might be able to outbid honest buyers because of the availability to criminals of large 
amounts of funds and their primal interest in finding a ‘safe haven’ or ML opportunity for their 
ill-gotten money instead of profit making.184Illicit enterprises might, for the same reasons, be kept 
growing by means of ill-gotten money although they are structurally loss making.185 The unfair 
competition effect of ill-gotten money could also influence the outcome of privatisation or 
tendering processes.  
Corruptive Penetration of the Upper-World  
Business and even government decisions might be affected by ill-gotten money. Van Duyne and 
Soudjin call this “corruptive penetration in the upper-world decision chambers”231–criminals 
buying their way into the government, the financial sector, and other public and private 
businesses. Corruptive penetration in the upper-world economy and criminal upper-world subsidy 
can occur on a national scale, but also on regional levels in specific markets or sectors of the 
economy.  
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Corruptive Penetration of the Anti-Money Laundering System  
Chaikin and Sharman have discussed the symbiotic relationship between corruption and ML. 
They argue that corruption and ML tend to co-occur, but, more important, the presence of one 
trends to create and reciprocally reinforce the incidence of the other.186 Corruption produces 
income that has to be laundered. At the same time, bribery, trading in influence and embezzlement 
can compromise the working of the AML system itself. The effect was referred to as the 
“corruptive penetration of the AML system”.187  
Distortion of the Foreign Exchange Market  
Ill-gotten money from ML might flow unrecorded over national border – either because of the 
transnational nature of many illicit markets (involving cross-border financial transactions), or with 
the aim of laundering or spending the proceeds of crime or corruption in another jurisdiction. 
These cross-border flows could give way to distortion in the foreign exchange market188and, more 
specifically, fuel the existence of a black market for foreign exchange (demand and supply).   
Distortion of Economic Statistics and Erosion of the Tax Base  
A basic concern related to the circulation of unlaundered ill-gotten money is that there is money 
in circulation that is officially not known.189  This could result in distortions of the national 
accounts and lower tax incomes. The concern is, however, not unique for ill-gotten money. 
Criminal activity can be considered a subset of the informal economy, which is particularly large 
in low – and middle– income countries.190 Both illegal and informal (that is, legal but unrecorded) 
activities will distort economic statistics, or at least make the official statistics less reliable.  
                                                     
186
 See D. Chaikin and J. C. Sharman Corruption and Money Laundering, A Symbiotic Relationship (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) cited in S. Yikona et al p.14.   
187
 S. Yikona et al supra note 170 p.14.  
188
 Ibid.  
189
 Ibid.  
190
 Ibid, p.15.  
      81  
  
Effect of the 9/11Financing  
It is worth reminding ourselves of what this innocuous stream of transactions actually led to and  
the cost on human and financial loss. In the days before 11 September 2001, having returned the 
remaining money – USD 26,000 in total – to Hawsawi in the UEA, the hijackers assembled in 
their various departure cities, ready to carry out arguably the most psychologically devastating 
attacks in American history. They were armed only with small knives, box cutters and can of 
mace or pepper spray.  
 Atta and fellow hijackers Omari flew to Boston and spent their last evening shopping, eating 
pizza and making ATM withdrawals. Their three accomplices stayed in a hotel just outside 
Boston. Next morning they were among the 81 passengers who boarded American Airlines Flight 
11, a Boeing 767 bound from Boston to Los Angeles. The plane took off at 7.59 a.m.; at 8.46, 
under the control of the hijackers, it ploughed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre 
(WTC) in New York, the impact killing all the passengers, nine flight attendants and an unknown 
number of people in the tower.  
 Al-Shehhi and his team were also in Boston hotels the night before the attack. They took off from 
Boston on another Boeing 767, United Airlines Filght 175, and an 8 a.m. departure for Los 
Angeles. There were 56 passengers and seven attendants on the flight, all of whom were killed 
instantly when the plane hit the South Tower of the WTC at 9.03 a.m. Within 90 minutes, both 
towers collapsed completely, killing more than 2600 people in total.  At 8.20 a.m., American 
Airlines Flight 77 – a Boeing 757 carrying 58 passengers and four attendants – left from 
Washington Dulles, again bound for Los Angeles. The five hijackers diverted the flight and at 
9.37 a.m. flew it into Pentagon in Washington at 530 miles per hour. Everyone on the plane was 
killed. The death toll in the building was 125.   
 The fourth plane to be targeted was a Boeing 757, United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark to San 
Francisco. Unlike the other planes, Flight 93 was hijacked by only four terrorists, led by Jarrah 
and apparently destined for the White House. However, in this case the 37 passengers fought back. 
      82  
  
After what must have been a desperate struggle, the plane came down in a field in Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, about 20 minutes’ flying time from Washington.  
Everyone on board was killed outright.  
 In total, 256 people died on the four planes. When taken with those who lost their lives in the 
WTC buildings and the Pentagon, the final death toll was greater than at Pearl Harbour in  
December 1941.191  
Toedorin Obiang and Others  
A newspaper article from Britain’s Daily Telegraph described the activities of French law 
enforcement agencies in seeking an international arrest warrant for Teodorin Obiang Mangue, the 
high-living son of oil rich Equatorial Guinea’s dictator-president. The case stemmed from a case 
brought in France by Transparency International (TI)192 claiming that the Obiangs had plundered 
and laundered billions in oil wealth that rightfully belonged to the people of Equatorial Guinea.193  
  The OECD said of Equatorial Guinea in 2010 that:  
“The ...increase in oil revenue, however, has had very little effect on poverty reduction in the 
country and on improving the general standard of living of the population. The poverty rate ...remains 
extremely high. The country also suffers from a high infant-mortality rate, persistent epidemics, a poor rate 
of access to drinking water, low vaccination coverage and a weakly managed public administration, 
education sector and health sector”.194  
 Corruption shatters the economies of poorer states and contributes to conditions in which crime, 
in all its manifestations, including terrorism, thrives. TI lists some of the larger kleptocrats of 
recent years, as in the table below. For example, during the presidency of Ibrahim Babangida of 
Nigeria, USD 12.4 billion in oil revenues received during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 
allegedly disappeared Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay was world class, believed to have ripped 
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off millions. The Angolan government of Jose Eduardo Dos Santo was accused in a 2004 report 
by Human Rights Watch of mislaying USD 4.2 billion from 1997 to 2002.  
Daniel arap Moi, ex-president of Kenya, was suspected of frauds that allegedly generated tens of 
millions of dollars sloshing out of the central bank. Omar Bongo of Gabon was tagged with  
USD 130 million in U.S. deposits in a 1999 Senate hearing,195196 and many more 
Table 0.1 Where Did The Money Go?  
  
Head of Government  Estimates  of  Funds 
Allegedly Embezzled  
Mohamed Suharto, Indonesia, 1967-1998  
Ferdinand Marcos, Philippines, 1972-1986  
Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire, 1965-1997  
Sani Abacha, Nigeria, 1993-1998  
Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia, 1989-2000  
Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti, 1971-1986  
Alberto Fujimori, Peru, 1990-2000  
Pavlo Lazarenko, Ukraine, 1996-1997  
Arnold Aleman, Nicaragua, 1997-2002  
Joseph Estrada, Philippines, 1998-2001  
  
  
USD 15 to 35 billion  
  
USD 5 to 10 billion  
  
USD 5 billion  
  
USD 2 to 5 billion  
  
USD 1 billion  
  
USD 300 to 800 million  
  
USD 600 million  
  
USD 114 to 200 million  
  
USD 100 million  
  
USD 78 to 80 million  
Source: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report, 2004242  
  
I.I.I.  Understanding the Legal Response: History and Development  
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The history or background, together with the subsequent international response to ML, underline 
a unique blending of both international and national responses to AML law and enforcement– a 
development that highlights a vertical application of substantive norm making197 in international 
law. The international response highlights the limits of the formal boundaries of mutual 
exclusiveness, which was inherent in a post-Westphalian world.198 The emerging trend is not so 
much on the form of the instruments but rather on the substance of existing norms in an area of 
law, and the emphasis is less on the theory of a system of rules, but rather on a ‘process’ where 
perspectives and goals play a prominent part.199   
The subsequent legislative response to ML is classed into three broad categories: vis-àvis 
regulatory development; criminalisation and internationalisation and, lastly, the 
supranationalisation stage.246 The author has decided to adopt the above approach, (on the legal 
response and subsequent development of the law) since the growth and development of global 
ML demands a progressive response that is equal in magnitude and scale to the problem. As noted 
in chapter one, Soft law is often explained based on the shortcoming of the ‘traditional sources’ 
of international law to respond to the needs of a rapidly changing world, that requires fast, flexible, 
adaptable, effective, and participatory ‘normative’ solutions.247  It is therefore my opinion that in 
order to understand the legal response to ML, there is a need to highlight the progressive nature 
of the legal development (from domestic to international) coupled with the ability to adapt in a 
rapidly changing world.   
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Regulatory Stage200  
The starting point on the legislative ladder is the enactment of the United States Bank Secrecy Act 
1970 (BSA).201 The BSA is a federal statute that imposes and authorises the Secretary of the 
Treasury to impose a series of duties to report and record certain transactions that are of use for 
criminal, tax and regulatory enforcement. Since that date, the evolution of ML law has gone 
through various phases and stages. The myriad of national, international and regional instruments 
have constituted a mosaic.202  
At the inception of developing ML law, the emphasis was on the regulative and preventive 
models, stipulating the banks’ duties to keep records and report transactions that might assist law 
enforcement agencies in carrying out their functions. This and other developments would clearly 
show that AML law was initially intended to curb the problem at the domestic level. The 
subsequent formal and informal international response was intended to strengthen an international 
AML response.  
Seven years after the BSA, a self–regulatory but similar instrument came into being in  
Switzerland. In 1977, Swiss bankers signed an agreement on the ‘Observance of Care by the 
Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy’203 (hereinafter CDB). This 
was in addition to the limited developments in the area of international cooperation, which took 
the form of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) 204 by some key states that were faced with 
the problem of cross-border enforcement of law. The original purpose of the 1977 CDB was to 
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ensure careful clarification of the identity of bank customers and to prevent the right to banking 
secrecy from being used to facilitate the making of transactions contrary to the CDB. This would 
be the case where the funds in particular are criminally derived. Accordingly, when a bank knows 
or should have known through the exercise of required due care that the funds were criminally 
derived; it was required to refrain from entering into transactions or to sever the relations with the 
customer.205   
However, a subsequent revision in 1982 deleted the express prohibition concerning the 
criminally derived funds since it was contended that, ML was already an offence under the law. 
Furthermore, the banks were no longer required to investigate the origin of the funds but simply 
obliged to verify the identity of a contracting partner. This includes the obligation to identify the 
actual beneficial ownership.206  
The interstate cooperation in penal matters, in the form of MLAT by the United States 
and Switzerland, was particularly significant in that it was the first such legal arrangement to be 
concluded between a state belonging to a civil law tradition and another belonging to the common 
law tradition. The emergence of the MLAT was indicative of the limits of the existing modalities 
of international cooperation,207 together with the differences in tradition and legal history.  The 
MLAT is a form of bilateral treaty agreement and derives validity under formal classification in 
international law. It represents the first international initiative in fostering cooperation in AMLC 
and could be said to have been useful in determining the subsequent language in the Vienna 
Convention 1988 on international cooperation.256   
The approach in the Vienna Convention 1988 is complimentary to existing domestic 
initiatives and was actually intended to take enforcement and crime control beyond the domestic 
borders where the predicate offence was perpetrated. This is as a result of the cross-border nature 
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of the ML offence. This initial response to ML was a preventive approach, which was based on a 
combined approach of regulatory and preventive measures. It is stated that, the history of the BSA 
depicts the law as one passed in response to certain difficulties in the area of criminal, fiscal, and 
regulatory enforcement of law and cross–border crime. These challenges, together with the 
limited powers of extraterritorial enforcement of law, make the element of cooperation at the 
treaty level inevitable – for purpose of crime prevention and enforcement of law.   
Era of Criminalisation and Internationalisation  
The 1980s saw a departure from the traditional preventive and regulatory approach to AMLC, to 
a period of repressive technique and subsequent internationalisation of the offence. This period 
witnessed an increased application of the use of penal legislation in AMLC, both at domestic and 
international levels. One of the most dramatic developments during this period was the emergence 
of the global AML regime, which combines both treaties and informal responses to ML.208   
The ML law (as a result of these developments) ceased from being a mere regulatory and 
preventive tool, but became a penal legislative response based on the repressive AMLC. The 
emergence of penal legislations to ML was simultaneous both in the United States and in the 
United Kingdom.209 The parallel development in both states was evidenced by the introduction of 
ML prohibition law, which was complemented by other existing measures on the prevention and 
regulation of the laundering process.   
In the United State, the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA)210 makes 
it a criminal offence to engage in the laundering of criminal proceeds. This includes willingly 
handling assets that are fruits of criminal activity: or to use structuring methods in order to evade 
the reporting requirements of law enforcement.211212260 In addition, the Act imposed harsher civil 
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and criminal forfeiture laws on money launderer and financial institutions who assist them in their 
practice.261 A similar approach was adopted in England, whereby the Drug Trafficking Offences 
Act 1986 (DTOA) made it a criminal offence to enter an arrangement where the proceeds of 
another’s drug trafficking activities are laundered.213  The UK DTOA created an offence of 
assisting another retain the benefit of drug trafficking and also contained a disclosure defence.214 
Overall, both of these responses represented the type of piecemeal response that was prevalent at 
the time and were limited to drug related type of ML.  
Based on this development, the criminalisation of ML in the United Kingdom and the 
United States witnessed the emergence of a new control or repression component being added to 
the legal approach to the already existing regulatory/preventive measures already adopted. The 
ML legal regime that evolved out of this development placed equal emphasis on both aspects of 
the regulatory and preventive strategy, which was reflective of the principles and mechanisms 
already introduced by earlier methods.  
However, in 1988, the trend towards criminalisation and internationalisation took a major 
leap. At the end of that year, the Vienna Convention 1988 was adopted. The language in the treaty 
did not actually use the term ‘laundering’, but the Convention defined a very broad offence of 
handling the proceeds of drug trafficking in any conceivable manner and imposed on states parties 
a duty to criminalise this conduct.215  
The Vienna Convention 1988 is important in three aspects, in relation to ML. First, is 
with respect to the provision in Article 3(1) of the convention, which require the parties to 
criminalise drug ML. Secondly, the convention required the parties to put in place measures to 
immobilise proceeds of crime.216 The Vienna Convention 1988 also recognised the international 
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nature of drug trafficking and related ML. It expressly contains provisions on mutual legal 
assistance and extradition (concerning relevant offences), as well as confiscation cooperation.217 
Cooperation here is strengthened by Article 5(5) (b) which permits the sharing among cooperating 
states either on regular or case by case basis of proceeds or property, or funds derived from the 
sale of such proceeds or property in accordance with domestic law, administrative procedure, 
bilateral or multilateral agreements entered into for this purpose.  
Given the ambit of the Vienna Convention 1988 the relevant provisions of the convention 
is said only to pertain to the confiscation and laundering of drug proceeds, and not of the proceeds 
of other crime. Nonetheless, there are also a number of substantive criminal law provisions, as 
well as mechanisms for international cooperation in criminal matters as expressed in the language 
of the treaty. It is thus argued that the most important contribution of the Vienna Convention 1988 
to ML law is the creation of an international obligation upon states to repress or criminalise a 
series of laundering offences.   
Although the Convention does not use the term ‘laundering’, its definition of the offence 
remains the prototypical definition of ML,218 globally. Whilst the Vienna Convention 1988 is 
limited in scope, since it is strictly related to drug offences, the Convention did provide great 
impetus for the internationalisation of repressive AMLC.  
The Vienna Convention 1988 is not isolated in this field of the internationalisation of the 
laundering offence; there are other categories of instruments that were also useful in promoting 
the much needed consensus on the insidious nature of this form of criminality. Some of these 
instruments, unlike the Vienna Convention 1988, were conceived within the relevant  
institutional framework of the organ creating them, albeit with a global appeal and inclusion of 
non-members as parties to such agreements. One such instrument is the 1990 Money Laundering 
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Convention, the text of which was drafted by a limited committee within the European Committee 
for Crime Problem (ECCP).219   
The 1990 Money Laundering Convention constitutes the first international binding legal 
instrument that focuses exclusively on ML. Like the Vienna Convention 1988, it deals only with 
the repressive fight against ML. It contains a number of substantive criminal law provisions, as 
well as mechanisms for international cooperation in criminal matters. The convention, however, 
differs from the Vienna Convention 1988 in that the scope is not limited to drug proceeds, but in 
principle encompasses the proceeds from any offence.220 The drafters however attempted to use 
as far as possible the same terminology as the Vienna Convention 1988.221 One unique thing about 
the convention is that, it is open to all states, including states who are not members, and therefore 
who are not members of the Council of Europe.222  
While the last two categories of instrument on internationalisation were focused on the 
criminal/repressive measure on the development of ML law, there is a third and most important 
body in this category. The emphasis of this body was not on criminalisation, but rather on 
preventive measures harnessed through prudential regulation of financial institutions. Thus, at the 
time of the coming into force of the Vienna Convention 1988, a parallel legal development was 
taking place in Basel, Switzerland, and in December that year, the Basel Committee on  
Banking Supervision issued a Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the 
Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (The Basel Principles 1988).223 However, 
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the Statement has no legal force (informal soft law), since it is a general Statement of ethical 
principles and its implementation will depend on national practice and law.224   
The importance of the Basel Principle 1988 lies in the fact that it enabled 
internationalisation of the law. The Basel Principle 1988 is the first international instrument to 
address the issue of ML internationally. Whilst the Vienna Convention 1988, focused on ML 
repression and left out the preventive aspect of ML law, this parallel development bridged the gap 
by attempting to develop some consensus on the preventive ML law within the narrower context 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter Basel Committee).  
The Basel Principles of 1988 is based on the assumption that banks are being used 
unwittingly for ML and that the cooperation of financial institutions with law enforcement 
agencies will be very useful as a way of preventing this use.225 The principles, accordingly, 
encourage the banks to put in place effective procedures that:  
• ensure the identification of any customer that enters a relationship with the bank;  
• prevent the engagement of the bank in transactions that appear illegitimate and  
• secure close cooperation with law enforcement.226  
Prior to the Basel Principles 1988, supervisory authorities were ambivalent about their 
role in the fight against ML thus resulting in some states imposing direct responsibility in this 
regard on the financial supervisory authorities – while others did not even bother to impose any 
such responsibility or duty.276 The latter represent cases where supervisory authorities lack the 
jurisdiction to play a role in the suppression of ML through the financial system.  
The value of the Basel Principles of 1988 was that, it established some convergence in 
approach amongst its members by attempting to create a prudential system in suppressing the use 
of the financial system for ML purposes. The ‘Preamble’ to these Principles acknowledges that, 
“the primary function of [banking supervision] is to maintain the overall financial stability and 
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soundness of banks, rather than to ensure that individual transactions conducted by banks 
customers are legitimate”.227 It goes on to argue that a bank’s association with criminals is bound 
to result in adverse publicity that might undermine public confidence in banks and hence their 
stability. This point was based on the fact that, association with criminals expose banks to the 
possibility of fraud by those undesirable customers as well as by their own employees, whose 
integrity may be undermined by this inopportune association.228  
The logic of the Principles has resulted in tying the ML suppression goal with the broader 
purpose in bank supervision and gradually led to the regulatory aspect of ML law becoming a core 
element of the legal regime as a whole.   
In conclusion, the Basel Principles 1988 in terms of internationalisation of ML law were 
to the regulatory/preventive side of the ML regime, what the Vienna Convention 1988 was to the 
criminal/repressive side of it. Moreover, the influence of the Basel Principles 1988 did not remain 
confined to its limited membership; the extension was thus typical of the operation of the Basel 
Committee, and was explicitly envisioned in the preamble to the Principles. 229  The Basel 
Principles 1988 highlights the emergence, influence of soft informal law, and is categorised under 
the preventive AMLC.  
Supranationalisation Stage  
Supranationalisation in the present context connotes an influence or power that transcends 
national boundaries or governments, and is said to be measured by the degree to which the 
ordering of a certain aspect of social life is conducted by an agency in a manner that derogates 
from states’ sovereignty and the principle of consent in international order.230 Whenever the term 
is used, it denotes an institutionalised exercise of power or authority over the state not by another 
state but by an international organisation or organ. The powers typically exercised are said to be 
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transcends national boundaries or government.  
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either juridical or prescriptive. This would be the case, where the supranational character has been 
attached to an international organisations or organs that are either adjudicating disputes between 
states or prescribing rules of conduct to be followed by states.231  
Thus, in the context of the ML regime the aspect on supranationalisation centre on the 
FATF,232 as a body created by the G7 Summit in Paris in 1989. It was given the specific task of 
studying the ML phenomenon and ways to deal with it. It is an inter-governmental organisation 
exclusively committed to fighting ML. It represents a policy body that works to generate the 
necessary political will to bring national legislative and regulatory reforms to combat ML.233 As 
an international body commissioned with the specific task of resolving the problem of controlling 
and preventing ML in the context of the global economy, its operation is said to have transpired 
into a supranational agency with a distinct features. ML was being formulated within a deliberate 
unrepresentative agency and accordingly imposed worldwide through aggressive enforcement 
mechanisms and quasi–judicial review processes.234   
Established in 1989 by the G7 Summit held in Paris, as a response to concerns about 
negative implications of ML on the financial systems, as of June 2012, it has 34 member 
Jurisdictions, 2 International Organisations – European Commission and Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and more than 20 observers. Its mission was initially to examine techniques and trends 
in ML, to review measures taken at national and international levels, and to set out measures still 
necessary to be taken.235  
Following its creation by the Summit, the FATF assumed a life of its own, without any  
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 The UN Collective Security System, by virtue of chapter 7 of the Charter stands out as an important 
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limitations of mandate or time-frame. After a meeting called by France, the FATF produced its 
first report ahead of the deadline in February 1990,236and the most important feature of the 1990 
Reports was the Forty Recommendations for action. The Recommendations as amended and 
interpreted over the past decade constitute the present blueprint of anti-money laundering law.237 
The most important element in the Forty Recommendations is that they help in shaping domestic 
legislation.238  
The other aspect on supranationalisation is concerning the EC ML Directives. Like the 
FATF 40 Recommendations, it has also yielded a unifying influence on the Prevention of the Use 
of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering. No less than fifteen FATF 
Recommendations have found their way to the EC ML Directives, which made them into binding 
law for EC member states.239 The EC ML Directives is an integral part of the European Union law 
making. This is because the directive whilst not a part of traditional international law, functions 
with the same binding effect as a treaty under the European Union on member  
states.240   
The EC ML Directive is thus, taken to have a supranational effect given the doctrine of 
the supremacy of the EC law, which emerged from the European Court of Justice Decision in 
Costa v. ENEL.241 However, the principle of direct effect was established in relation to the Treaties 
of the European Union, by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in Van Gend en Loos v. 
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Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen242 (commonly referred to as Van Gend en Loos).293 
Nevertheless, the principle has subsequently been loosed in its application to treaty articles294 and 
the ECJ has expended the principle, holding that it is capable of applying to virtually all of the 
possible forms of EU legislation,295 the most important of which are regulations and in certain 
circumstances directives.  
The modalities for cooperation concerning the international AML law could thus be said 
to have been aimed at both repressing the laundering offence and on the prevention of the proceeds 
of crime from entering into the legal economy. The above AML legal approach is what is 
commonly referred to as the twin- track controls296 of ML and this is perfectly captured by the 
various stages in the legal development of the ML law.  
Whilst the repressive measure was aimed at criminalisation and confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime,297 the preventive aspect was directed at creating obligations for financial 
institutions.298  This may include other agencies in the state (both private and public) taking steps 
to reduce ML. AML preventive measures, although initially limited to banks, has extended  
                                                                                                                                                            
EEC) were upheld against the employing airline Sabena who were in breach of the obligation. This ability 
to enforce rights against individual legal entities is termed ‘horizontal direct effects’ as it applies between 
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provisions of the treaties and legislative acts such as regulations are capable of being directly 
enforced horizontally.  
296
 See Buranaruangrote supra note 11.  
297
 ML is thought to be a derivative and confiscation is a tool to deprive perpetrators of proceeds 
generated from crime.  
298
 The FATF defines the term ‘financial institution’ very broadly. It means any person or entity who 
conducts as a business a wide range of activities on behalf of a customer List of activities listed in 
Glossary to the FATF Forty Recommendation (2012).  
to non-banking financial institutions, even non-financial businesses, and certain professions, such 
as casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones and lawyers.243  
Conclusion  
The cross-border element of ML has made it impossible for the crime to be the subject of a 
separate regional or domestic control. The origin and development of the law clearly highlight the 
need for a harmonised response to the problem of ML. The limits of initial domestic AML 
responses (by the American and Swiss response) underscore the need for a better international co-
ordination, which led to the various formal and informal international AMLC.   
The foregoing international response, in the area of AMLC, demonstrate that both formal 
and informal soft law instruments can be vehicles for focusing consensus and for mobilising a 
consistent general response on the part of states. Subsequent chapters in this thesis will therefore 
build on this development and demonstrate the benefits and strength of a coordinated response to 
the problem of ML through soft law.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
I.  Repressive Anti-Money Laundering Control  
The global response to the fight against ML consists of a repressive technique founded in criminal 
law and preventive technique, founded in financial regulation. 244  These techniques are the 
repressive and preventive AMLC, which is based on the formal/treaty obligations to criminalise 
the offence and informal/non-treaty arrangements to prevent it. Both of these techniques, as would 
later be seen, come under our framework type of soft law – formal and informal categorisation of 
soft law.   
The techniques are thought to have evolved from an initial American repressive or penal 
legislative model, and a Swiss preventive or private sector initiative.245 The American penal 
model, just like existing treaty-based repressive technique, is based on criminalisation and 
confiscation of the proceeds from crime.246 However, the main reason behind the Swiss model 
was for Bank’s self-regulation and prevention of ML in the financial system. The role of financial 
and non-financial institutions in prevention of ML has since gained prominence through some of 
the informal/non-binding arrangements in this area. The focus here is on the  obligations of 
financial and non-financial institutions to undertake certain measures to disclose  
ML operations and to identify the ‘beneficial ownership’ of the proceeds of crime.247    
The repressive and preventive AMLC underscore the importance of an international 
response to ML, which centres on an initial formal treaty obligation to repress the crime, and an 
informal non-treaty response to prevent it. The measures were thus, with an instance of the need 
to control organised crime and to prevent the negative impact of ML on the global financial 
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system. 248  The significance of these techniques is underlined by the treaty and non-treaty 
response, as the failure of ‘traditional sources’ of international law to respond to the needs of a 
rapidly changing world has now prompted fast, flexible, and adaptable/effective participatory  
‘normative’ solutions.249 Our framework type of soft law underscores this narrative.  
ML criminalisation under the repressive technique was effected through a broad 
definition of the offence of ML under both the UN250251 and EU307 Conventions. This policy 
definition tended to be much broader than the cases that instigated the concern and initiated the 
process of laundering. This breadth was incorporated into the legal definitions of the offences of 
ML, which tended to be open-ended and unqualified. The only restriction of the actus reus in a 
ML offence is the subject of the predicate crime. Apart from that, the acts forming the offence are 
general enough to encompass any possible handling of these proceeds. The purpose of the acts is 
therefore, all encompassing. The broad definition of the offence of ML corresponds to our earlier 
classification of formal soft law, under which we considered treaty provisions that are imprecise, 
subjective or indeterminate in language.252 Treaty provisions in this category do not include 
immediate obligations for the parties; instead, they merely develop programmes of actions, as it 
is in the examples of European Social Charter (1961) and the United Nations Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), urging or merely advising the parties to cooperate.   
According to Dupuy, that an agreement is soft or hard law does not refer to the formally 
binding character of the instrument. Here the ‘softness’ of the instrument corresponds to the 
‘softness’ of its contents.309 This concept of soft law refer to treaty provisions that do not tend to 
create definitive obligations, despite their legally binding form, but are rather imprecise or flexible 
in character. The framework type of formal soft law is captured in the broad definition of ML, 
and has led to the harmonisation and approximation of domestic AML criminal legislation. This 
                                                     
248
 T. Buranaruangrote supra note 11 at 8.  
249
 I. Alkan-Olsson supra note 117.  
250
 Under this category is the Vienna Convention, 1988, the Palermo Convention  
251
 Money Laundering Convention and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention against  
Money Laundering  
252
 C. Chinkin in D. Shelton supra note 81 p. 25 309  
 Dupuy supra note 94.  
      99  
  
is important for both formal and informal cooperation and is relevant for mutual legal assistance 
(MLA) in the fight against ML.  
Accordingly, the international AMLC is referred to as the twin-track technique253 to 
repress and prevent global ML, through soft law. The emphasis therefore is on a repressive control 
that is focused on criminalisation and confiscation, and a preventive control that is based on 
obligations of financial and non-financial institutions to undertake certain measures to disclose 
ML operations and identification of beneficial ownership. However, the techniques are not 
independent one from the other, as certain aspects of preventive control have been transformed 
into criminal legislation,254 and criminalisation of ML has since become a tool for international 
co-operation and relevant MLA.  
Thus, the approach here will be to examine the international law-making processes that 
have been engaged in response to the threat of ML by looking at the technique to repress ML 
through the criminal law. The focus here, as with other chapters, is not to give account of the 
sources of international law but the aim is to identify the instruments, participants and processes 
employed in response to threat of ML by looking at the role of a broad definition of ML on 
domestic criminal legislation.  The chapter does this by examining the subject of the broad 
definition of the obligations to criminalise, the elements of the offence of ML and the role of 
criminalisation and confiscation as a repressive tool for AMLC.   
The other aspect on the twin-track control of ML would be considered in the next chapter, 
as this relates to the informal/non-binding preventive technique and the impact on financial and 
non-financial institutions as it relates to beneficial ownership.255  
I.I.  Broad Definition of the Obligations to Repress Money Laundering  
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The repressive AMLC represents a strategy that includes criminalisation of ML and confiscation 
or forfeiture of criminal profit. The obligations to criminalise ML that flowed from the UN and 
Council of Europe Conventions has led to a plethora of domestic criminal legislation. These 
Conventions, together with the UN Model Law on ML, are essential for legal harmonisation and 
approximation of domestic AML law and international cooperation.  
Harmonisation and approximation of domestic law should therefore be seen as a soft law 
solution to the problem of territoriality of the criminal law and extra-territorial reach of crime. 
This is done by generating soft law norms that are incorporated by the national legislature into 
domestic law.  An agreement that is to work between states with divergent legal systems, traditions 
and practices, in the area of ML, is likely to result in an instrument which, having taken into 
account the views and requirements of all potential states parties, represents the best available 
compromise on all issues rather than reflecting the most effective regime.256 The broad definition 
of ML is based on this understanding, and this is part of the reasons for the choice of soft law. As 
noted in chapter one, soft agreements lower the costs of reaching consensus in most cases, they 
are therefore more attractive to states as contracting cost and the cost to state sovereignty (given 
the intrusive nature of hard law) increase. In the section below, we shall examine how the broad 
definition of ML through soft law is adopted uniformly in all conventions and applied in domestic 
criminal legislation. The approach then is to first examine the language of the obligations to 
criminalise ML in the various conventions, including the model law on ML, and impact this may 
have had on the subsequent domestic criminal  
legislation.   
UN Conventions  
The Anti-Money Laundering Unit (AMLU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
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(UNODC) is responsible for carrying out the Global Programme against Money Laundering 
(GPML), which was established in 1997 in response to the mandate given by the Vienna 
Convention 1988.257 The Vienna Convention 1988 expresses in its preamble the recognition by  
states that:   
“Illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal 
organisations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial 
and financial business, and society at all its levels” and affirms that the international community is 
henceforth “determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of proceeds of their criminal activities 
and hereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing”.  
 Article 3(1) of the Vienna Convention 1988 therefore calls on states to criminalise the following 
types of ML activities:  
b) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any 
offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or from an 
act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such 
an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions.  (ii) The concealment or 
disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or 
ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences 
established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation 
in such an offence or offences.  
(c)  Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system:  
 (i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of the receipt, that such 
property was derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph 
(a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence or offences.  
From the above definition, the Vienna Convention 1988 defines the obligation to 
criminalise ML broadly (formal soft law) and the definition of the various offences is thought not 
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to be clearly delineated. The definition includes conversion or transfer of drug-derived property 
for the purpose of concealing the origin or evading the legal consequences of a person’s drug-
related activities. It also includes the mere concealment or disguise through any process of any 
fact regarding the drug-derived property such as its nature, location, dispositions movement and 
rights with respect to it.258  
Although the ML offence established by the Vienna Convention 1988 has a narrow 
application, since it applies only to property derived from drug-related offences, 259  it is 
nonetheless very broad, in that it covers any manipulation of such property whether to conceal its 
origin, location, disposition, movement, ownership, or any other rights with respect to the 
property.260 The broad definition of ML is similar to our model categorisation of soft law, where 
treaties with imprecise, subjective, or indeterminate language are termed ‘legal soft law’ in that 
they fuse legal form with soft obligations.261 ‘Property’ is defined very broadly to include any 
possible kind of asset,262 and the asset in the context generally refers to assets that are considered 
proceeds of the specified offences derived directly or indirectly from the offence.  
It is important to note that the Vienna Convention 1988 does not address the preventive 
aspects of ML law. It, however, was aware of the importance of financial information for the 
effective enforcement of drug control systems. This recognition is reflected in the text of the 
Convention where states are explicitly precluded from denying assistance to other states merely 
on the basis of bank secrecy.263 The preventive aspects of ML law were discussed in detail in a  
UN informal, non-binding soft law instrument that preceded and led on to the Vienna Convention 
1988 namely, the ‘1987 United Nations International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking: Comprehensive Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control’.321 The 
preventive aspects of ML were also referred to with detail in the official ‘Commentary on the 
                                                     
258
 See also Article 6 of the 1990 Money Laundering Convention and Article 6 of the Palermo Convention.  
259
 Article 1(p) Vienna Convention 1988.  
260
 Article 3(1) (b) Vienna Convention 1988.  
261
 C. Chinkin in D. Shelton supra note 81, p. 26.  
262
 Article 1(q) Vienna Convention 1988.  
263
 Articles. 5(3) and 7(5) of the Vienna Convention 1988. 321  
 Hereinafter the Comprehensive Outline 1987.  
      103  
  
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
1988.’322 The foregoing informal non-binding references should not be neglected in terms of their 
impact on building an international consensus in this area of the law.  
In September 2003 and December 2005, the UN Convention against Transnational  
Organised Crime (Palermo Convention)323 and the UN Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC)324 respectively came into force. Both instruments widen the scope of the ML offence 
by stating that it should not only apply to the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking but should also 
cover the proceeds of all serious crimes – which covers organised crime and corruption related 
aspects of ML. Both Conventions urge states to create a comprehensive domestic supervisory and 
regulatory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including natural and legal 
persons, as well as any entities particularly susceptible to being involved in a ML scheme. The 
Conventions also call for the establishment of FIU, an informal, non-binding arrangement for 
exchange of information on AMLC.  
Thus in keeping with the requirements of the UN Conventions and other internationally 
accepted standards, such as the Recommendations of the FATF, the broad objective of the   
GPML is to strengthen the ability of member states to implement those standards through ML 
criminalisation and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. More specifically, GPML’s objectives  
are:   
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 The Palermo Convention, in Article 6, widens the definition of ML to include the proceeds of all 
serious crime, and gives legal force to a number of issues addressed in the 1988 UN General 
Assembly  
Special Session’s (UNGASS) Political Declaration. Article 6 provides thus:  
Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally:  
a. (i) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person 
who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his 
or her action;  
(ii) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or 
ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of 
crime;  
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b. Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:  
(i) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property 
is the proceeds of crime.  
324
 Article 23 of UNCAC creates as an offence the concealment and laundering of the proceeds of 
acts of corruption and includes further extensive measures to combat ML.   
• to assist in the achievement of the objective set up by the UN General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) for all states to have in place legislation on ML;  
• to equip states with the necessary knowledge, means and expertise to implement national 
legislation and UN Plan of Action against ML;  
• to increase the capacity of states successfully to undertake financial investigations and 
prosecutions;  
• to equip states with the necessary legal, institutional and operational framework to 
comply with international standards on countering the financing of terrorism including 
the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;264  
• to assist states in detecting, seizing and confiscating illicit proceeds.  
The Programme also encourages ML policy development, raises public awareness about 
ML and acts as a coordinator of AML initiatives between the United Nations and other  
organisations.265  
Council of Europe Conventions  
The European Union, through a series of reforms outlined in the Amsterdam Treaty has 
undertaken to construct an area of Justice, Freedom and Security. These three democratic ideals 
have been at the top of the Union’s agenda for the last couple of years. However, this rapid 
expansion has not only resulted from an expansion of the competencies of the Union per se, but 
more so due to contingent events that have demonstrated the need for common policies in a 
number of key areas close to the daily life of every citizen. An area without internal frontiers must 
be an area of justice in order to serve its citizens, one where criminals can find no safe havens, 
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and where citizens and business are not discouraged by cross-border obstacles in the exercising 
of their rights.327  
  This objective was reaffirmed in the Tampere declaration following the European  
Council of October 1999. An entire paragraph was dedicated to actions necessary to counter ML. 
In particular, the European Council affirmed that: “Money Laundering is at the very heart of 
organised crime. It should be rooted out wherever it occurs. The European Council is determined 
to ensure that concrete steps are taken to trace, freeze, seize and confiscate the proceeds of 
crime”.266  No matter how effective preventive measures may be, crucial to the success and 
credibility of the AML scheme is that further action is taken along the line. This requires that 
suspicions of ML are effectively dealt with by the judiciary and lead to the swift implementation 
of appropriate sanctions.   
An obvious starting point for action in this field was Convention n 141 of 1990 from the 
Council of Europe (1990 Money Laundering Convention).329 This laid down a comprehensive 
system of rules aimed at covering all procedural aspects connected to ML – from the initial 
investigations to the adoption and execution of the confiscation sentence. It provided for special 
mechanisms promoting the widest possible cooperation required to deny criminal organisations 
access to ML instruments and to the proceeds of crime.  
More than a deepening of existing MLA instruments, the 1990 Money Laundering 
Convention laid out detailed rules on the form international cooperation should take in the specific 
context of the fight against ML. International cooperation is critical in many laundering cases, 
where the proceeds of crime are often laundered in another country. The fact that all EU member 
states have signed and ratified the 1990 Money Laundering Convention, illustrates the value 
placed upon the instrument.  
The Council of Europe, in May 2005, has since adopted a revamped instrument–  
Council of Europe Convention n 198 on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the  
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Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005 Council of Europe Convention 
against Money Laundering).330 The difference between this last instrument and the former is that 
the offence of ML is now extended to terrorist financing.  
The definition of the three types of activities in the Vienna Convention 1988 was copied 
almost verbatim into Article 6 of the 1990 Money Laundering Convention. The predicate 
offence,331 as noted above in Article 3(1) (a) of the Vienna Convention 1988, was limited to the 
proceeds from drug trafficking offences. However, the predicate offence under the 1990 Money 
Laundering Convention, in principle, applies to the proceeds from any predicate offence, even 
though contracting states are allowed to make a declaration (as many have done332) to the effect 
that ML will only be criminalised with respect to certain categories of predicate offences.267 This 
applies to the most serious offences or solely intentional offences. The current trend is to cover 
all serious crimes, particularly those criminal activities that generate large amounts of  
profit.268  
The UN Model Anti-Money Laundering Law  
The GPML has developed, in collaboration with the UNODC legal Advisory Section, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), model laws for both 
common law and civil law legal systems to assist states in drafting AML legislation269 in order to 
be in full compliance with the applicable UN Conventions and the FATF Recommendations. The 
model law therefore, serve as working tools for member states and are continually being upgraded 
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in order to encompass any new international standards. The model law is intended to be adjusted 
to the particularities of national, legal and administrative systems. The criminal  
  The expression ‘predicate offence’, borrowed from the Vienna Convention, 1988 and many subsequent 
international instruments, describes the offence by which the profits were acquired. 332  Declarations here 
were said to include those made by Austrian, Cyprus, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland.  
definition of ML in the model law is instructive, as the definition bears similarity to the one under 
Article 3 of the Vienne Convention.  
 It will be up to each individual country to adapt the proposed provisions in order to bring them, 
where necessary, in line with the constitutional and fundamental principles of its legal system, 
and to supplement them with whatever measures it considers best suited to contribute towards an 
effective AMLC. However, the model law constitutes in itself a coherent legal whole. By 
incorporating these provisions into their legal apparatus, states must ensure that all elements of 
this model are adopted. Some provisions are intrinsically linked and would not have the desired 
degree of effectiveness if they were adopted in isolation or out of context. The comprehensive 
scope of the model law would also be lost if paragraphs were removed.  
In order to facilitate its adaptation to national legislation, the model law presents some of 
its provisions in the form of variants or options. A variant allows for the adjustment of a provision, 
which should not be left out of any legislation against ML. Whereas an option denotes a provision 
that is not deemed essential under the current standards but may improve the effectiveness of a 
given AML system – which can be included or not at the discretion of a particular state. The model 
law, for the purpose of this study, comprises six titles:  
I. Definitions (a variant)  
II. Prevention of ML  
III. Detection of ML  
IV. Investigation and secrecy provisions  
V. Penal and provisional measures  
VI. International cooperation  
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For the purpose of this section and for the rest of the thesis, the focus will be on the 
variant: definition of the criminal offence of ML. A consideration of the definition of the criminal 
offence of ML is important for two reasons: first, it shows that the definition of the offence under 
both the model law and the conventions is the same – as the former is merely a derivative of the 
latter. Second, the definition under the model law underscores the importance of a uniform 
definition of the offence of ML, as this is crucial to harmonisation and international cooperation. 
The model law is therefore, part of a wider international effort to control ML through repressive 
criminal law. A look at the criminal definition of ML under the model law will show the similarity 
between it and the definition under the conventions.  
Model Definition of Money Laundering  
Article 5.2.1 of the model law provides for the criminal offence of ML. The definition of ML,270  
(same under the conventions), provides thus:  
 I.  For the purposes of this law, ML shall be defined as follows:  
a. The conversion or transfer of property, by any person who knows or should have known 
by any person who knows or suspects by any person who knows, should have known or 
suspects that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing  or 
disguising the illicit origin of such property or of assisting any person who is involved in 
the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal  
consequences of his or her actions;  
b. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement 
or ownership of or rights with respect to property  
c. The acquisition, possession or use of property  
As noted above, the definition of ML is uniform in the conventions and model law. The 
difference however is with the predicate offence, which varies according to the instrument.337 The 
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 See also Article 3 Vienna Convention 1988, Article 6 Palermo Convention, Article 6 1990 Money 
Laundering Convention, Article 23 of UNCAC and Article 9 of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention 
against Money Laundering . 337  Infra pp. 91-94.  
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definitions of ML therefore underscore the role of formal soft law, through a broad definition of 
the crime. As noted earlier by Chinkin, treaties with imprecise or indeterminate language have 
been termed ‘legal soft law’.271 This is perhaps the reason for the broad definition of the crime of 
ML.  
I.I.I.  The Criminal Offence of Money Laundering  
As noted above, the offence of ML was drafted broadly, which relates to three types of criminal 
conduct- conversion, concealing and acquisition of criminal property or criminal proceed.  The 
conducts are aimed at extending the application field of the obligations to criminalise ML by 
drafting the offence broadly to cover every possible manipulation of criminal proceeds,272 or 
property,340 whether to acquire, convert or conceals,  the origin, location, disposition, movement, 
ownership, or any other rights with respect to the criminal property or proceed.   
The definition of the offence under the Vienna Convention 1988 is limited to drugrelated 
offences, but subject to that, Article 6 (1) (a) of the Palermo Convention corresponds to  
Article 3(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention 1988.273 Similarly, Article 6(1) (b) of the Palermo 
Convention corresponds to Article 3(1) (c) (i) and (iv) of the Vienna Convention 1988.274 On the 
subject of the intention to commit the crime Article 6 (1) (f) of the Palermo Convention also 
corresponds to Article 3(3) of the Vienna Convention 1988.275   
 In addition, the FATF in its 1990 Report adopted as a working definition a description of ML 
virtually identical to that in the Vienna Convention 1988, and its current ‘Forty 
Recommendations’ urge states to criminalise ML on the basis of the Vienna Convention 1988 and 
the Palermo Convention.276 Even closer to the text of the Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 1988 
                                                     
271
 Supra note 318.  
272
 Infra pp. 92-109 on the actus reus of ML 340  
 Infra pp. 114-116 on the concept of ‘property’  
273
 See also Article 23 (1) (a) (i) of UNCAC and Article 9 (1)(a) of 2005 Council of Europe Convention 
against Money Laundering  
274
 Article 23(1) (b) (i) of UNCAC and Article 9 (1) (c) of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention against 
Money Laundering.  
275
 Article 28 of UNCAC and Article 9(2)(c) of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention against  
Money Laundering  
276
 Recommendation 3.  
      110  
  
was Article 6(1) of the 1990 Money Laundering Convention. A new feature of the 1990 Money 
Laundering Convention was its application where the predicate offence was committed outside 
the jurisdiction of the state in which the ML offence was being tried,277278 a principle adopted in 
Article 6(2) (c) of the Palermo Convention. In addition, Article 9(1) of the 2005 Council of Europe 
Convention against Money Laundering is virtually identical to Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 
1988 and Article 6(1) of the Palermo Convention.  
 Similar language has been used in European Community instruments. The first EC ML Directive 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for ML346 took further the approaches of both 
the Vienna Convention 1988 and 1990 Money Laundering Convention; both were referred to in 
its Preamble. It also reflected the view of the European Commission that the Community had a 
duty to protect its financial system.279 While the first EC ML Directive requires that member states 
ensure that, the laundering of the proceeds of any serious crime is treated as a criminal offence,280 
its main purpose is to ensure that credit and financial institutions adopt a system, which allows 
effective supervision of their customer.281  
 The effect of a 1998 Joint Action282 by the European Commission was that no member states 
would exercise a right of reservation against the definition of serious offences contained in the 
1990 Money Laundering Convention, offences with a maximum prison sentence of more than one 
year or a minimum sentence of more than six months. Similar provisions in the second EC ML 
Directive later replaced the Joint Action. The second EC ML Directive itself was substantially 
amended in 2001,283 principally by widening the scope to include predicate offences other than 
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drug trafficking, and by extending the obligations under the first EC ML Directive to certain 
professions and activities outside the narrower financial sector.   
The third EC ML Directive replaced it in 2005.284285 This brought the definition of serious 
crime into line with the 2001 second EC ML Directive, extended the scope to include the financing 
of terrorism and Internet transactions, and set out more detailed procedures for customer 
identification on the prevention of ML.  
 In the EC ML Directive, the definition of ML was taken verbatim from Article 3(1)(b), 3(c)(i), 
and 3(c)(iv) of the Vienna Convention 1988, but with more general reference to  
‘criminal activity’ substituted for that to drug offences. The definition of ML offences therefore 
forms part of an international consensus to extend the scope of the offence of ML, through soft 
law, by defining the offence broadly to accommodate every manipulation of the offence. A most 
influential formulation is that in Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 1988, a text itself strongly 
influenced by the then legislation in the United States.353  
The remainder of this section will examine components of the offence of ML, the subject 
of criminal property and the scope of the predicate offence, as a way of understanding how 
domestic legislations have responded to the broad definition of the offence of ML and 
criminalisation as a tool for the repression of ML.   
Examining the Actus Reus of Money Laundering   
It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless 
the prosecution have proved the existences of both physical element (actus reus)286 and the mental 
element (mens rea).287 Later in this section, we will address the subjective or mental element of 
the criminal offence of ML. This section will try to examine the implementation of the physical 
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actus reus elements of ML offence in domestic legislation through a broad definition of the 
offence. The section uses case law and legislation from mainly the United Kingdom and other 
jurisdictions to throw more light on the underlying subject of the offence of ML.  
 The legal definitions of the process of ML are to be found in the provisions defining the actus 
reus of ML offences. As indicated above, the most universally accepted definition of ML as an 
offence is that of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 1988.288  This Article does not delimit the 
process of ML. The Article refers to ‘conversion or transfer of property’ and to ‘concealment or 
disguise’. The latter designation is clearly based on the purpose of the process and does not 
provide any hint as to what type of process is envisioned. The former description, without being 
restrictive, provides more suggestions regarding the process that the state parties had in mind. 
There is also the third category of acquisition. These will all be considered under this section.  
Conversion or Transfer of Criminal Property  
This offence is defined in terms which follow very closely the language of Article 3(1)(b) of the  
Vienna Convention 1988 and Article 6 paragraph (1)(a) of the Palermo Convention. The 
Conversion suggests an alteration in the form of the property or proceeds and ‘transfer’ suggests 
physical movement of the property or legal change of title. According to the Black’s Law 
Dictionary, ninth edition, “conversion entails the act of changing from one form to another or the 
wrongful possession or disposition of another’s property as if it were one’s own”.289 On the other 
hand, transfer of criminal property is thought to be the act of the transferor rather than the 
transferee, the recipient, who will be engaged in the acquisition of the property. The issue was 
central to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v. Daoust.358 The court held that transfert 
in the French text of section 462.31 of the Criminal Code did not apply to the receiver of the 
property.  
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 The United Kingdom’s ML offences are set out in section 327-329 of the POCA 2002.290 By 
section 327(1) (c) of POCA 2002, a person commits an offence if he conceals, disguises, converts, 
transfers or removes criminal property from England and Wales, or from  
Scotland or Northern Ireland. Section 327 offence has its root in section 14 of the Criminal Justice 
(International Cooperation) Act (CJA) 1990, and section 14 of the 1990 Act was partially re-
enacted in section 49 of the Drug Trafficking Act (DTA) 1994 (mirrored in section 93C of CJA 
1988).291  
The offence is framed in a way that ensures that the UK meets its international obligations 
under the relevant conventions. Indeed the UK has exceeded its obligations as it includes an 
arrangement offence under section 328 of POCA 2002 whereas Article 3 of the Vienna 
Convention 1988 only provides that parties to the convention are to establish, as offences: “[T]he 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with 
respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or 
offences. . .”  
 The word conversion may have technical meanings in a number of legal systems. For example, 
the common law knows the tort of conversion, described in Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraq 
Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5)292 as the principal means whereby English law protected the ownership 
of goods, but it is clear that in the Vienna Convention 1988 context the word bears a more natural 
meaning.   
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This is the approach adopted in the Ontario Court of Appeal in a related context. In R v 
Tejani293 the defendant was charged with ML offence under section 19(2) of the Narcotic  
Control Act294 which required proof of ‘the intent to conceal  or convert’. Rejecting arguments to 
the contrary, the court held that the words ‘conceal’ and ‘convert’ were not synonymous. 
Although conceal did mean to hide, convert had a broader meaning of to change or transform. A 
mere currency exchange was a ‘conversion’ for this purpose. In another Canadian case, R v. 
Daoust,295 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the word ‘convert’296 had to be given its  
ordinary, literal meaning.   
An example of conversion is a case where in the placement stage of ML (as noted in 
chapter two) different types of insurance and investment policies are purchased for cash, through 
independent financial advisers or brokers who have persuaded themselves that the cash is of legal 
provenance. At a selected moment, the policy is surrendered and a redemption cheque or funds 
transfer is received from the issuer.297 On the other hand, it might involve a business that is cash 
intensive, which then allows the criminal cash to be mingled with that of the business and banked 
as if it were the legitimate proceeds of the business.  
In the case of R v. Fazal 298 D had allowed another person to lodge stolen monies into his 
bank account. An issue arose as to whether in law he had ‘converted’ criminal property in these 
circumstance. Victim purchased goods on the Internet, which were never delivered although 
payment was made. D permitted another to use his bank account. He submitted there was no case 
to answer as D had not converted the money, there being no act of conversion by him, only by 
others, even if he had acquired the relevant suspicion and knowledge. He contended that he might 
have been guilty of an offence under section 328 of POCA368 but none was charged. The Court of 
Appeal in dismissing the appeal held that D had ‘converted’ the stolen monies by allowing another 
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to use his account.  A person might lodge receive, retain, or withdraw money from his account 
each of which would amount to converting the money concerned, by asking or allowing another 
agent, innocent or not, to do so. That did not prevent the owner of the account who used or 
operated it, albeit with the help of an agent, innocent or not, from converting the money. The 
reference to ‘converting’ in POCA was not necessarily the civil tort of conversion but could not 
be far removed from its nature.299   
 In DPP v. Naylor300 a man, who was a second-hand car dealer, was convicted of ML. He had 
accepted cars bought with the proceeds of crime to sell through his business. In addition, travel 
agents are also thought to be good targets for this type of ML offence. A money launderer in this 
case may book an expensive holiday, but cancel it before departing so that a refund by cheque is 
returned with a minor cancellation fee deducted there from.  
Companies can also play a central role in ML schemes of this kind. It has been commonly 
appreciated for many years that the shield of incorporation is used to assist in the perpetration of 
fraud and other financial crimes. According to the FATF:  
 “The common methods identified by Irish law enforcement through which criminals have laundered money 
in Ireland have been through:  
• the purchase of high value goods for cash;  
• the use of credit institutions to receive and transfer funds in and out of Ireland  
• the use of complex company structures to filter funds”.301  
Corporate structures may be used to disguise the source or nature of illegal funds by 
channelling such funds through them in order to infiltrate the legal economy. In R v. H,372 the case 
concerned fraud involving 12 false identity companies, which issued invoices primarily for the 
sale or purchase of mobile phone. The unaccounted VAT element was approximately GBP 41, 
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600,000 and the fraud involved the use of cloned Hong Kong companies, forged invoices and 
forged company documents.   
Rather than pay a bookkeeper, solicitor, bank manager or a business to launder the 
proceeds of crime, in this type of offence, the money launderer may set up a business himself. 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that criminals looking to convert their criminal proceeds 
into the legal economy have targeted struggling companies, which are badly in debt and in need 
of capital, deliberately. In some cases, the companies’ officers have been persuaded to inject funds 
into the companies so that clean cheques emerge.302  
 The text of this first category of ML offence, under Article 3(b) (i) of the Vienna Convention 
1988,303 establishes that the conversion or transfer of property must be done with the aim of 
concealing the criminal origin of the proceeds of crime. The requirement that the conversion must 
be done with the aim of concealing the criminal origin of the proceeds or property, will 
immediately lead us to the second category of the offence of concealing the criminal origin of the 
proceed or property.  
Concealing or Disguise of Criminal Property  
This is defined under Article 3(1) (b) (ii) of the Vienna Convention 1988 and Article 6 paragraph 
1(a) (ii) of the Palermo Convention. ‘Concealment or disguise’ includes preventing the discovery 
of the illicit origins of property or the proceeds of crime. Similar to the offence of conversion, the 
language in respect of the offence of concealing or disguising criminal property is drawn from 
various international conventions.304   
The offence of concealing or disguising criminal property is drafted in broad terms and 
this is the trend in most domestic AML legislation. The language of Article 3 of the Vienna  
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Convention 1988 provides thus: “the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offence or offences. . .” The language of the Article 3 is tailored 
towards criminal property in relation to drug related aspect of ML. However, this has been 
extended to criminal proceeds and to other predicate offence in several jurisdictions.  
 Section 327(1) (b) of the POCA 2002 provides for this offence. Section 327(1) (b) of POCA 
provides that it is an offence to conceal or disguise criminal property.305 The terms  
‘concealing’ and ‘disguising’ are not defined in POCA but section 327(3) provides that they 
include concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition, movement, ownership 
or any rights with respect to criminal proceeds. It is not clear whether ‘concealing’ must always 
involve a positive act or whether an omission or a failure to disclose the existence of criminal 
property might also constitute concealing. Suppose D1 knew that D2 stored painting in the loft of 
a house that they occupied jointly. D1 subsequently suspected (correctly) that the paintings were 
stolen but failed to alert the authorities of that fact. It is submitted that mere inaction is insufficient, 
but things done by D1 with respect to paintings after he or she became suspicious of their origin, 
may be enough to bring D1 within section 327 (for example locking the loft or covering the 
paintings with a dustsheet).306     
 The United States legislation uses very similar language to that in POCA. Title 18 of the US code 
makes it an offence, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, to conduct or attempt to conduct such a financial 
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, knowing that the 
transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
ownership or control of the proceeds.307308 In the United States v. Majors,379 the court said that the 
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offence was a provision structured to reach those types of ML activities designed to conceal or 
disguise the attributes of proceeds produced by unlawful activity. The activity that the offence 
seeks to prevent is the injection of illegal proceeds into the stream of commerce while obfuscating 
their source.  
 In order to prove the commission of the concealing or disguising offence in the UK, the 
prosecution essentially have to prove three elements. It is, however, important to note that the 
evidence, which is offered to prove one of the three elements, may also be evidence, which is 
offered to prove the other two elements. First, it must be proved that the property was the proceeds 
of crime. In R v. Montila,309 the House of Lords held it was an essential part of the actus reus of 
ML offences that the prosecution prove that the property was, as a matter of fact, criminal 
proceeds. Section 340(3) provides that property is criminal property if it constitutes a person’s 
benefit from conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole or in part and whether directly or 
indirectly). This will usually be proved by circumstantial evidence. Second, it must be proved that 
the defendant knew or suspected that the property was such. Section 340(3) provides that for 
property to be criminal property, the alleged offender must know or suspect that it constitutes or 
represents such a benefit. Third, it must be proved that the defendant acted in such a way as to 
conceal or disguise the nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or any rights 
with respect to the property.310   
  As noted above, the words ‘conceal’ or ‘disguise’ are not defined in POCA. When  
ordinary English words are used undefined in legislation, the courts assume that, in the absence 
of good reason to the contrary, they should be given their ordinary, natural meaning.311 The  
Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘conceal’ as “to not allow to be seen; hide”,312 while  
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‘disguise’ is defined as “to make something unrecognisable by altering its appearance”.384 
Although there may be a difference between the ordinary meaning of the words ‘conceal’ and 
‘disguise’, there appears not be a difference in the use of these words in a ML context. For 
example, in United States v. Beddow,385 the court referred to the defendant using another person 
as “a ‘front man’ to disguise his ownership” of gemstones purchased with illegal drug proceeds 
when it could just have easily used the word ‘conceal’. US indictments also tend to use ‘conceal’ 
or ‘disguise’ as a phrase rather than as separate terms with distinct meanings.   
 Thus, concealing and disguising in section 327 (3) of POCA includes concealing or disguising 
criminal property and its true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or any 
rights with respect to it. It is plain from that subsection and from the context as a whole that the 
terms are intended to be broad in their effect. Between them, they cover dealing with criminal 
property in a multitude of ways.386 In United States v. Sax,387 the court stated that those things, 
which could be concealed, were listed in the disjunctive, and held that the ML statute was not 
aimed solely at commercial transactions intended to disguise the relationship of the item 
purchased with the person providing the proceeds. It was rather aimed broadly at transactions 
designed in whole or part to conceal or disguise in any manner the nature, source, ownership or 
control of the proceed of unlawful activity.  
Similarly, in United States v. Barber and Barber,388 the defendants opened five joint 
accounts in various banks and deposited large amounts of cash into them, usually in small 
banknotes. Typically, a few days later they withdrew the cash in larger banknotes. Expert evidence 
was given explaining how the defendants’ activities constituted concealment for purpose of ML. 
The expert testified, that by depositing cash into a bank account and then withdrawing it, the 
proceeds of drug sale could be concealed at several levels. First, because the deposit slip did not 
show the banknotes’ denominations, it could not be determined later that a large number of small 
banknotes had been deposited. Second, because banknotes used for buying drugs often retain 
traces of drugs, the deposit eliminated the possibility of linking the money to drug trade. Third, 
depositing drug money into an account that contained legitimate  
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income lent credence or credibility to drug proceeds. Fourth, withdrawals of large banknotes 
facilitated physical concealment because one large banknote was easier to conceal than several 
small ones.  
 In laundering criminal proceeds, a defendant may have a number of objectives. For example, he 
may often simultaneously be seeking to conceal the nature, location and ownership of criminal 
proceeds. Thus, the drafting of indictments by prosecutors, and the findings of guilt by courts, 
may therefore often be in relation to multiple objectives without falling foul of the principle of 
duplicity. In United States v. Rahsepharian and Another, a case of telemarketing fraud, the 
evidence showed that the defendant had income from fraud sent to a mailbox where his father 
would collect it and deposit it into different bank accounts, none of which were connected with 
the company through which the defendants committed their fraud. The Court of Appeals held that 
jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that these transactions were designed to “conceal 
the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds” and did not feel the need to 
distinguish between these objectives.389  
 As earlier observed, the offence of concealing or disguising criminal property is drafted in broad 
terms, which is intended to cover dealing with criminal proceeds, or property, in a multitude of 
ways. Given the transnational nature of ML, it is not surprising that the influence of soft law has 
been especially notable in the area of the criminalisation of ML.   
Acquisition, Possession or Use of Criminal Property  
In Article 3(1) (c) (i) of the Vienna Convention 1988390 each state, apart from the concealing and 
conversion offences, is required to establish as a criminal offence the acquisition, possession or 
use of criminal property. This is similar to the offence in Section 329 of POCA, 2002. The section 
makes it an offence for a person to acquire, use, or possess, criminal property.  
No offence is however committed if the accused makes an ‘authorised disclosure’ under section  
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338 or  intended to make such a disclosure but had a reasonable excuse for not doing so. It is  
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 See also Article 6 (1) (b) (i) of the Palermo Convention.  
also not an offence under the section if the accused gave adequate consideration at the time he 
acquired, used, or took possession of the property or  performed a function he has relating to the 
enforcement of POCA or other relevant enactment. The defendant will similarly be excused from 
the crime in that section, if the conduct related to ‘relevant criminal conduct’ that occurs in a 
jurisdiction overseas and which is lawful there.  
  The section 329 offence has its origins in section 14(3) of the Criminal Justice (International 
Cooperation) Act (CJA) 1990, later enacted as section 23A of the Drug Trafficking Offence Act 
1986, re-enacted as section 51 of DTA of 1994, and mirrored in section 93B of CJA 1988.313 
However, section 14(3) of the CJA was limited to the acquisition of property. Section 51 of DTA 
and section 93B of CJA extended the activities to ‘use’ and ‘possession’. This is consistent with 
the three EC ML Directives. The prosecution must prove that the property handled is ‘criminal 
property’,314 namely that it constitutes a persons’ benefit from criminal conduct or it represents 
such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly).393  
The word acquisition means gaining of possession or control over something.315 In order 
to possess property, it is necessary that there be knowledge that there is something.316 While 
possession only applies to tangible property, to acquire encompasses intangible property.396 Put 
differently, acquisition means to obtain, to attain, by whatever means. It implies the act by which 
a person becomes the owner of something and the thing acquired. The word acquisition covers 
everything that can be attained or obtained by a purchase, a donation or any other way; even what 
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is obtained with money, in settlement, by skill or hard work, or in any similar way, although not 
what is obtained by inheritance.317   
An acquisition can be obtained from another by sale, gift, purchase, and donation or in 
any other way. The acquisition of the proceeds or property of crime is typical ML offence and it 
involves conducts envisaged in the layering stage of ML such as purchase and sale of real estate 
– apartment, houses, flats, and commercial premises. It might also involve investment in financial 
products, which have good liquidity, which can be bought and sold easily – for example unlisted 
stocks and shares.   
 The word possession means “the fact of having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise 
of dominion over property”.318 Possession has also been described as the de facto and de jure right 
to a material object, constituted by the intentional element or animus (the belief and purpose of 
owning the object) and the physical element or corpus (the control or effective enjoyment of a 
material object).399 Meanwhile to ‘use’ is “the application or employment of something;319 to 
employ, to utilise”.320  
An example of a section 329 offence is the case of R v. Gabriel.402 In that case, the police 
had searched the defendant’s house and found GBP 10,000, hidden under the mattress of a 
waterbed, and on another occasion, GBP 6,070 inside an air pistol case. Within the house the, 
officer observed a 42-inch plasma television screen, an ornate mahogany fireplace, a conservatory 
with a swimming pool and sauna, a large fridge, spa jets in the bathroom, a computer, good quality 
stereo equipment throughout the house, and Playstation games and DVDs. There was also a 
closed-circuit television set up outside the house, which could be viewed, from a monitor in the 
living room. Evidence was read from Department for Work and Pension and Inland Revenue (now 
HM Revenue & Customs) officials to the effect that the household received social security 
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benefits of about GBP 500 a week. The prosecution alleged that, in the circumstances, it could be 
inferred that the monies were proceeds of crime, and that the defendant, as the householders, knew 
it. She was charged with possessing criminal property.  
 Similarly, Griffith v. Pattison,321 the defendant Pattison was an estate agent who bought, at 
substantial undervalue, a house, from a known drug dealer who was awaiting the determination 
of confiscation proceedings against him. Pattison was charged with, amongst other charges, 
acquiring criminal property, namely the house.   
The Section 328 POCA Offence: Concerned in an Arrangement  
As earlier observed, the United Kingdom legislation goes further than the Conventions, and 
indeed further than EU ML Directives, by defining ML to include property known or suspected 
to constitute or represent a benefit from criminal activity.322It is an offence under section 328 of 
POCA, 2002, to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement which he knows or suspects 
facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use, or control of criminal property by 
or on behalf of another person. The section 328 offence has its origins in section 24 of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act 1986, and later section 50 of DTA 1994. Corresponding provisions 
relating to other forms of criminal conduct appears in section 93A of the CJA 1988,323 and section 
38 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995.   
 The ‘another person’ need not be the person who originally obtained property as a result of, or 
in connection with, conduct carried on by him.324 It is submitted that the ‘another person’ referred 
to in section 328 of POCA 2002 can be someone named in the same indictment as the accused, 
although it cannot be someone named in the same count.325 The submission is based on a decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Connelly,326 albeit in the context of section 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs 
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Act 1971 (possession with intent to supply ‘to another’). The key words in section 328 of POCA, 
2002, are ‘become concerned in’, ‘arrangement’, and ‘facilitates’.   
In Bowman v. Fels327 the Court of Appeal took a robust and welcome approach to some 
of the more exaggerated views of what might amount to a breach under the section. In that case, 
the court held that, section 328 of the POCA, 2002, was not intended to cover or affect the ordinary 
conduct of litigation by legal professionals. That included any steps taken by such professionals 
in litigation from the issue of proceedings and securing of injunctive relief or a freezing order up 
to its final disposal by judgement. Thus, the central question in the case was whether section 328 
applies to the ordinary conduct of legal proceedings ‘or any aspect of such conduct – including, 
in particular, any step taken to pursue proceedings and the obtaining of a judgement’. According 
to the Court, Parliament could not have intended that proceedings or steps taken by lawyers in 
order to determine or secure legal rights and remedies for their clients should involve them in 
section 328 offence even if they suspected that the outcome of such proceedings might have such 
an effect.328  
 The section 328 offence is a source of considerable concern to those who handle or advise third 
parties in connection with money and other types of property. The court in that case left open 
whether section 328 means that a person who has done some previous act “such as giving advice, 
or playing a role in negotiations, can fall to be treated retroactively as having committed an 
offence by that act, if and when an arrangement is subsequently made”. 329   In Kensington 
International v. Vitol330 the question arose of whether, by giving a bribe,331a person necessarily 
enters into an arrangement, which he knows facilitates the acquisition of criminal property by the 
recipient, contrary to section 328 of POCA 2002, on the grounds that the bribe, once received, 
constitutes the latter’s benefit from criminal conduct. The Court of Appeal held that the answer is 
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in the negative if the only arrangement into which he enters is one, by which the property in 
question first acquires its criminal character. A person who gives a bribe may know that it will 
constitute criminal property in the hands of the recipient, but that does not make him guilty of 
entering into an arrangement, which facilitates the acquisition of what is already a criminal 
property.  
The Authorised Disclosure Defence: Section 338 of POCA 2002  
It is a defence to a charge under sections 327 to 329 of POCA 2002 that a person makes an 
authorised disclosure under section 338 and (if the disclosure is made before he does the 
prohibited act) he has the ‘appropriate consent’, or he intended to make such a disclosure but had 
a reasonable excuse for not doing so. It is also a defence if he acted for the purpose of carrying 
out a function relating to the enforcement of any statutory provisions relating to criminal conduct 
or benefit from criminal conduct.332 The expression ‘authorised disclosure’ is defined by section 
338 of POCA 2002 to mean a disclosure authorised by a constable, an officer of HM Revenue & 
Customs, or a ‘nominated officer’.333 Section 337 protects disclosure – that is to say, a disclosure 
is not to be taken to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information  
‘however imposed’.334  
 However, where a disclosure has been made, it is the offence of ‘tipping off’ to give information 
(typically to the suspected offender) which might prejudice an investigation, which might result 
from the initial disclosure.335 This can cause problems to banks and other institutions. In C v. S,418 
a bank had made a series of ML reports to the Economic Crime Unit of the National Crime 
Intelligence Service (NCIS). Later in civil proceedings, an order was made that the bank disclose 
certain papers, and the bank feared that compliance might amount to ‘tipping-off’. The NCIS 
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refused to give an assurance that it would not prosecute for that offence, and instead sought an 
order for the disclosure to it of the same papers. The bank faced the choice between possible 
prosecution and possible action for contempt of court. After an  
extraordinary appeal, extraordinary in that the appellant was excluded from most of the hearing, 
the Court of Appeal described the NCIS position as ‘neither sensible nor appropriate’. It indicated 
that where such conflicting pressures existed, the party required to disclose should seek a ruling 
from NCIS as to what material they would ‘clear’ for disclosure, and in the case of failure to 
agree, the court should be asked for directions.   
Implementing the Actus Reus: Other Examples  
Implementing the actus reus of the offence of ML does take different forms in different states, 
and only a few selected examples, with differing degree of complexity, can be considered under 
this section. The aim is to show how the broad definition of ML, as stated in the conventions, is 
transposed into domestic AML legislation. The approach in all examples is to extend the 
application field of the obligations to criminalise ML by drafting the offence broadly to cover 
every possible manipulation of criminal process.  
Section 461.31(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code  
With its sophisticated financial system, long borders, multicultural population, and of the world’s 
highest rates of electronic banking and commerce, Canada may be considered an attractive place 
for ML. The FATF has identified drug trafficking as a significant source of illicit funds along with 
prostitution, illegal arms sales, migrant smuggling, and white-collar crime such as securities 
offences and payment systems, real estate and telemarketing fraud.336  
 In 1998, Canada amended its Criminal Code to make it a criminal offence to engage in ML. The 
Criminal Code also provides for the seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds and property derived 
from various criminal and drug offences.   
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  Section 461.31(1) of the Criminal Code provides:  
“Everyone commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any  
person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any 
means, any property or any proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those 
proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or 
derived directly or indirectly as a result of:  
a. the Commission in Canada of a designated offence; or  
b. an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted a 
designated offence”.337  
A designated offence is defined as an indictable offence under the Criminal Code or any other Act 
of Parliament (other than an indictable offence prescribed by regulation) or a conspiracy or an 
attempt to commit, or being an accessory after the fact, or any counselling in relation to an offence 
referred to above.338 This would include a range of federal offences that are usually motivated by 
profit. Similar provisions relating to drugs are found in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
ML offences in Canada therefore include offences relating to drug trafficking, bribery, fraud, 
forgery, murder, robbery, counterfeiting, and stock manipulation.   
Section 4 of the South Africa Prevention of Organised Crime Act 1998422  
The concept of international organised crime and its negative effects is a fairly recent phenomenon 
in South Africa from the international community during the apartheid era which resulted in 
minimum exposure to and relative immunity from international organised crime.339The increasing 
effects of international organised crime in South Africa have coincided largely with South 
Africa’s re-entry into the international community. This considered, it is not surprising that prior 
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to 1998 the only legislation which addressed the issue of ML was the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act 140 of 1992.340   
 The increasing need for effective legislation relating to ML following South Africa’s reentry into 
the international community, compounded by increasing pressure on South Africa to bring its 
legislation into line with international standards, resulted in the promulgation, in 1998, of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (hereinafter POCA 1998).  
  Thus in South Africa the actus reus of ML is established by section 4 of POCA, 1998.  
The offence is defined in these terms:  
 “Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is or forms part of the proceeds 
of unlawful activities and–  
a. enter into any agreement or engages in any arrangement or transaction with anyone in connection 
with that property, whether such agreement, arrangement or transaction is legally enforceable or 
not; or  
b. performs any other act in connection with such property, whether it is performed independently or 
in concert with any other person, which has or is likely to have the effect–  
i. of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the said 
property or its ownership or any interest which anyone may have in respect thereof; or ii. of 
enabling or assisting any person who has committed or commits an offence, whether in the 
Republic or elsewhere–  
• to avoid prosecution; or  
• to remove or diminish any property acquired directly, or indirectly, as a result of the 
commission of an offence, shall be guilty of an offence”.  
Summary   
The obligations to criminalise ML that flowed from the international AML conventions has led to 
a plethora of domestic criminal legislation. The criticism, which has often been levelled at these 
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domestic AML legislations, is that their broad character has led to a drastic inflation of criminal 
liability. Although it is true that the definition of actus reus is, under many domestic ML 
legislation, very wide, both in regard of type of activities that fall under the offence and in regard 
of the range of predicate offences (as shall later be seen) covered by these legislations.  
However, it will be argued that in most cases this broad or wide application field of the ML 
offences can be kept in balance by the requirement to prove mens rea.341 In the next section, we 
shall examine the requirement to prove the mens rea in light of the broad obligations to criminalise 
ML.  
Examining the Mens Rea in Light of the Broad Definition of the Actus Reus  
The wide application field of AML legislation arising from the broad definition of the actus reus 
can only be kept in balance by the requirement for the prosecution to establish the mens rea. This 
moral element is two-fold: the required knowledge of the criminal origin of the proceeds and the 
required (specific) intent.342 The first element, the guilty knowledge element, has undoubtedly 
caused most discussion. At the heart of almost every ML trial is a dispute about the knowledge of 
the defendant. As it is often difficult for the prosecution to establish that the defendant actually 
knew that proceeds were criminally derived (and even less that he knew from which offences they 
were derived), in most cases the prosecution will try to infer knowledge from factual 
circumstances.427 This way of proving the knowledge requirement is sanctioned on an 
international level by Article 3(3) of the Vienna Convention 1998 and Article 6(2) (c) of the 1990 
Money Laundering Convention and has been endorsed by other instruments likes the OAS-
CICAD Model Regulation.343  
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 Circumstantial evidence derives its main force from the fact that it usually consists of a number 
of terms pointing in the same direction. This point was made in R v. Exall: 429   
 “[I]t has been said that circumstantial evidence is to be considered a chain, and each piece of evidence as 
a link in the chain, but that is not so, for then, if any one link breaks, the chain would fall. It is more like 
the case of a rope comprised of several cords. One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the 
weight, but three stranded together may be of quite sufficient strength. Thus it may be in circumstantial 
evidence – there may be a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable 
conviction or more than a mere suspicion; but the three taken together may create a conclusion of guilt with 
as much certainty as human affairs can require or admit of”.  
 Thus, a useful analogy may be drawn between ML and handling stolen goods. That goods were 
stolen may be proved by circumstantial evidence, although there may be no direct evidence from 
the victim or the thief of the fact of their being stolen. Indeed, circumstances in which the 
defendant handled the goods may, of themselves, be sufficient to prove not only  that the goods 
were stolen but also that, at the time when the defendant handled them, he knew or believed that 
they were stolen.430  
  As the illustration above indicates, the use of circumstantial evidence to prove the elements of 
ML offences is now a regular practice in a wide range of legal jurisdictions. Indeed the 
circumstances from which the jury are asked to draw inferences that the property is the proceeds 
of crime are frequently the same evidence from which they asked to draw inferences that the 
defendant also had the requisite mens rea. In United States v. Avery, Daniels and Daniels431 the 
US Court of Appeal held that Sherry and Michele Daniels were extensively involved in a ML 
operation. The court said that the evidence, much of it circumstantial, heavily incriminated them 
and went on to state: “Circumstantial evidence on its own can sustain a jury’s verdict. . . Although 
they offered an innocent explanation for the incriminating facts proved by the government, the 
jury was free to disbelieve them”. In United States v. Quintero432 the conviction of a grandmother 
for laundering the drug-trafficking proceeds of her grandson was upheld. The US Court of 
Appeals held that the prosecution had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to 
find that the grandson was a drug dealer, that the grandmother knew that he was a drug dealer and 
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that she knew that car purchases and trade-ins, which she participated in, involved the proceeds 
of drug dealing. The evidence that the prosecution adduced included evidence of the grandson’s 
lifestyle, his vacations, his lack of  
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gainful employment, his failure to submit income tax returns and his purchase of eight expensive 
cars which were registered in his grandmother’s  name.344345  
 In United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel,434 the court stated that there were a variety of types of 
evidence that had been considered when determining whether a transaction was designed to 
conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of criminal proceeds. The 
list included unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; structuring the transaction in a way to 
avoid attention; highly irregular features of the transaction; using third parties to conceal the real 
owner; a series of unusual financial moves culminating in the transaction; and expert evidence on 
the practices of criminals.346 This list might equally well, it is submitted, have been in relation to 
evidence that may be used when determining whether the property in question was the proceeds 
of crime.  
The Required (Specific) Intent for Money Laundering  
The mental standard of liability for the laundering offence differs from state to states. The Vienna 
Convention 1988 requires knowledge that the property is derived from drug-related crimes, 
although it may be inferred from objective circumstance.347  The Palermo Convention similarly 
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requires knowledge of property being the proceeds of crime.348 The 1990 Money Laundering 
Convention, in addition to knowledge, permits members to criminalise ML on a negligence 
standard.349   
Some variation of the mental standard is also thought to exist in domestic law of some 
states. For example, the POCA 2002 in the UK requires knowledge or suspicion of property being 
criminal property. However, suspicion in this regard is subjective-based350 and therefore cannot 
be equated with negligence, which is objective-based under the 1990 Money Laundering 
Convention. In the US, the mental standard required is knowledge of property being the proceeds 
of crime.440  
By setting the threshold for mens rea as low as suspicion, or ‘reasonable grounds for 
suspecting’, the UK has exceeded its treaty obligations. The mens rea requirement is found in the 
definition of criminal property in section 340(3) of POCA, 2002. It requires the alleged offender 
to know or suspect that that property constitutes or represents the benefit of criminal conduct.   
 Suspicion is thought to be a much easier test and presents a greater risk. The meaning of the word 
‘suspicion’ has been considered in a number of cases both under the predecessor of POCA 2002 
(CJA 1988) and under POCA 2002 itself. The case of R v. Da Silva441 concerned a prosecution 
under section 93A (1) (a) of the CJA 1988 which is the predecessor of POCA 2002, section 328. 
The Court of Appeal was required to consider the meaning of ‘suspicion’ and found that:  
 “It seems to us that the essential element in the word ‘suspect’ and its affiliates, in this context, 
is that the Defendant must think that there is a possibility, which is more than merely fanciful, 
that the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling of unease will not suffice. But the statute does not 
require the suspicion to be ‘clear’ or ‘firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts’ or based on 
‘reasonable ground”.  
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 The definition of suspicion used in R v. Da Silva was adopted in K Ltd v. National Westminster 
Bank plc,442 which addressed the position of a bank that had refused to implement a customer 
order to transfer funds on the basis of a suspicion of ML. The issue arose as to what constituted a 
proper suspicion in law. The Court found that the existence of a suspicion is a subjective fact and 
that there is no legal requirement that there should be reasonable grounds for a suspicion. The 
issue was also considered in the case of Shah v. HSBC Private Bank (UK  
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Ltd.351 In that case the court rejected a contention that a suspicion should be a ‘rational’ suspicion 
and said that the decision in K Ltd clearly established that a suspicion under POCA 2002 is a 
subjective one.  
 In addition, in R v. Montila352 the House of Lords noted the absence of ‘reasonable suspicion’ as 
a basis for criminal liability in the three main international instruments.353 The third EU ML 
Directive defines culpable ‘ML’, as conduct that is committed intentionally, either knowing that 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity and, that 
‘knowing, intent or purpose required as an element of the activities mentioned  may be inferred 
from objective factual circumstances.354  
Examining the Term ‘Property’ in the Context of the Obligations to Criminalise  
In drafting the Vienna Convention 1988 the definition of the word ‘property’ was originally the 
definition of the term ‘proceeds’.355 However, it became clear that two definitions were needed, 
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one (that of ‘property’) serving to emphasise that assets of every possible kind were included and 
the second (‘proceeds’) addressing the derivation of the property.356  Surprisingly, when the 
definition first appeared in a draft of the Palermo Convention, that experience was overlooked, 
and the language was part of a definition of ‘proceeds of crime.357 At the First Session of the Ad  
Hoc Committee, definitions of ‘property’ and ‘proceeds of crime’ based on those in the Vienna 
Convention, 1988, were inserted.450  
 The language used is apt for the various classifications of property to be found in national legal 
systems. In some systems the legal documents of title to property are not merely evidence but 
have value in themselves, and this is catered for in the definition. According to Article 2 (e) of the 
Palermo Convention “Proceeds of crime shall mean any property derived from or obtained, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence”.358  
  In addition, the 2009 Model Provisions on ML, defines the word ‘property’ to mean:  
 “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, moveable or immovable, 
however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, 
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including but not limited to currency, bank credits, deposits 
and other financial resources, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, 
drafts and letters of credits, whether situated in [insert name of State] or elsewhere, and includes a legal or 
equitable interest, whether full or partial, in any such property”.359  
  The foregoing definition together with the definition of property in the conventions is broad and 
wide enough to include every conceivable aspect of the term ‘property’.   
  For the purpose of POCA 2002, the definition of ‘criminal property’ is widely drawn.453  
Property is ‘criminal property’ if “(a) it constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or it 
represents such a benefit (in whole or in part and whether directly or indirectly) and (b) the alleged 
offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit”. By section 340 (9) of 
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POCA 2002, ‘criminal property’ extends to property anywhere in the world – and includes (a) 
money, (b) all forms of property, real or personal, heritable or moveable, (c) things in action and 
other intangible or incorporeal property.  
 Rules that apply in relation to property are set out in section 340(10) of POCA 2002. The most 
important rules are (1) that property is obtained by a person if he obtains an interest in it, and (2) 
that reference to an interest in relation to property other than land, include references to a right 
(including a right to possession). It is crucial to note that the definition of ‘criminal property’ has 
two principal elements. First, the property either is, or represents, any persons’ benefit from 
‘criminal conduct’. Secondly, property is only criminal property if the person dealing with it 
‘knows or suspects’ that it constitutes such a benefit.360  
 The concept of ‘criminal property’ is central to the way in which the ML offences of the POCA 
2002 have been expressed. The term criminal property carries within itself the mental element of 
the offences, so that the sections creating the offences are expressed in very simple terms.361 In 
arriving at a definition of criminal property, certain other terms have also to be defined. The most 
important terms are ‘property’,362 ‘criminal conduct’,363 ‘benefits’364 and ‘criminal property’.365  
Examining the concept and scope of the ‘Predicate Offence’  
Article 2(h) of the Palermo Convention460 defines the predicate offence as any offence as a result 
of which proceeds have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in 
article 6 of the convention. A predicate offence is therefore the underlying criminal offence that 
gave rise to the criminal proceeds, which are the subject of a ML charge.366 The concept is an 
important one in US law because, in order to prosecute successfully for ML, there must be proof 
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that the property involved in the transaction was the proceeds of ‘specified unlawful activities’ 
(SUA) as defined by 18 USC 1956 (c)(7).  This subsection contains a list of crimes that constitute 
SUA, most of which are crimes commonly associated with organised  
crime.367   
 The concept of predicate offence can also be observed in the ML legislation of other jurisdictions. 
For example, Canada introduced legislation which was limited to where the proceeds were derived 
from an ‘enterprise crime offence’ or a designated drug offence’368 and New Zealand introduced 
legislation which applied to offences with a five-year minimum period imprisonment.369  
The concept of the predicate crime has also had an impact on international conventions 
dealing with ML. The Vienna Convention 1988465 adopted to stem the threat of ML had a limited 
scope in the sense that it criminalised ML proceeds from drug offences only. Subsequent 
international conventions370  and the FATF have however provided for optional extension of 
criminalisation to further categories of predicate offences.   
 The scope of the ML predicate offences has however been elaborated in the glossary to FATF 40 
recommendations to encompass the following: it includes participation in organised criminal 
groups and racketeering; terrorism, including financing of terrorism; trafficking in human beings 
and illegal migrants smuggling; sexual exploitation including exploitation of children and illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Other include illicit arms trafficking in 
stolen and other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting currency; counterfeiting and 
piracy of products; environmental crimes; murder or grievous bodily injury, kidnapping, illegal, 
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and hostage taking; robbery or theft; smuggling; extortion; forgery; piracy; tax crime and insider 
trading and market manipulation.371  
 As far as the European Union AML framework is concerned, the issue of ML predicate offences 
has been partly addressed in the specific context of the third pillar measures on fraud372and 
confiscation.373  According to recommendation 26(b) of the action plan on organised crime, 
criminalisation of laundering of the proceeds of crime should be created as broad as possible to 
ensure a range of powers of investigations into it.374  In its report on the first Commission 
Implementation Report, the European Parliament adopted a motion, whose resolution point 5 calls 
on all member states, in so far as they have already not done so, to extend their legislation on 
combating ML, not only to money derived from drug trafficking but also money acquired from 
professional and organised crime.375  
  The need for the extension of ML predicate offences was also reiterated in the Tampere  
European Council conclusion, which called for a ‘uniform and sufficient broad scope’ of predicate 
offences. This position was also reflected on the European Union view on the proposed United 
Nations Conventions of transnational organised crimes.376Article 1(5) states that, “in the money 
laundering field, the convention should extend a broad range of offences, and in particular should 
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be consistent with the 40 recommendations of the FATF”. This particular provision was 
incorporated as an acknowledgement to the international trends of ML, such as the revision of the 
FATF recommendations, justified by the need to facilitate suspicious transaction reporting and 
international co-operation in this area.377  Rather than following the allcrime prohibition the 
commission opted for an extension to cover, along with the drug offences of the 1991 text, the 
following conduct: participation in the activities linked to organised crime; and fraud, corruption 
or any other illegal activity damaging or likely to damage the European Communities financial 
interest.378Another prevalent trend following the adoption of the first EU ML Directive was the 
increasing use of the wider financial and non-financial institutions – prompting launderers to shift 
to non-regulated professions for their activities. 379  This trend was also associated with the 
sophistication in ML activities, which involve a wide range of intermediary professions of varied 
expertise.  
 The growing role of professionals such as accountants, solicitors, and company formation agents 
was highly emphasised since they were frequently mentioned in ML cases.380 In establishing 
sophisticated businesses that conceal ML, the professionals provide advice and extra layer of 
respectability to ML operations. FATF addressed the foregoing concerns by revising the 40 
recommendations in 1996. Recommendations 8 of the 2003 recommendations (formerly 9)381 was 
revised to ensure that member states equally apply AML standards to nonfinancial institutions 
which are not subject to formal prudential supervisory regime in all states such as bureaux de 
change.382  
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 The European Union AML counter-measures have been emboldened by the third EU ML 
Directive, which consolidated the earlier directives on the same issue.383  The third EU ML 
Directive reflects the changed regulatory market environment and typologies of ML as per the 
revised FATF 40 recommendations. The revised was aimed at, in particular, to extend the scope 
of predicate offences, providing guidance on customer identification requirement, which now take 
place on the basis of a risk based approach,480 taking into account categories of individuals such 
as politically exposed persons (PEPs) and misuse of corporate vehicles. As a strategy to undercut 
terrorist funding, which is largely fuelled by ML, the third EU ML directive signalled a concerted 
effort in the EU to use ML counter-measures in fighting the threat of terrorism.384 The provision 
of customer identification have been expanded to introduce various levels of due diligence, which 
may range from simplified due diligence, in particular in the course of correspondent cross-border 
banking with third parties, transactions with PEPs or where the use of shell banks is involved. The 
revised framework is very broad, subsuming traditional crimes, such as theft, robbery, and more 
that fall in the realm of domestic law.   
The UK Approach  
UK legislation historically drew a distinction between laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking 
and laundering the proceeds of other. ML offences were first introduced in England and Wales 
under the DTA 1986, but it was not until 1993 that ML offences in crimes respect of the proceeds 
of non-drug trafficking criminal conduct were created by the CJA 1993 and inserted in the CJA 
1988.  
 The POCA 2002 removed the distinction between these two different types of ML offences. The 
ML offences in the Act refer to ‘criminal property’, which is defined, as noted above, property 
which constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or represents such a benefit (in whole 
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or in part and whether directly or indirectly) and which the alleged offender knows or suspects 
constitutes or represents such a benefit. Criminal conduct is widely defined as conduct that 
constitutes an offence in any part of the UK or would constitute an offence in any part of the UK 
if it occurred there.   
 Arguably, referring to predicate offences in the context of the UK, ML legislation was always 
misleading in that the prosecution did not have to prove a predicate offence in the American sense, 
but merely which side of the drug trafficking/non-drug trafficking divide the criminal monies 
derived from. Use of the term since the passing of the POCA 2002 is, however, completely 
otiose.385 There is no need to prove either a specific offence or a type of offence. if the jury can 
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the property in question was derived from criminal 
conduct and that the defendant knew or suspected this then, even if they do not know what 
particular type of offence was committed, they may still convict the defendant.386  
 During the passage of the POCA, 2002, the government resisted an opposition amendment that 
proposed limiting the application of the ML offences to the proceeds of indictable offences. One 
of the grounds on which the amendment was resisted was that having to identify the predicate 
offence as having been an indictable one rather than a summary one would act as a barrier to 
successful prosecutions.387 It may be that in some cases the prosecution will be able to call 
evidence to prove exactly how the proceeds were derived. However, if not, then, as long as the 
jury are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the funds were derived from some sort of 
‘underlying criminality’, a matter which may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence, they 
will be entitled to convict.  
Given the cross-border nature of the offence of ML AML investigators and prosecutors 
will still have to turn their minds to the concept of ‘predicate offence’ when seeking mutual legal 
assistance and international cooperation from a jurisdiction where the term remains relevant.  For 
example, when sending Letters of Request to the US, prosecutors will have to satisfy the US 
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authorities that ML, as the US understands that offence has been committed. This will mean 
proving evidence that the proceeds were derived from a predicate offence as defined by US 
legislation. Whereas in the UK, laundering charges may be preferred, regardless of the particular 
type of crime that gave rise to the ill-gotten gains.  
The Problem of Tax Offences  
The most politically sensitive question in this area is whether tax offences are predicate offences 
for the purpose of ML charges. Although the UK position is that revenue offences are predicate 
as far as ML offences are concerned,388 the same is not necessarily true of other jurisdictions. 
While some jurisdictions have no difficulty in accepting their own domestic tax offences as 
predicate offences, the position is often more difficult when it comes to foreign tax offences. Since 
a traditional approach has been that foreign taxation offences are not predicate offences for the 
purpose of ML charges.389 Whether this position is likely to change needs to be examined in the 
global context of developments in relation to harmful tax practices.   
In recent years, international initiatives487 have placed pressure on offshore tax havens to 
be more transparent and to grant more cooperation in investigations by foreign tax authorities. A 
crucial issue for the future will therefore be whether such trends will eventually result in an 
international initiative for all jurisdictions to remove the taxation ‘loophole’ from their ML 
legislation. This is a major source of concern as existing repressive and preventive AMLC have 
failed to address the specific cases of the tax element in cross border ML.   
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In summary, while the ML activities that should be criminalised are the same under the 
relevant conventions and the model law, the predicate offence is not. The Vienna Convention  
1988, for example, only applies to proceeds from drug trafficking offences488whereas the Palermo 
Convention applies to the proceeds of all serious crime.489 The model law is clearly part of an 
international effort to expand the predicate offence beyond drug trafficking to other types of 
offences.   
 This trend is also notable, for example, in the 2002 amendments to the Inter-American Drug 
Abuse Control Commission (hereinafter CICAD) Model Regulations Concerning Laundering 
Offences and in the 1998 United Nations Political Declaration and Action Plan against Money 
Laundering.390 This trend has led to the criminalisation of ML evolving as a technique that can be 
used against any type of acquisitive crime. This is especially the case of legislation where the 
operation of the confiscation of proceeds operates in personam and hence does not allow the 
removal of proceeds, which have been channelled, to third parties.   According to Stessens, once 
the criminalisation of ML is seen as an alternative, rather than a complement, to the in rem 
confiscation of criminally derived proceeds391 it is only logical to have a wide application field of 
predicate offences.  A conviction on a charge of ML may often then be the only way, save value 
confiscation,392 to ensure deprivation of proceeds that can no longer be traced in the estate of the 
person who has committed the predicate offence.393  
 The latitude available to individual states arising from the flexibility of these international 
instruments (a peculiarity with soft law) has resulted in a patchwork of predicate offences, centred 
around  drug trafficking,394 corruption,395 organised crime396 and other criminalised types of ML 
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activities.397 The increase in international instruments has led to an increase in the number of 
offences, which are recognised by every state as predicate offences in relation to the offence of 
ML. With the increasing number of international instruments, States that confine the application 
field of their domestic AML legislation to a single category of predicate offence is becoming rare.   
Criminalisation and Confiscation: A Repressive Technique  
There is a further aspect to repressive AML technique. This has to do with the confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime, and this type of confiscation is of recent origin in relation to confiscation of 
subject and instrumentality of crime.   
Confiscation as part of repressive AMLC generally operates in-personam, and may not 
apply when the proceeds of crime have already been channelled to third parties.498 Nevertheless, 
in most cases, confiscation as a legal tool for the repression of ML is also pursued both in-rem 
and in-personam. The point is that, the use of confiscation without a general purpose, in relation 
to an in rem application, may not have achieved the aim of the law since repressive AMLC, apart 
from punishing culprit in relation to the laundering offence, is also aimed at stopping criminals 
benefitting from their crime.  
Referring to Confiscation in rem, the American Supreme Court, in United States v.  
Various Items of Personal Property499 stated that, “it is the property which is proceeded against 
and, by resort to legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of 
inanimate and insentient”. In view of this, criminalisation of ML was seen as an alternative (rather 
than a complement), to the in rem confiscation of criminally derived proceeds. This however, has 
resulted in the wide application field of predicate offences, as a conviction on a charge of ML 
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may often be the only way to ensure deprivation of the proceeds that can no longer be traced in 
the estate of the person who has committed the predicate offence.  
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Confiscation and Models  
Confiscation is said to be justified by a principle, deeply ingrained into the law that people should 
not profit from unlawful activity in general and from crime in particular.398 This principle follows 
from the requirement that if law is to impact upon people’s behaviour, it should deliver coherent 
messages. It is not coherent, on the one hand, to try to prevent a particular form of behaviour, but 
on the other, to permit someone who does it to benefit. The principle is stated in the judgement of 
Lawton LJ in R v. Waterfield:399  
 “The first thing the law should do is to ensure that those who break it . . . should not make any 
money out of their wrongdoing . . . This court is firmly of the opinion that if those who take part 
in this kind of trade know that on conviction they are likely to be stripped of every penny of profit 
they make and a good deal more, then the desire to enter it will be diminished”.  
Two models of confiscation can be distinguished: object confiscation and value 
confiscation.  The distinction in the first place concerns the mode in which property rights are 
affected: either through the imposition of an obligation to pay a certain amount of money or 
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through transfer of property. It will be argued, however, that this distinction also concerns the in 
rem or in personam character of confiscation. Both the Vienna Convention 1988400 and the 1990  
Money Laundering Convention401 provide for both models.402  
 Object confiscation is a powerful criminal sanction: it results in the transfer of property title to 
the State.505 Object confiscation, often known as forfeiture, function in many criminal justice 
systems in relation to the instrumentalities of crime. The application field of this type of 
confiscation, when extended to the proceeds from crime, creates a number of 
sometimesinsurmountable problems. A definite drawback of object confiscation, especially in 
relation to proceeds from crime, is its uncertain character; property which at the time of the 
judicial decision has been consumed or which cannot be traced any more, escapes confiscation. 
That this may cause inherently unjust consequences needs little explanation.  
 As an American judge once put it succinctly: “A racketeer who dissipates the profit...on wine, 
women and song has profited from organised crime to the same extent as if he had put the money 
in his bank account”.403 The goal of an effective deprivation of the fruits of crime may thus suffer 
from the fact that (some of) the property constituting the fruit of crime cannot be traced any more.   
 A possible more harmful disadvantage of object confiscation relates to the right of bona fide third 
parties, whose rights may suffer because of the ‘blind’ application of object confiscation.404 In 
relation to proceeds from crime, this type of confiscation normally functions independently of any 
property rights that may be established in relation to the proceeds. As far as the person who 
committed the crime is concerned, this is only logical; he can indeed not have any bona fide rights 
with regards to property he obtained through an offence. This conclusion cannot be broadened, 
however, to third parties who have established rights with respect to the property representing the 
proceeds from crime, after the offence has been committed.  The second model of confiscation is 
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value confiscation, and this type of confiscation does not consist in the deprivation of property 
(known as proceeds from crime) but of a judicial order to pay a certain amount of money, 
corresponding to the value of the proceeds from crime.508 This entails that value confiscation can 
in principle only be in relation to the proceeds from crime.  
 Once a value confiscation has been ordered, the state can in principle use the remedies available 
to a private creditor to ensure payment (attachment of property etc). This will generally be the 
case in respect of object confiscation as well. The clearest advantage of value confiscation lies in 
the fact that, unlike object confiscation, it operates in personam, meaning that confiscation can in 
principle be pronounced only with regard to the proceeds enjoyed by the offender and can be 
enforced only on property owned by the offender.  
Part 2 of POCA 2002 lays down the statutory framework for confiscation orders post 
conviction, and restraint and receivership orders.405 One of the requirements which has to be 
fulfilled before the court can make an order is that there should be “reasonable cause to believe 
that the alleged offender has benefitted from his criminal conduct”.406 It is now clearly established 
that this requirement must be fulfilled on the basis of full and complete evidence being put before 
the court, as was held in Early in 2011 by the Court of Appeal in the case of Windsor v. CPS.407  
 In addition to introducing new and stricter ML offences, POCA 2002 enhanced the courts’ post-
conviction confiscation powers, and transferred to the Crown Court powers formerly exercised 
by the High Court.408 The confiscation provisions came into force on 24 March 2003.409They 
apply only in respect of offences committed on or after that date. Offences committed before that 
date are governed by the DTA 1994 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Confiscation procedures 
depend on the conviction of an offender.  
 Part 2 of POCA 2002 contains statutory powers to confiscate the assets of convicted criminals. 
The term ‘confiscate order’ is in many ways a misnomer, but a useful shorthand term: the actual 
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order is to pay a sum of money equal to the benefit from the criminal conduct.410Confiscated assets 
are forfeit to the Crown. A victim of crime cannot intervene in confiscation hearing to seek, for 
example, the return of stolen funds. In practice, however, prosecutors will have in mind the 
possibility of asking the court to make a compensation order in appropriate cases. The amount of 
compensation payable will depend on the court’s view of the defendant’s means: the 
compensation can be paid out of the sums confiscated.411 However, a court has discretion not to 
make a confiscation order, or to reduce its amount, if the victim of the criminal conduct has started 
or intends to start proceedings against the defendant.412  Confiscation is a harsh regime, and 
intended to be so. Together with the criminalisation of ML, confiscation is a powerful repressive 
AMLC. Hardship is thought not to be a consideration, as general fair trial guarantees under Article 
6(1) of the Human Right Act 1998 apply.413 The presumption of innocence does not apply, as 
confiscation only arises after conviction.414 The primary purpose of a confiscation order is to 
deprive the defendant of his illgotten gains, not to enrich the Crown; where possible, 
compensation order will also be made.415  
Arguments for criminalisation   
This section will consider a few of the moral arguments for criminalisation as a tool for repressive 
AMLC – confiscation is a direct consequence of criminalisation.  
Punishing Laundering Removes the Incentive to Commit Predicate Offences  
                                                     
410
 The question of whether a confiscation order is appropriate in cases involving major corruption has been 
called into question by Thomas LJ in his Sentencing Remarks in R v. Innospec [2010] Lloyd’s Rep F.C. 
462 cited in Hatchard et al supra ft. 84.  
411
 POCA 2002, section 13(5) and (6).  
412
 POCA 2002, 6(6).  
413
 See Lloyd v. Bow Street Magistrate Court [2004] 1CrAppR 11, DC and ReS (Restraint Order: Release 
of Assets) [2005] 1 WRL 1338 (CA). (An appeal against a refusal to vary a restraint order to permit funding 
for legal representation – appeal dismissed, having regard to funding available under the Access to Justice 
Act 1992 Sch 2.) cited in Hatchard et al supra note 509, p. 249.  
414
 Hatchard et al p. 249.  
415
 Ibid.  
      148  
  
ML is associated with the commission of a predicate offence (fraud, theft, drugs, corruption). This 
means that resources are illegally and unfairly transferred from the control of the victim to the 
offender.416 The illegal nature of the proceeds of crime renders the laundering activity necessary 
in order to make the wealth appear as if it was derived by legitimate means. Thus, ML contributes 
to the process of unfair reallocation of wealth from the good to the bad by rendering detection 
extremely difficult and allowing criminals to enjoy the fruits of their crime undisturbed. It also 
helps make crime worthwhile, by giving economic power to criminals and  
takes it from law-abiding citizens.   
The argument here is very simple one, akin to the assertion of the principle against 
allowing profit from crime. As noted above, “the first thing the law should do is to ensure that 
those who break it...should not make any money out of their wrongdoing . . .”417  The deterrent 
argument here can be sustained if the chance of being detected for the predicate offence is 
significantly lower than for laundering offence, or where the penalties for the laundering offence 
are so much higher than for the predicate offence as to make a difference to a rational, calculating 
criminal.418    
Punishing Laundering Attacks the ‘Real’ Criminal  
Attention in recent time has been drawn in particular to the billions stolen by the world’s dictators 
and those in their immediate circle, 419 and it is only recently that serious efforts began to be made 
to recover some of these looted assets. There had been growing recognition internationally of a 
need when dealing with the proceeds of serious crime to combine criminal sanctions with civil 
remedies. This recognition sprang from the realisation that depriving the criminal of the fruits of 
his criminal activity can often best be achieved by a two-pronged effort.524 On the one hand, there 
was the traditional route of criminal restraint and confiscation following trial and conviction, but 
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on the other, there were increasing situations in which the criminally acquired assets themselves 
need to be the focus of the proceedings.  
 The argument then made for criminalising ML is that the criminals cannot distance themselves 
from the profit, because that is the benefit of their crime. The real criminals can be identified and 
punished if money can be traced to them. If the ML can be traced to the real criminal, there can 
be an independent case for criminalisation based on laundering apart from the predicate offence. 
Criminalisation then becomes a useful tool for a conviction based solely on the offence of ML 
and not just the predicate crime.  
Money Laundering has a Negative Economic Impact  
ML is thought to produce negative economic and financial implications, which affect the efficient 
allocation of resources. An efficient allocation of resources exist where there is a free play of 
market forces and risk adjusted returns from all the various forms of economic activities are 
equalised at the margin.420 While the efficient allocation in this regard refers to that of the public, 
a private efficiency is socially efficient where market failures and externalities are 
negligible.421Money Launderer maximise their returns with the risk of detection but this private 
maximisation is socially efficient, since laundering produces significant externalities in terms of 
costs upon the society from laundering and the predicate crime.   
 The costs associated with the predicate crime need not be elaborated, as they are evident, for 
example, costs from drug trafficking. The impact of the economic costs from ML can only then 
be appreciated from the directions of movement of funds from such activities. The large inflows 
or outflows of criminal funds from laundering could, therefore, significantly influence variables 
such as the exchange rates and interest rates or create price bubbles of particular assets towards 
which the funds are invested, such as lands and houses.422  
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As the changes in these variables bear no relation to economic fundamentals, the policymakers 
could get confused as to these changes and possibly implement incorrect economic policies.423  
The economic consequences of ML therefore justifies the criminalisation of the offence, 
as this would deter launderers and avoid the negative impact on the legalised economy.  
Conclusion  
Since the Vienna Convention 1988, criminalisation of ML has developed beyond the scope of 
drug-related proceeds. It became obvious that such limitation is neither justified nor practical, in 
view of the trend in ML typologies. Drug trafficking is not the only serious offence that generates 
large criminal fortune; therefore confining ML offences to the proceeds of drugrelated crime 
creates a host of practical problems and renders the law ineffective. Defining the predicate 
offences of ML is now a policy issue to which subsequent international instruments and states 
give different solutions. It was now common to extend the offence of ML beyond the scope of 
drug-related offences.  
Given that it was left open to States to decide exactly which crimes would qualify as 
predicate offences to ML, a veritable patchwork of national lists of predicate offences has resulted. 
Harmonisation through a broad definition of ML (by using soft law), has created the needed 
atmosphere for compromise in criminal AML repressive technique. Criminalisation is therefore a 
tool for repressive AMLC.   
As noted in chapter one, soft law can ease bargaining problems among states by opening 
up opportunity for achieving mutually preferred compromises. Negotiating a hard, highly 
elaborate agreement among heterogeneous states is a costly and protracted process. It is therefore 
more practical to negotiate a softer form of agreement that establishes general goals but with less 
precision. Soft law accordingly, allows states to adapt their commitments to their particular 
situations rather than trying to accommodate divergent national circumstances within a single text. 
This provides for flexibility in implementation, helping states deal with the domestic political and 
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economic consequences of an agreement and thus increasing the efficiency with which it is carried 
out.424 This is the effect of a broad definition of ML (as a repressive criminal technique) in a 
heterogeneous international system.  
  
  
  
  
CHAPTER FOUR  
I.  Preventive Anti-Money Laundering Control  
Chapter three of this thesis considered the role of soft law as a technique for repressive AMLC 
through criminalisation of the offence of ML and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
Criminalisation, as noted earlier, was effected through a broad definition of the offence of ML 
under both the UN425426 and EU531 Conventions. The broad definition of the offence of ML relates 
to our earlier definition of formal soft law, under which we considered treaty provisions that are 
imprecise, subjective or indeterminate in language.427  
  In order to examine the role of soft law as a technique for preventive AMLC this  
chapter will consider the role of certain non-treaty or informal instruments and their relevance to 
the prevention of ML.  These international instruments and initiatives, of non-binding origin, 
include the work of the FATF and other FATF-style regional bodies and organisations,428 the EC 
ML Directives534and the Basel Statement of Principle of 12 December 1988, issued by the Basle 
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Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices.429 The Basel Principle 1988 is 
directed specifically at prevention of laundering crimes and is targeted at the financial system, 
especially banks.   
Thus, legal measures on the preventive aspect are understood as referring to obligations 
of financial and non-financial institutions to undertake certain actions to disclose ML operations. 
These obligations, while initially limited to banks have been extended to non-bank financial 
institutions, 430  and even non-financial businesses and certain professions. 431  The principal 
justification for this extension is that criminals turn more and more to those nonfinancial 
businesses and professions to launder proceeds from crime. This is the reason for the 
implementation of the preventive measures on banks and financial institutions. Reference in this 
regard should be made to the FATF suggestion that the preventive measures be applied to 
nonfinancial businesses and professions.432  
However, there is a further aspect to the preventive AMLC. This is in relation to the 
identification of the beneficial ownership of the proceeds of crime, which work in tandem with 
the obligations placed on financial institutions to undertake certain actions to disclose laundering 
operation. The identification of beneficial ownership is important to preventive AMLC as it bears 
direct relation to the obligations placed on financial and non-financial institutions on the 
prevention of  ML through reporting obligations and customer due diligence (hereinafter CDD). 
Unlike the earlier approach that dwelled on Customer Identification or KYC, the current trend is 
towards enhanced CDD in high-risk cases. Together with the current riskbased approach, the 
identification of beneficial ownership brings existing efforts in preventive AMLC to a natural 
person or the controlling entity behind a ML scheme.  
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Thus, the  approach here, as with the last chapter, will be to examine the international 
law-making processes that have been engaged in response to the threat of ML by looking at the 
technique to prevent ML through informal non-binding soft law. The focus here, as with other 
chapters, is not to give account of the sources of international law but the aim is to identify the 
instruments, participants and processes employed in response to threat of ML by looking at the 
obligations placed on financial and non-financial institutions in the prevention of ML. The 
emphasis here is not on repression through the criminal law, but prevention through industry 
regulation. The chapter does this by examining the role of informal non-binding initiatives under 
existing international arrangements. Together with the obligations placed on financial and non-
financial institutions on the prevention of ML, the prevention of ML operation through soft law 
has become a focal point for global AML policies and initiatives.   
The chapter will therefore do two things: first, it will highlight the body of informal AML 
arrangements (or initiatives); second, it will examine the measures adopted under these 
instruments (as applied in domestic legislation) and the relevance to the prevention of global ML. 
The chapter is divided into two sections: informal instruments and initiatives on the prevention of 
ML and preventive AML measures.  
I.I.   Soft Law in the Preventive Anti-Money Laundering Control  
The role of soft law in preventive AMLC is centred on the uniform application of preventive AML 
measures that transforms into domestic AML legislation. Unlike the repressive control that is 
based on criminalisation and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, the preventive AMLC is aimed 
at preventing the negative impact of ML on the financial system. These informal initiatives, of 
non-binding origin, legitimise participation in national decisions by international actors and 
concerned domestic bodies by fostering a significant degree of convergence around the principles 
contained in them. They are many and fluid, and bear direct impact on the overall global challenge 
that the problem of ML poses.   
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According to Slaughter, soft law can “offer a focal point for convergence”.433 National 
adherence to international standards, such as the FATF Recommendations, can therefore foster a 
process of ‘leading example’. Non-treaty based obligations, like the FATF Recommendations and 
EU ML Directive, can exert pressure on states to adopt internationally-recognised AML standards 
through mutual evaluation techniques under the FATF and the principle of direct effect under 
European Union law. However, the initial priority under this section is to highlight the category 
of soft law instruments in the area of preventive AMLC.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices  
While it is generally accepted that efforts to combat ML and the broader financial aspects of 
serious forms of transnational criminality must place particular reliance on criminal justice 
mechanisms, the nature and extent of the problem are such as to require the imposition of 
internationally co-ordinated measures. This is aimed at preventing the use of the financial system 
and other vulnerable parts of the private sector for criminal purpose. The prevailing philosophy 
in this regard was well captured by Sherman in 1993 in these words:  
 “The fight against money laundering cannot be the sole responsibility of government and law enforcement 
agencies . . . if these activities are to be suppressed and hopefully, in the long term, substantially eliminating 
it will require the collective will and commitment of the public and private sector working together”.434  
 The first major initiative to give substantive expression to this approach was the December 1988 
Basel Statement of Principles. Its basic purpose is to encourage the banking sector, through ‘a 
general statement of ethical principles’, to adopt a common position in order to ensure that banks 
are not used to hide or launder funds acquired through criminal activities and, in particular, 
through drug trafficking.435   
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The Basel Committee is an informal committee of banking supervisory authorities that 
was established by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten States in 1974.436 It provides 
a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance 
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide.  
In the 1988 Statement of Principles, the Basel Committee acknowledged that ML could 
undermine public confidence in banks and their stability. The central principles, which it 
enunciates, have been summarised as follows:437   
• Know Your Customer: Banks should make reasonable efforts to determine the  
customer’s true identity, and have effective procedures for verifying the bona fides of 
new customers (whether on the asset or liability side of the balance sheet).  
• Compliance with laws: Bank management should ensure that business is concluded in 
conformity with high ethical standards, that laws and regulations are adhered to and that 
a service is not provided where there is good reason to suppose that transactions are 
associated with laundering activities.  
• Co-operation with law enforcement agencies: Within any constraints imposed by rules 
relating to customer confidentiality, banks should cooperate fully with national law 
enforcement agencies including, where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting ML, 
taking appropriate measures, which are consistent with the law.  
• Policies, procedures and training: All banks should formally adopt policies consistent 
with the principles set out in the Statement of Principles and should ensure that all 
members of their staff concerned, wherever located, are informed of the bank’s policy. 
Attention should be given to staff’s training in matters covered by the Statement. To 
promote adherence to these principles, banks should implement specific procedures for 
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customer identification and for retaining internal records of transactions. Arrangements 
for internal audit may need to be extended in order to establish an effective means of 
testing for general compliance with the Statement of Principles.  
In an effort to maximise the impact of these principles, the Basel Committee took the step 
of commending the Statement of Principles to supervisory authorities in other jurisdictions. It 
considered that banking supervisors had a general role to encourage ethical standards of 
professional conduct among banks. The Statement of Principles therefore encouraged the 
management of banks to put in place effective procedures to ensure that all persons conducting 
business with the institution concerned were properly identified.  Transactions that did not appear 
legitimate were discouraged and that effective cooperation with law enforcement agencies was 
achieved.438 Not restricting itself to the proceeds of drug trafficking as the Vienna Convention 
1988 had done, the Basel Committee, as the 1990 Money Laundering Convention was to do two 
years later, stated that the Statement of Principles was to apply to criminal activity more generally.  
 Seven year later, in reviewing the findings of an internal survey of cross-border banking  in 1999, 
the Basel Committee identified deficiencies in the bank know-your-customer (KYC) policies of 
a large number of states.439 It consequently asked the Working Group on Crossborder Banking to 
examine the procedures then in place and to draw up recommended standards applicable to banks 
in all states. These were issued as a consultative document in January 2001.  
This resulted in the publication in October of that year of the Basel Committee’s Customer due 
diligence for banks report.440 The Basel Committee made clear its expectation that the report 
would become the benchmark for supervisors to establish national practices and for banks to 
design their own KYC programmes although it noted that some jurisdictions already met or 
exceeded the standards set out in the report.  
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 In publishing the report, the Basel Committee stressed that it continued strongly to support the 
adoption and implementation of the FATF Recommendations and that its KYC principles were 
intended to be consistent with them. It also said that it would consider the adoption of any higher 
standards introduced by the FATF as a result of its current review of the Recommendations.441  
 The Basel Committee’s view was that KYC safeguards should exceed simple account opening 
and record-keeping and require banks to formulate customer acceptance policies and tiered 
customer identification programmes that involve more extensive due diligence for higher risk 
accounts and pro-active monitoring for suspicious activities. KYC should be a core feature of 
bank’s risk management and control procedures and be complemented by regular compliance 
reviews and internal audit. The Basel Committee advised that the intensity of KYC programmes 
beyond such essential elements should be tailored to the degree of risk.442  
 In February 2003, the Basel Committee published an attachment to Customer due diligence for 
banks, entitled General Guide to Account Opening and Customer Identification, which was 
developed by the Working Group on Cross-Border-Banking. This provided additional guidance 
for banks with regards to the nature of information that should be obtained in relation to a new 
customer opening an account and the appropriate sources for verifying such information.443  
  Since 2003, the Basel Committee has published various other statements and  
documents. In particular, in May 2009, after consultations taking place over several years, it 
published a new paper on the importance of transparency in the processing of cross-border 
payment transfers.444 The paper addresses a significant problem that arises in the processing of 
cross-border payments involving several financial institutions (in particular SWIFT payments), in 
which many of the institutions will act as no more than intermediaries in the payment process 
between the originator of a transaction, and the ultimate beneficiary. The crucial element of the 
problem identified by the Basel Committee is the fact that existing messaging practice do not 
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always ensure transparency for cover intermediary banks on the transfer they facilitate. 
Intermediary banks in the process may not be able to see sufficient information as to the identity 
of the originator of the transaction and the beneficiary, with the result that those intermediaries 
cannot adequately assess the risk associated with correspondent and clearing operations. For 
example, the cover intermediary bank may be unable to screen those entities or individuals against 
appropriate sanctions and other applicable lists. Clearly, this could present a serious problem 
where, for example, the jurisdiction in which a transaction originates has less stringent AML 
standards than those in the jurisdiction of an intermediary bank.  
 The Basel Committee paper therefore calls on supervisors worldwide to establish regulations 
ensuring that the full information, currently seen by the originating bank and the beneficiary’s 
bank, is also provided to intermediary banks. The SWIFT community has been active in 
developing a technical solution in the form of a new transaction message format, which allows 
originator and beneficiary information to be transmitted with cover payments in a standardised 
manner.445  
The Basel Principles 1988f has no legal force, since they are informal and non-binding 
under general international law. However, different methods have been adopted to provide the 
force in this regard. First, formal agreements among banks committing them to comply with the 
Statement of Principles were adopted in Austria, Italy and Switzerland.446Second, bank regulators 
indicate that failure to comply with the Statement could lead to administrative sanctions, which 
was the case in France and the United Kingdom at the inception of the Principles. Finally, 
customer identification or KYC, is now included as part of wider customer due diligence (CDD) 
under the FATF Forty Recommendations; this is further considered below. 
    
The Wolfsberg Principles  
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As the public sector reacted to the threat to the financial system posed by ML with a multiplicity 
of initiatives and bodies, the private sector was also taken steps to address its own needs in the 
area. In October 2000, 11 major international banks447 known as the Wolfsberg Group signed and 
unveiled a set of non-binding informal best practice guidelines called the Global AntiMoney 
Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking (known as the Wolfsberg Principles) governing the 
establishment and maintenance of relationships between private banks and clients. 448  The 
Principles contain guidelines on client acceptance and list a number of situations where additional 
due diligence should be carried out.  
 The guidelines were formulated with the practical needs of the above segment of banking sector 
in mind. In terms of innovation, most attention has been attracted by the guidelines on client 
acceptance and the enumeration, in that context, of situations requiring additional diligence or 
attention. These ranged from the problems posed by those connected with high-risk states to 
public officials and associated PEPs.449 This refers to individuals who have to have had positions 
of public trust and who should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Additional guidance was 
published by the Group indicating that the term should be understood to include persons whose 
current or former positions450 could attract publicity beyond the borders of the state concerned 
and whose financial circumstances may be the subject of  
additional public interest.451  
 The Wolfsberg Group has been active since 2000 in publishing further guidelines for the private 
banking industry. In particular, in June 2006 the Wolfsberg Group published two papers: 
Guidelines on a Risk-Based Approach for Managing Money Laundering Risks and AML Guidance 
for Mutual Funds and Other Pooled Investment Vehicles.558 The Wolfsberg Group also works 
with other industry bodies to develop guidelines, and approve standards developed elsewhere in 
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the financial industry to combat ML. Recently the Wolfsberg Group, in conjunction with other 
industry bodies such as the Bankers Association for Finance and Trade, and the Clearing House 
Association, has been active in assisting with developing and approving the new SWIFT message 
format for cover payments noted above.  
 Welcome though such developments are, they can only play a secondary role in effort to combat 
ML. As the October 2001 Basel Committee Report noted:  
 “Voluntary codes of conduct issued by industry organisations or associations can be of 
considerable value in underpinning regulatory guidance, by giving practical advice to banks on 
operational matters. However, such codes cannot be regarded as a substitute for formal regulatory 
guidelines”.452 This attests to the informal non-binding nature of the codes.  
The EC Money Laundering Directives  
European Union Law is a body of treaties, law and court judgements that operates alongside the 
legal systems of the European Union member States. It has direct effect within the EU member 
states and, where a conflict occurs, takes precedence over national law.453 The primary source of  
EU law is the EU’s treaties.454 These are power-giving treaties, which set broad policy goals and 
establish institutions 455 that amongst other things can enact legislation in order to achieve those 
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goals. The legislative acts of the EU come in two forms: regulations and directives. Regulations 
become law in all member states the moment they come into force, without the requirement for 
any implementing measure, 456  and automatically override conflicting domestic provisions. 
Directives require member states to achieve a certain result while giving the state the discretion 
as to how to achieve the result.  
 Treaties under EU law thus, have similar effect under general international law, as would any 
other treaty in international law. However, regulations and directives lack the attributes of a treaty, 
since they are created for the specific purpose of meeting the obligations  
under an existing EU treaty. They are therefore outside the definition of an international agreement 
under Article 2 of the VCLT, 1969.  In addition, given their mode of creation (which is outside 
the traditional definition of a treaty in international law), they may be classed as informal soft law 
as noted under our model categorisation of soft law in chapter one.  
 However, the EC ML Directives is an integral part of the European Union law making. This is 
because the directive whilst not a part of traditional international law, functions with the same 
binding effect as a treaty under the European Union on member states.457 The implication is that 
the EC ML Directives, though informal, are binding on the member states of the European Union 
under the principle of direct effect. The EC ML Directive is thus, taken to have a supranational 
effect given the doctrine of the supremacy of the EC law, which emerged from the European Court 
of Justice Decision in Costa v. ENEL.458 Although the principle of direct effect was established 
by the ECJ in relation to the Treaties of the European Union, in Van Gend en Loos,459 the principle 
has subsequently been loosed in its application to treaty articles.460 The ECJ has expended the 
principle, holding that it is capable of applying to virtually all of the possible forms of EU 
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legislation, 461  the most important of which are regulations and, in certain circumstances, 
directives.  
 Accordingly, it is to the European Commission’s credit that it became aware early on of the need 
to effectively respond to the threat of ML. A Community regulation was first laid down in 1991 
through the first EC ML Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of ML.569 The first EC ML Directive’s definition of ML specifies categories of financial 
intermediaries and their obligations and requirements. It defines these obligations and 
requirements, and indicates the public authorities responsible for the control functions. This 
general framework was devised as consistent with the 40 Recommendations of the FATF (at the 
time) on ML, which was then seen as the global standard-setter created shortly before.462  
  Key to this directive was distinguishing between ‘competent authorities’ and  
‘authorities responsible for combating ML’. This recognised that the authorities responsible for  
combating ML were mainly those who received and carried out analyses of suspicious transaction. 
When reporting entities or supervisory authorities become aware of such transactions, they are 
required to forward these on for subsequent analysis to the national authority responsible for 
combating ML. This distinction is fundamental to the AML framework developed according to 
the FATF Recommendations, which is thought to focus more on the role of ‘competent 
authorities’. The directive thus provides for a clustering of public sector expertise to analyse what 
could be very complex schemes.   
 The dual nature of this system also recognises the early warning role of the private sector in the 
prevention of ML. Leads provided from this source are purely indicative and are subject to a series 
of filters established by the authority responsible for combating ML. After the filtering, selected 
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material can then be used by ‘competent authorities’, i.e. traditional law enforcement authorities 
who are better able to focus their investigative and judicial powers on relevant facts.   
 This directive was also said to be a landmark text in the sense that most of the key preventive 
measures that subsequently proved useful were first introduced here.463 These consist of the earlier 
preventive measures, which include the need for customer identification, record keeping and 
reporting requirements associated with suspicious transactions. For a suspicious transaction to 
lead to investigation, reporting entities were required to maintain sufficient customer details and 
the relevant documentation admissible as evidence to an investigation into ML. Consistent with 
such an integrated approach, all reporting entities were required to implement appropriate internal 
control and communication procedures. In addition, they had to train their employees to be aware 
of possible laundering patterns.  
  However, the need for further progress was required to enhance the effectiveness of the  
EU and national AML frameworks, hence the introduction of the second EC ML Directive.464 The 
aim of the second EC ML Directive was to refine existing provisions and to plug perceived gaps 
arising out of the successful implementation of the first directive.465 As  noted in chapter three, 
this directive also played a repressive role by extending the scope of predicate offences to all 
forms of large-scale criminal activity with links to organised crime, and thus liable to generate 
significant ‘launderable’ revenues.466   
 Other elements introduced in the second directive include extending the scope of reporting 
entities.575 The European Parliament and some typological work467 drew the  
Commission’s attention to launderers passing numerous low-value wire transfers through bureaux 
de change and money remittance outlets in reaction to heightened culture of surveillance in the 
banking sector. Naturally, as larger institutions tightened their control, organised crime turned to 
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financial intermediates operating under less stringent scrutiny. A result of this was to broaden the 
scope of financial institutions covered in the directive to include both mutual funds and 
independent legal professionals. Nevertheless, information received by legal professionals in their 
role of defending or representing a client was exempted from the reporting obligation.   
Thus, the majority of discussion on AML legislation proposed by the European 
Commission was stated to have taken place in a consensual atmosphere. This consensual spirit 
was present when the Commission tabled a proposal for a third EC ML Directive,577 and is 
noteworthy given the potential irritation of it following so soon after the second EC ML Directive. 
In particular, some member states had not even completed transposition of the second EC ML 
Directive, when the draft of the third EC ML Directive was being released. The other explanation 
that could be given for the swift adoption of the directive is the very changed circumstances 
emerging in the wake of the 11 September and the Madrid bombings. It was also said to have been 
facilitated by the need to build on existing measures.468 Put simply, the third EC ML Directive 
release extended the scope to the financing of terrorism.  
The third EC ML Directive expanded the range of institutions within scope to include life 
insurance intermediaries and trust and company service providers and widened the definition of 
high value dealers to capture those who accept cash payment of EUR 15,000 or more. This is 
wider than the scope of the equivalent definition in the second EC ML Directive, which included 
only dealers in goods such as precious stones.469 It has however, been recognised that the nature 
of the relationship between professionals (especially lawyers) and their clients requires special 
treatment, particularly in the context of the operation of the obligation to report suspicious 
transactions to, and otherwise cooperate with, the authorities.470 The exemptions for members of 
the professions, acting in circumstances where those persons are in the course of ascertaining the 
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legal position for the client or performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or 
concerning judicial proceedings, are duly provided for under article 23. 471  
Accordingly, chapter II of the third EC ML Directive requires CDD to be carried out by 
persons within the scope of the directive when:  
a. establishing a business relationship;  
b. carrying out occasional transactions amounting to EUR 15,000 or more (whether 
by way of a single operation or a series of operations that appear to be linked);  
c. there is a suspicion of ML or terrorist financing (regardless of any derogation, 
exemption or threshold);472 or  
d. there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification data.473  
The required CDD measures, which follow closely the measures set out in the  
Recommendation 5 of the 2003 FATF’s Recommendations,474 are set out in article 8 of 
the third EC ML Directive, and comprise:  
a. identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity on the basis of 
documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source;  
b. identifying, where applicable, the beneficial owner475and taking risk-based and 
adequate measures to verify his identity so that the institution or person is 
satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, including, with regard to legal 
persons, trusts and similar arrangements, taking adequate steps to understand the 
ownership and control structure of the customer;  
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c. obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship; and  
d. conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship including scrutiny of 
transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship to ensure that 
transaction being conducted are consistent with the institution’s or person’s 
knowledge of the customer, the business and risk profile, including, where 
necessary, the source of the funds, and ensuring that the documents, data or 
information held are kept up-to-date.  
Under the third EC ML Directive, the identification of beneficial ownership is crucial.  
Financial intermediates can no longer stop at knowing the identity of managers of a legal 
arrangement, such as a company or a trust. They are now required to go beyond the intermediary 
in order to determine who exactly the beneficiaries of deposited funds are. A crucial aspect of the 
third EC ML Directive compared with its predecessors is the embodiment of a ‘risk-based 
approach’ to CDD. The institutions that apply CDD measures are therefore permitted to determine 
the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business 
relationship, product or transaction. 476  The directive adopted a ‘riskbased approach’ in 
consideration of the daunting overhead such extensive cross-checking entails. As such, financial 
intermediaries have to set up adequate internal procedures to pinpoint areas of high, medium and 
low risk and adjust their level of scrutiny accordingly.  
The third EC ML Directive also includes provisions relating to the mandatory reporting 
by relevant institutions of suspicious transactions. Specifically, member states must require such 
institutions to promptly inform the national FIU,477 on their own initiative, where they know or 
suspect, or have reasonable grounds to suspect that ML is being or has been committed or 
attempted, and by promptly furnishing the FIU, at its request, with the procedures established by 
the applicable legislation.478 There is also the requirement that such institutions must not carry out 
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transactions, which they know, or suspect relate to ML, until they have informed the national 
FIU.479 The third EC ML Directive also includes provisions that prohibited ‘tipping off’480 a 
customer or any other third party that a suspicious activity report has been made, or that a ML 
investigation is being carried out.591  
While the EC ML Directives have been concerned primarily with the regulation of 
financial services activities and the prevention of ML within the single market of the EU, it should 
be noted that they have had a direct and indirect impact well beyond the common external 
frontier.592 This has been, and is being achieved in a number of different ways. First, for example, 
the Directives themselves have been drafted in such a way as to ensure that all relevant institutions 
which operate within the EU are subject to their provisions, and not solely those institutions which 
have their head office within its borders. The third EC ML Directive makes it clear that its 
application extends to branches in the EU of credit and financial institutions that have their head 
office outside the EU.481 The impact is in effect, supranational.   
Secondly, and of greater importance, is the fact that the EC ML Directives (from the First 
Directive onward) have all applied to those European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states which 
ratified the Agreement for a European Economic Area (EEA). Consequently, Australia, Finland 
and Sweden were not faced with the need to address this issue de novo upon entry to the EU in 
January 1995.482 Similarly, the fact that Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland are not EU members483 
does not affect the need for them to comply with this measure.   
The eastward expansion of the influence of the Directives has also been a feature of the 
strategy of the EC in this sphere. This has been most obvious in the negotiation of ‘Europe 
Agreements’– association arrangements of the most advanced form –with the newest member 
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states of the EU, including both those who joined in 2004,484as well as the current candidate 
states.485 Each new candidate will be expected by the EC to adopt stringent standards on ML. The 
EU has been active in providing assistance to its current candidate states to combat ML, in order 
to help ensure that they meet the required standards prior to any future entry into the EU: in 2007, 
for instance, the EU provided EUR 1.5 million to help Macedonia strengthen its financial system 
to prevent ML.486  
As the EC has previously stated in relation to an earlier set of candidate states:   
“The ML directive is an integral part of the acquis communautaire and all candidate states will be 
required to implement it. Efforts to assist in this process form part of the pre-accession 
strategy.”487 This emphasis has been strengthened and deepened by the 1998 Pre–Accession Pact 
on Organised Crime between the applicant states and the member states of the EU. Principle 13 
thereof expressed agreement that there should be not only full implementation of the Directive, 
but also of the FATF Recommendations and the 1990 Money Laundering  
Convention. In this manner, as Cullen has pointed out, the first EC ML Directive provided “the 
basis for a comprehensive code of AMLlegislation throughout the continent of Europe”.488  In the 
words of Koskenniemi, soft law provisions then become negotiating chips in an unending process 
of balancing members’ interest.489   
Complementary Measures  
On October 26 2005, the European Parliament and Council adopted, under Articles 95 and 135  
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EC, 490Council Regulation (EC) 1889/2005.491 This obliges any person entering or leaving the 
Community and carrying cash (including bearer-negotiable instruments such as a travellers’ 
cheque, promissory notes, and money orders) of EUR 10,000 or more to declare that sum to the 
competent authority of the relevant Member State.492 This measures represents the  
Community’s implementation of the then FATF Special Recommendation IX, 493  adopted in 
October 2004. As all regulations adopted under EC Treaty, by Article 249 EC, it is directly 
applicable, either, it does not require transposition into domestic law to take legal effect so far as 
individuals are concerned.   
 Of a similar nature is Council Regulation (EC) 1781/2006, adopted under Article 95 EC,494 in 
order to implement the then FATF Special Recommendation VII on wire transfers, having regard 
also to the FATF revised interpretative note for its implementation. This Regulation lays down 
rules for payment service providers with regard to the information on the payer, which must 
accompany the electronic transfer of funds (subject to certain exemption).  
The principal requirement is that the payer’s name, address, and account number are included, 
although there are a number of permitted variations and derogations.495   
The third EC ML Directive has since been implemented in the UK by way of the  
Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which repealed and replaced the 2003 Regulations.496  
The FATF and the Forty Recommendations  
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When the heads of state and governments of the G7 states and the President of the European 
Commission convened in Paris in July 1989 for the fifteenth G7 summit, they met amid mounting 
international concern over the devastating proportions that the international drug problem had 
reached. There was widespread concern over the size of the threat posed by ML to financial 
institutions and the banking system. It was decided that firm action was needed at both national 
and international level to combat the problem. As a result, the G7 attendees convened a FATF to 
assess the results of cooperation already underway to prevent ML, to examine the current ML 
techniques and trends and to set out future implementation measures, including the adaptation as 
necessary of the statutory and regulatory systems of members to enhance multilateral assistance.  
The FATF was thus conceived as an informal non-binding inter-governmental 
policymaking body that would work to generate the necessary political will to bring about national 
legislative and regulatory reforms to combat ML. It was intended to be flexible, with no closely 
drawn constitution, nor even an unlimited lifespan. Indeed, the FATF conducts reviews of its 
mission periodically. The current review extends the work of the FATF from 2012 until 2020. 
The presidency of the FATF is a one-year position held by a high-level government official 
appointed from among the FATF members. A small-specialised Secretariat unit services the 
FATF and assists the President. Housed at the headquarters of the OECD in Paris, it nevertheless 
remains an independent body and is not a part of the OECD.  
Plenary meetings are used to discuss the policy direction and initiatives of the FATF. 
Discussions typically cover issues such as the analysis of ML trends and counter-measures, 
monitoring the implementation of AML measures within the FATF and the establishment of a 
worldwide AML network. There are three plenary meetings each year, held in February, June and 
September/October. A consensual decision-making process is employed, with decisions made by 
the FATF on the basis of papers prepared by the Secretariat or based on written or oral reports 
from delegations, with the FAFT’s primary publication being its annual report published at the 
end of June each year. This sets out the FATF’s work and activities during the year.  
The FATF’s annual report, apart from setting out the work and activities of the FATF 
during the year, also set the tone for the next phase of activity and the FATF’s current priority. 
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While the priority of the FATF, in a way, depends largely on the person that takes over the 
presidency, there are on-going projects that are of high priority. For example in 2011, the President 
of the FATF noted in an interview with the International Bar Association (IBA)497 that one of the 
on-going projects that are of a very high priority is the G20’s call on the FATF to identify states 
that might be representing a large risk on ML and financing of terrorism to the Financial System. 
Thus with the financial crisis of 2008, the G20 requested the FATF to review in general all the 
jurisdictions around the world498 that might still be posing a risk of ML and financing of terrorism 
to the Financial System. The 2010-2011 FATF annual report 499  and the latest 2012 Forty 
Recommendations demonstrate a clear response on the part of the FATF to  
this call.500  
In addition, ML techniques are examined each year at a ‘typologies’ meeting. This 
provides a forum for law enforcement and regulatory experts from FATF member states, together 
with certain international organisations and bodies, as well as representatives from other states, to 
discuss the prevailing ML methods, the emerging threats, and any effective counter-measures that 
have been developed. The FATF then releases an annual typologies report in February each year. 
This contains FATF’s findings on trends, techniques and countermeasures. Various geographic 
ad hoc groups are also convened to discuss issues that are relevant to particular regions of the 
world, with further ad hoc groups covering special topics that require more analysis that is 
detailed. Such groups have specific mandates and report to each plenary meeting regarding their 
work.  
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The FAFT also holds a Financial Services Forum (FSF) every two years with national 
and international representatives of the financial services sector and other relevant professional or 
business interests to discuss topics of common concern.  
The Current FATF Mandate  
As terrorist financing (TF) has risen up the international agenda, the FATF‘s role has naturally 
extended to encompass TF as well as its remit was recently extended to include the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It currently works in close cooperation with various 
other international bodies, including the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations. The FATF 
effectively has a manifold role at the heart of the overall international AML and counter terrorist 
financing (CFT) regime, described below.  
First, is to monitor the progress of states in introducing AML and CFT measures, using 
self-assessments and more detailed mutual evaluations techniques. Non-cooperative governments 
have found themselves under heavy moral, political and economic pressure to be up to standard 
through the reviews. For example, Austria eventually agreed to prohibit anonymous savings 
accounts as a result of pressure from the FATF, and the states of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union (including Russia) have embarked upon urgent national legislative programmes in 
a very short space of time as a result of their inclusion on the Non- 
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT)501 List.502  
Second role, is to review trends, techniques and innovations in ML (which has led to 
annual and specialised ML typologies reports), and to keep member states abreast of the findings.  
The third role is to build a global AML and CFT network by extending the reach of FATF 
principles. This has resulted in new member states joining the group and has led to the formation 
of regional FATF-style groups.503  
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The last role is to define and promulgate international standards on the combating of ML, 
TF and WMD Proliferation. At the heart of FATF’s activities are the recommendations on 
measures for combating of ML, TF and WMD Proliferation, which were completely revised and 
refreshed in February 2012 (now known as ‘The FATF Recommendations’504). The extension 
beyond ML and TF into the field of proliferation of WMD has been a reaction to one of the major 
issues of our time. A number of states, notably Iran, appear to be taking steps to build a WMD 
capability and accordingly we may expect sequential action and guidance from FATF on the issue 
of WMD proliferation financing.505 The FATF Recommendations are summarised below.  
The Forty Recommendations506  
The FATF 40 Recommendations cover five main areas, namely: AML/CFT policies and 
coordination; criminalisation of ML and confiscation of the proceeds of crime; TF and financing 
of proliferation; Financial sector and non-financial sector measures; and International 
cooperation.   
AML/CFT Policies and Coordination  
Recommendations 1 and 2 cover this area. Recommendation 1 requires states to adopt a riskbased 
approach619 to combating ML and TF to ensure that resources are as efficiently applied as possible. 
It also requires financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Business and Professions 
(DNFBPs) to identify, assess and take effective action to mitigate their ML and TF risks. 
Recommendation 2 requires national coordination between policy-makers, the FIU, 507  law 
enforcement authorities, supervisors and others, to ensure that the implementation of policies and 
activities to combat ML, TF and WMD proliferation is effectively coordinated  
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domestically.   
Criminalisation of Money Laundering and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime  
Recommendation 3 and 4 cover this area. In general, states are required to strengthen their legal 
framework, particularly their criminal law and criminal procedure law, with respect to the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime and measures relating to freezing, seizing, and confiscation 
of the proceeds of crime. Recommendation 3 therefore requires states to criminalise ML as a 
specific offence and to apply the crime to the widest range of predicate offences.508 Most notably, 
2012 recommendations require that states include tax evasion as a predicate offence, which was 
never the case previously.   
 Recommendation 3 requires states to criminalise ML as an offence and to do so in a manner that 
is consistent with the Vienna Convention 1988 and the Palermo Convention. Here, whilst the 
FATF has become recognised as the standard setter for international standards and best practices 
in AML/CFT, it has consistently reinforced the provisions of the UN instruments. The FATF in 
Recommendation 3 defines serious offences as those punishable by a minimum penalty of six 
months’ imprisonment.509 This is broader than the Palermo Convention, which defines a serious 
offence as any conduct constituting an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least 
four years.623  
Recommendation 4 requires states to empower their competent authorities (such as police 
and prosecutors) to identify, trace, freeze, seize and confiscate criminal assets. It also permits 
states to confiscate such assets ahead of any criminal conviction, which is likely to be sought. This 
is an important aspect of the FATF Recommendations (and likewise for the Vienna Convention 
1988 and the Palermo Convention). This is because it requires states to ensure that their 
administrative and law enforcement agencies have adequate powers for identifying and 
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appropriating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, particularly in order to stem the flight of 
illicit funds and to provide for their eventual confiscation.510 It essentially represents a shift 
towards targeting the financial incentives of organised crime and criminal activities, a significant 
development that was originally signalled in the Vienna Convention 1988.  
Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation  
Recommendation 5 requires states to criminalise both the financing of terrorist acts and the 
financing of individual terrorists and terrorist organisations, as well as designated terrorist 
financing offences as predicate offences for ML purpose. The recommendation represents one of 
the new additions to the 2012 FATF Recommendations as it incorporates earlier provisions from 
the nine special recommendations to the body of new FATF 40 Recommendations.   
 The first three Special Recommendations under the earlier nine recommendations on terrorist 
financing, are concerned with the implementation of the 2002 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter STF Convention), UN Security  
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267 (and related resolution), and UNSC Resolution 1373. Special 
Recommendation 1 requires states to ratify and implement the STF Convention and implement 
Resolution 1373. Special Recommendation II then requires states to criminalise the financing of 
terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist organisations.   
Recommendation 6 of the 40 FATF Recommendations, accordingly, requires states to 
implement targeted financial sanctions regimes to prevent and suppress terrorism and terrorist 
financing pursuant to the various UNSC Resolutions, for the purpose of freezing terrorist funds 
and denying their availability to designated persons and entities. This was in relation to Special  
Recommendation III, which requires states to freeze funds and other assets pursuant to UNSC 
Resolution 1267 and 1373, and to have measures in place for confiscating such funds and other 
assets.  
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 Recommendation 7 also requires that states implement targeted financial sanctions regime aimed 
at preventing, suppressing and disrupting WMD proliferation pursuant, again, to UN Security 
Council Resolutions.511  
 Final under this category is Recommendation 8, which requires states to pass laws that prevent 
the exploitation of Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) for terrorist financing purpose. An example 
here will be donations from charities sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause (or possibly even set up 
by the terrorist group itself), or from charities whose administration systems have been infiltrated 
and hijacked by terrorists who then divert legally obtained charitable donations to their own 
terrorist cause. The aim therefore is to combat terrorist ML typologies.  
Preventive Measures: Financial and Non-Financial Sector Measures  
The FAFT has consistently emphasised the need to strengthen oversight of the financial sector 
and has provided specified recommendations on the regulatory and supervisory framework of the 
financial sector and on requirements relating to CDD, record-keeping, and suspicious transactions 
reporting. Needless to say that these measures are core to the preventive AMLC, and will still be 
examined later in this chapter.  
 Recommendation 9 requires that bank (and other financial institutions) secrecy laws should be 
subordinate to the implementation of the FATF recommendations (so that, for example, 
institutions reporting in good faith cannot be the subject of successful legal actions for damages 
by customers and clients claiming damages for breach of confidentiality). Moreover, financial 
institutions that are in the banking, insurance, or security businesses are subject to additional 
prudential requirements, such as pursuant to the ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ (2006) and the ‘International  
Association of Insurance Supervisors’ Insurance Core Principles and Methodologies’(2003), 
where applicable.   
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 Recommendation 10 relates to CDD, which provides that Financial institutions must undertake 
CDD when:  
• establishing business relations;  
• carrying out occasional transactions above USD/EUR 15, 000 or certain wire transfers;  
• there is a suspicion of ML or TF or;  
• there are doubts about the truth or adequacy of previously-obtained identification 
information.  
Under Recommendations 10, institutions must:  
• identify and verify the customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, 
date or information;  
• identify the beneficial owner of the account (either the natural person or persons who own 
or control it, or for whose benefit it exists, and behind whom there are no further 
interest(s), and understand the ownership and control structure of corporations and other 
entities to this effect;  
• understand the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; and   
• conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny throughout the course of the 
relationship to ensure consistency between account activity and stated purpose.  
The CDD measures should be determined according to a risk-based approach (this is 
further considered below in this section) and although customer identification and verification is 
not required to precede the opening of business relations, this is subject to the risks being 
effectively managed. An inability to conduct CDD for any reason should effectively prohibit a 
financial institution from providing the requested services and generate a need to consider the 
making of a suspicious transaction report.  
Recommendation 10 is the subject of an extensive interpretative note containing 
expanded requirements on CDD for legal persons and arrangements. In particular, it contains a 
systematic process for the establishment of the identity of beneficial owners. Under this process, 
institutions should first identify the natural person or persons exercising control of the corporation 
or trust through ownership; failing that, they should attempt to establish those exercising control 
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by means other than ownership (presumably, for example, through secret agreements, commercial 
arrangements etc.); failing that, they should establish a relevant natural person who holds a senior 
management position.512  
Recommendation 11 requires financial institutions to maintain transaction and CDD 
records for a minimum period of five years from the date of the transaction (in relation to 
transaction records) or following the termination of the business relationship (in relation to CDD 
records). These records must also be made available to competent authorities within the 
jurisdiction.  
Recommendations 22 and 23 contain a range of requirements in relation to DNFBPs. A 
substantial change from the 2003 FATF Recommendations is the requirements on CDD, record- 
keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting to a category of DNFBPs.  DNFBPs are essentially 
casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, and professionals such as lawyers 
and accountants, where they carry out certain transactions on behalf of their clients, such as the 
buying and selling of real estate and establishment and management of companies and other forms 
of arrangements.   
Recommendations 22 and 23 require that states impose CDD, record-keeping, and 
suspicious transaction reporting requirements on these DNFBPs that are similar to those 
applicable to financial institutions. These are challenging requirements for a number of reasons. 
First, the different categories of DNFBPs are different from each other and therefore their 
differences ought to be taken into account when AML/CFT requirements are imposed. For 
instance, casinos are specifically targeted given the extent of their cash operations and perception 
of the involvement of organised crime in the industry. Lawyers and accountants are targeted where 
they are involved in setting up companies or other legal arrangements that can be used for layering 
or where they make use of client accounts to carry out transactions for their clients, both in 
offshore and onshore jurisdictions.513 In the case of lawyers, there is the additional question of the 
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extent to which the public interest in ensuring that AML/CFT requirements are satisfied outweighs 
legal professional privilege. This then justifies the requirement that lawyers are to report to an 
FIU 628 where they suspect or have reason to suspect that they are dealing with funds that are the 
proceeds of crime or are related to terrorism financing. In addition, unlike financial institutions, 
DNFBPs are not subject to prudential regulations and therefore, typically, are not regulated and/or 
supervised in the way that financial institutions are. To introduce these measures requires the 
development of a suitable level of regulation and supervision of these categories of DNFBPs and 
ensuring that the measures adopted are proportionate and based on a suitable risk-based 
assessment.  
Thus, the CDD and record-keeping requirements set out in the 2003 recommendations 
still apply to DNFBPs in designated situations, as do the recommendations relating to internal 
control/foreign branches and subsidiaries, higher-risk states, the reporting of suspicious 
transaction and tipping-off. Specifically, the interpretative notes to Recommendation 23 make it 
clear that lawyers (accountants providing legal advice) are not required to file suspicious 
transaction reports in circumstances where the information forming the basis of their suspicion 
was acquired in a situation which was subject to professional secrecy or legal professional 
privilege. Furthermore, lawyers are not deemed to have tipped-off a client if they seek to dissuade 
them from engaging in certain types of activities that might constitute ML.  
Recommendations 24 and 25 require states to ensure that information on beneficial 
ownership and control in relation to legal persons (for example, corporations) and legal 
arrangements (for example, trusts) is available and can be accessed by competent authorities, and 
that they should also consider measures to make information on beneficial ownership and control 
available to financial institutions and DNFBPs. These greatly expanded requirements in relation 
to beneficial ownership are the subject of an extensive interpretative note, which makes it clear 
that at the heart of the matter companies are going to have to be able to draw a distinction between 
legal ownership on the one hand, and beneficial ownership on the other. They are also to appoint 
one or more natural persons resident in the state to provide information on beneficial ownership 
to the authorities.  
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Recommendations 26, 27 and 28 require states to maintain adequate regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks for financial institutions and DNFBPs, and set out the minimum 
standards applicable.   
Additional Measures for Specific Customers and Activities  
Along with enhancing requirements for financial institutions and DNFBPs, the FATF 
Recommendations are also concerned with strengthening regulators and law enforcement 
agencies. The aim is that, regulators have suitable powers for monitoring and ensuring compliance 
with AML/CFT requirements and that law enforcement agencies have suitable powers to 
investigate and prosecute ML and TF. Specifically, Recommendations 29, 30 and 31 require states 
to enable regulators and law enforcement agencies to obtain records held by financial institutions. 
Thus, states are required to ensure that their FIUs, regulators, and law enforcement agencies are 
adequately staffed and resourced. These bodies are also required to maintain comprehensive 
records and statistics on their work so that this information can be used for measuring the 
effectiveness of the AML regimes.  
 Recommendation 12 deals with PEPs 514  and their family members or close associates and 
requires institutions to take additional steps to the CDD measures outlined in Recommendation 
10. In particular, to put in place systems to determine whether the proposed relationship involves 
a PEP, to obtain senior management approval  for such relationships, to take ‘reasonable 
measures’ to establish the source of wealth and the source of funds and to conduct ‘enhanced 
ongoing monitoring’ of the relationship.  
  Recommendation 13 contains a series of requirements in relation to cross-border correspondent 
banking, under which, in addition to the CDD measures described in Recommendation 10, 
financial institutions must obtain information on and understand their respondents’ business, 
reputation, quality of supervision and quality of AML control. This also extends to obtaining 
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senior management approval for the establishment of new correspondent relationships and 
understanding the respective responsibilities of the respondent and corespondent.  
 Recommendation 14 requires states to establish licensing and registration systems for customers 
who provide money value transfer services (MVTS) with appropriate penalties for unlicensed 
operators.  
 Recommendation 15 requires states and financial institutions to risk assess new products and 
delivery mechanisms and technologies for ML and to take steps to mitigate those  
risks.  
 Recommendation 16 relates to wire transfers and is the subject of extensive guidance in the 
interpretative notes. The headlines requirement is that states must require financial institutions to 
include both originator and beneficiary information in wire transfers, and that that information 
should remain with the transfer throughout the payment chain. There are also requirements for 
financial institutions to be able to detect wire transfers, which lack the necessary information, and 
to freeze the processing of wire transfers apparently involving designated persons and entities.  
 Recommendation 17 allows states to permit financial institutions to rely on third parties to 
perform CDD steps (other than ongoing due diligence) in certain circumstances. However, the 
relying institution must retain ultimate responsibility for the adequacy or otherwise of the CDD 
measures.  
 Recommendation 18 requires that states should compel their financial institutions to implement 
AML programmes, which, in the case of institutions with overseas branches and subsidiaries, 
should be a consistent standard throughout, based on the home state’s requirements.  
 Recommendation 19 requires that financial institutions should apply enhanced CDD measures to 
relationships involving states, which have been designated by FATF as higher risk.   
Recommendation 20 requires that financial institutions be under an obligation to report suspicious 
ML promptly to the state’s FIU, while Recommendation 21 requires that national laws should 
protect financial institutions and their staff who have reported suspicions of ML in good faith, 
from civil or criminal liability for breach of confidentiality. Recommendation 21 also mandates 
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that states prohibit by law the practice of ‘tipping-off’; which has since been criminalised under 
section 333 of POCA 2002.   
 Recommendation 32 deals with cash couriers, and the requirement that couriers should put in 
place mechanisms to control the cross-border transportation of cash and negotiable instruments 
through declaration and/or disclosure systems.  Recommendations 33 and 34 impose further 
obligations on couriers to maintain statistics pertaining to the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
AML systems and to provide feedback to financial institutions and DNFBPs, which will assist 
them in complying with their obligations, in particular their reporting of suspicious transactions. 
Thus, Recommendation 35 requires couriers to maintain a range of effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanction against persons and entities which fail to comply with their AML obligations.   
International Cooperation  
A key aspect of the FATF Recommendations is their focus on international cooperation. This 
takes the form of government-to-government cooperation, notably in the areas of mutual legal 
assistance and extradition, and agency-to-agency cooperation, in particular between national 
regulators and law enforcement agencies.515 Recommendations 36 to 40 therefore cover a range 
of requirements in relation to international cooperation, including becoming parties to relevant 
international conventions,516 mutual legal assistance, cross-border asset freezing and confiscation, 
extradition and generally providing the widest range of international cooperation in relation to 
ML, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.  
Key Differences between the 2012 Recommendations and their Predecessors  
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Apart from bringing the former nine special recommendations relating to terrorist financing within 
the body of the main AML recommendations, thereby creating a more unified and inclusive set 
of standards, the new 2012 FATF Recommendations are different in the following key areas:517  
• Tax crimes are now predicate offences: Those who followed the subject over the years 
will be aware that the absence of tax evasion and other serious tax crimes within the 
definition of ‘predicate offences’ which could give rise to ML– and therefore trigger the 
application of the necessary laws and standards– was an issue of hot debate. That debate 
has now been resolved and tax evasion (and other serious tax crimes) now sits alongside 
fraud, kidnapping and narcotics trafficking as offences, which can give rise to ML.  
• Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs): Whilst many financial institutions had included 
domestic PEPs within their PEP risk management processes for a number of years, the 
old standards did not actually require this, applying, as they did, only to foreign PEPs.  
This has now been remedied and the requirements for enhanced due diligence and other 
standards in relation to PEPs effectively now apply to both foreign and domestic PEPs 
alike.  
• Wire Transfer: The previous standards (which in themselves significantly increased the 
information requirements relating to wire transfers) required only that originators 
information should remain with the wire transfer throughout its journey through the 
financial system. The new standard requires that both originator and beneficiary, and 
related information, should travel with the transfer.  
• Beneficial Ownership: Responding, no doubt, to the growing realisation of the extent to 
which front companies, front trusts and other types of corporate and legal structures and 
arrangements can be used for laundering large amounts of criminal money,518 the new 
standards have expanded significantly the requirements in relation to the establishment 
of beneficial ownership.  
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Specifically, Recommendation 10 dealing with CDD now includes a step-by-step process 
to be followed when identifying beneficial ownership, as described earlier on. In addition, 
there are now major new requirements for states to create systems (including a company 
registry, if they do not already have one) in which information on beneficial ownership 
is both recorded and available.  
Required measures include the nomination of a specific person or persons who will be 
responsible for available information regarding beneficial ownership and for providing 
further assistance to the authorities. Similar requirements apply to trusts and other legal 
arrangements. There are also requirements for states to tackle ‘obstacles to transparency’ 
such as the misuse of bearer shares and nominee shareholding arrangements.  
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories and On-Going Evaluation and Assessment  
As part of the effort to combat ML, in 2000, the FATF began an initiative to identify 
NonCooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs). The aim of the process was to ensure that 
all financial centres adopt and implement AML measures according to internationally recognised 
standards.   
 Following its plenary meeting in February 2002, FATF published an initial report on NCCTs.519 
It set out 25 criteria to identify detrimental rules and practices that impede international 
cooperation in the fight against ML. The report also described a process designed to identify 
jurisdictions that have rules and practices, which impede the fight against ML, and to encourage 
these jurisdictions to implement international standards in the relevant area. Thirdly, the report 
contained a set of possible counter-measures that FATF members could use to protect their 
economy against the proceeds of crime. Three counter-measures were initially suggested:  
a) imposing customer identification obligations for financial institutions in FATF member 
states in respect of transactions with persons whose account is at a financial institution in 
an NCCT;  
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b) imposing specific requirements for FATF members states that are faced with such 
transactions to pay special attention to or to report such financial transactions; and  
c) conditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting financial transactions with NCCTs.  
The FATF’s aim was to apply counter-measures in a gradual, proportionate and flexible 
manner, in the hope that the prospect of enhanced surveillance and reporting of financial 
transactions with the NCCT would persuade it to introduce the required AML measures. Other 
suggested counter-measures included taking into account that a bank is in an NCCT when 
considering requests for the establishment of subsidiaries or branches of that bank in FATF 
member states and warning non-financial sector businesses that transaction with entities within 
the NCCT might run the risk of ML. In addition, the FATF automatically applies the then 
Recommendation 21635 to all states on the NCCT list. It also remains open to member states to 
impose counter-measures of their own choosing that go beyond those suggested by the FATF.  At 
the plenary meeting in February 2000, the FATF also set up four regional review groups (covering 
the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Africa and the Middle-East respectively) that would 
analyse the AML regimes of a number of jurisdictions against the 25 criteria in its initial report. 
These review groups have been maintained and continue to conduct analyses of jurisdictions for 
compliance and to assess the progress of those classified as NCCTs. In June 2000, the FATF was 
able to produce its first lists of NCCTs,636 being jurisdictions that it considered had critical 
deficiencies in their AML systems or that had demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate in AML 
efforts. Fifteen jurisdictions were initially named and shamed, being the Bahamas, Cayman 
Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
Panama, Philippines, Russia, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.  
 The states on the list of the NCCTs for the most part made significant progress in remedying the 
areas in which they were deficient. In June 2001, the FATF updated the list of NCCTs with the 
publication of its second NCCT review.637 Four states were removed from the list,638 but six were 
added639 with an additional two being added640 at the FATF’s plenary meeting in September 2001. 
In June 2002, four more states were removed from the list,641 upon  
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    Hungary, Israel, 
Lebanon and St Kitts and Nevis.  
publication of a third NCCT review,520 and another four were removed in October 2002.521 In 
February 2003, the FATF removed Grenada from the list, and in June 2003, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines was removed from the list, upon publication of a fourth NCCT review.522523 Since the 
fifth NCCT review was published, Guatemala, the Cook Islands, Indonesia, the Philippines 
Nauru, Nigeria, and Myanmar have been de-listed. As of 13 October 2006, there were no 
NCCTs.645  
The 2007 to 2008 Annual Report declared the NCCT process to have been a success. All 
the 23 jurisdictions named646 in 2000 and 2001 made significant progress to avoid being listed by 
the FATF as non-cooperative and efforts were made to improve AML systems. To decide whether 
a jurisdiction should be removed from the NCCT list, the FATF must first be satisfied that it has 
addressed the identified deficiencies by enacting relevant legislation and regulations. These must 
not only have been enacted but also have come into effect. The FATF will also take into account 
whether the jurisdiction is actually enforcing the necessary changes effectively. Once the FATF 
has decided to remove a jurisdiction from the NCCT list, it continues to monitor developments in 
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that state closely and in doing so works with the relevant FATF-style regional body.647 The 
jurisdiction concerned must submit regular implementation reports and the FATF or relevant 
FATF-style regional body will carry out follow-up visits to assess progress. Progress is reviewed 
against the implementation plan drawn up by the de-listed jurisdiction and implementation issues 
encountered by FATF members in the past.  
Although there are no longer any jurisdictions on the lists of NCCTs, the FATF remains 
alive to the risks posed by certain jurisdictions to the international effort to prevent ML. Where 
concerns arise, the FATF will release a statement to the effect. Two statements were released  
during 2008 and 2009 expressing concern at the lack of adequate AML systems in certain 
jurisdictions.524 In February 2012, the FATF confirmed nine jurisdictions525 with strategic AML 
deficiencies, already identified in the FAFT Public Statement in October 2011.The jurisdictions 
had still not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies identified in their action plan. 
For all these jurisdictions, the FATF has called upon its members to consider risk arising from the 
deficiencies associated with each of the jurisdictions.   
Domestic Law Significance  
A unique aspect of the FATF Recommendations is the emphasis on their implementation through 
mutual evaluations undertaken by the FATF and assessments undertaken by the IMF and the 
World Bank. Essentially, whilst the FATF Recommendations are not binding even between FATF 
members and do not carry the force of law, the focus of their implementation, particularly through 
mutual evaluations and assessments, has meant that they have had supranational influence over 
(or at least provided impetus for) the development of preventive national AML laws and practice 
around the world. The non-binding nature of the FATF Recommendations underscores the role 
and importance of soft law in this area. As noted in chapter one, the essential characteristics of 
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the soft law (informal soft law) are that it is not legally binding and cannot be enforced by legal 
means.526 This therefore buttresses the significance and impact that the role of informal soft law 
(such as the FATF Recommendations) has had in the area of preventive AMLC.  
 Moreover, the FATF Recommendations have been deployed in parallel with the UN conventions 
and UNSC resolutions and they have taken into account developments at the international law 
level and reinforced these international law instruments. The publication of interpretative notes 
alongside the recommendations, have been instructive as regards the  
implementation of the international law instruments. Additionally, whilst the substance and 
drafting of the FAFT Recommendations ultimately reflect a consensus among the FATF members 
(and the scope and language of individual Recommendations are often heavily negotiated in view 
of members’ positions), they nevertheless contain a relatively high level of specificity  as to what 
is expected in this area. In this respect, although FATF Recommendations are not legally binding 
in domestic courts, they can be relevant in constructing domestic law and practice, which gives 
effect to them.527  
 An area where the FATF Recommendations have made substantial inroads into the development 
of domestic law and practice is in the establishment of FIUs. As set above, Recommendation 29 
requires states to establish an FIU for receiving, analysing, and disseminating suspicious 
transaction reports and other information regarding potential ML and to ensure that the FIU has 
access on timely basis to financial, administrative, and law enforcement information, especially 
for the purpose of analysing suspicious transaction reports. Recommendation 20 requires financial 
institutions to report to the FIU any suspicion that funds are the proceeds of crime.528  
 In addition, since the first reference to the filling of suspicious transaction report in the original 
version of the FATF Recommendations and the requirement relating to the establishment of the 
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FIUs in the current version of the FATF Recommendations, FIUs529 have sprouted in more than 
a hundred states around the world. However, whilst these FIUs may be cast in different modes 
and are part of different government agencies (or are even stand-alone national agencies), they 
are essentially national focal points for processing suspicious transaction reports with the view to 
identifying instances where further action is required in order to pursue ML or other criminal 
activities. The methodology used in the FATF mutual evaluations and in the IMF/World Bank 
assessments654 and the mutual recognition of FIUs in the Egmont Group530 of FIUs have helped 
to spur the development of FIUs in other states’ AML regimes, including the development of 
domestic laws and practices for such FIUs.531  
FATF-Style Regional Bodies and Organisations  
As noted earlier, several regional or internal bodies (either exclusively or as part of their work) 
perform similar functions to the FATF and the FATF makes an active effort to support their 
development. Such groups now exist in the Caribbean, Europe (for non-FATF members of the 
Council of Europe), Asia/Pacific, Eastern and Southern Africa and South America with further 
groups being established in Western and Central Africa.  
 Many of the groups have observer status with the FATF and have similar form and functions of 
the FATF with some FATF members belonging to more than one body. Bodies include the 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean Financial Action  
Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe Select Committee OF Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures (Moneyval), the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in 
Southern America (GAFISUD).  
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 The FATF also works with international organisations to implement effective worldwide AML 
measures, some of which also have FATF observer status, including the Egmont Group of FIUs.532 
Over the last 15 years, a number of states have established specialised government agencies, 
known as FIUs, as part of their response to ML activity. These increasingly serve as a focal point 
for AML programmes and allow rapid and effective cooperation between states. Since 1995, a 
number have worked together as an informal organisation called the Egmont Group533 with the 
UK represented in the Group by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).  
I.I.I.  Preventive Anti-Money Laundering Measures and Requirements for Financial  
Institutions  
There is by now a fairly well defined suite of activities which, taken together, denote current 
international best practice in preventive AMLC, and these revolve around certain core areas listed 
below.  
Name Screening  
Before entering into a business relationship, prospective customers’ names must be checked 
against published lists of persons and organisations suspected of being connected with ML. 
Financial services must not be provided to those on the lists.534  
Risk Assessment  
In addition, before entering into a business relationship, prospective customers must be assessed 
as to the degree of ML risk, which they pose, and must thereafter be the subject of appropriate 
risk-based procedures and controls. The requirement for a risk-based approach has generated 
probably the most radical overhaul in AML strategy to be seen since the inception of the global 
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standards shortly after FATF was formed in 1989. This is currently part of the 2012 FATF 40 
Recommendations and Recommendations 1 and 21 provides for this.  
 According to the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG),535 a risk-based 
approach involves a balance between the cost burden on individual firms and their customers and 
a realistic assessment of the threat of the firm being used in connection with ML.661 The JMLSG 
Guidance thus defines ML risk as the risk that a firm may be used to further ML, and notes that a 
failure to manage this risk effectively will increase the risk to society of crime.662  
The basic point about the risk-based approach is the risk qualification of the customer. 
This shifts the focus from applying a general rule or standard to every potential and existing 
customer, to one that qualifies the customers in high and low-risk customers. Financial and credit 
institutions and other entities subject to regulation must therefore ensure that the measures they 
take are adequate and proportionate to the level of risk that exists. The essence of this approach is 
that resources should be directed in such a manner that the highest risks receive most attention.  
The development highlights the need for prioritisation in the international efforts in 
preventive AMLC. It confirms the current approach of the FATF and her work of placing priority 
on certain typologies and not on others. The first step then for international and domestic 
regulators is to prepare an AML policy that complies with the recommendations of the FATF, the 
Basel CCD paper and the EU Directives based on a risk based approach. The policy has to embody 
a risk-based approach, because only then can it validate the claim for compliance to the measures.  
Example of a risk-based approach can be found under the CDD measures in the third EC 
ML Directive.663 The provisions with regard to CDD were extended under this directive, and this 
included simplified and enhanced CDD procedures. The level of CDD can differ and may be 
determined on a risk-sensitive basis, if the entities subject to regulation are able to demonstrate to 
the supervisory institutions and self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) that the measures are appropriate.664 
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The risk-based approach is reflected in the CDD measures that entities must take. The level of 
risk– low, medium or high– determines the level of CDD, simplified or  
                                                                                                                                                            
addressed to other sectors, and in particular to the professions (such as lawyers and accountants) is 
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enhanced. Under normal circumstance, standard CDD should apply. Thus, a low-risk profile can 
only attract a simplified CDD.536 However, if there were to be a higher risk of ML, then enhanced 
CCD measures must take place.  
 The second example of a risk-based approach in the third directive is the subject of ultimate 
beneficial ownership (UBO).537 The first and second directives were only directed to the CDD 
requirements in relation to the customer,538 whereas the third directive provides that CDD shall 
also comprise the identification of the beneficial owner.539 The third EC ML Directive thus 
provides that the CDD on UBOs should be performed by:  
 “. . . taking risk-based and adequate measures to verify his identity so that the institution or person 
covered by this Directive is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, including, as 
regards legal persons, trusts and similar legal arrangements, taking risk-based and adequate 
measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer”.540  
  The reference in the above quote that the CDD requirement on UBOs may be performed  
on a risk-sensitive basis illustrates a risk-based approach under the directive.  
                                                     
536
 See Article 11(2) third EC ML Directive and Article 3 Implementing Directive for more on simplified 
CDD.  
537
 Article 3, sixth paragraph, third EC ML Directive. The UBO relates to “the natural person(s) who 
ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction or activity 
is being conducted”  
538
 While the first directive noted “...such provisions must be also be extended, as far as possible, to any 
beneficial owner”, the directive never made mention of who a beneficial owner is in the text of the directive.  
539
 Article 8(2) third EC ML Directive.  
540
 Article 8(1)(b) third EC ML Directive. 670  
 T. Parkman supra note 201.  
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 Thus, before entering into a business relationship, prospective customers must be assessed as to 
the degree of ML risk which they pose, and must thereafter be the subject of appropriate risk-
based procedures and controls.670 Risk factors to be considered include:  
• location of customer and/or transaction;  
• type of customer (individual, corporate, trust, etc.);  
• nature of customer’s business;  
• age/period of existence of customer;  
• states where customer typically conducts its business;  
• counterparties of customer;  
• product profile and sales distribution channels.  
Customer Due Diligence   
CDD and ongoing monitoring policies and procedures play a crucial role in the fight against ML. 
In order to understand the role of CDD in preventive AMCL, this section will examine the 
approach under the 2007 UK Money Laundering Regulations (hereinafter, the ML Regulation  
2007).541542 Part of the ML Regulations implements Chapter II of the third EC ML Directive543 
and Article 3 of the Commission Directive (EC) 2006/70. They in turn principally implement 
Recommendations 5 to 12 of the 2003 FATF Recommendations.544 Part of the ML Regulations 
2007 sets out the content of CDD, when they should apply, and the consequence of the failure to 
apply them. The EC ML Directive and the ML Regulations 2007 are innovatory in that CDD is 
now to apply to a new category of customers, namely PEPs;545 and in that there are two levels of 
due diligence available: simplified and enhanced CDD.  
                                                     
541
 SI 2007/2157 –The ML Regulations 2007 are intended to implement both the third EC ML Directive and 
the first implementing directive of the EC Commission – Commission Directive (EC)  
542
 /70 of 1 August 2006, [2006] OJ L214/29. They came into force on 15 December 2007. The ML 
Regulations 2007 revoke the Money Laundering Regulations 2003. However, Chapter III of the Directive, 
which requires member states to impose reporting and disclosure obligations on institutions and persons 
covered by the Directive, are implemented not by means of the ML Regulations 2007, but by means of Part 
7 of the POCA 2002.  
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 Articles 6 to 9.  
544
 Recommendations 10 to 17 of the 2012 FATF Recommendations.  
545
 Regulation 14(4) of the ML Regulation 2007.   
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 The above instruments are also innovatory in that the EC ML Directive and the ML Regulations 
2007 are significantly more prescriptive of the form that CDD should take than previous regimes. 
In other words, they seek to embody in statutory form what had previously principally been the 
subject of industry guidance and regulatory control.546  
  Central therefore to CDD are the concepts of identification and verification. The  
regulated sector is obliged to satisfy itself, on a risk sensitive basis, that it knows with whom it is 
dealing, and to do so with the best information proportionately available.547 Regulation 5 of the 
ML Regulation 2007 (which implements Article 8 of the third EC ML Directive) specifies the 
content of CDD. This entails the following requirements discussed below.  
Identification of the customer and verification of the customer’s identity on the basis of 
documents, data or information obtained from a reliable or independent source. According to the 
FATF interpretive note, the types of measures that would be normally needed to satisfactorily 
perform this function would require obtaining proof of certain information. These includes, 
incorporation or similar evidence of the legal status of the legal person or arrangement, as well as 
information concerning the customer’s name, the names of trustees, legal form, address, directors, 
and provisions regulating the power to bind the legal person or arrangement.548   
Identification, where applicable, of the beneficial owner, which requires taking riskbased 
and adequate measures to verify the beneficial owner’s identity and similar measures to 
understand the ownership and control structure of the customer.549 The term ‘beneficial owner’ is 
defined in Regulation 6 of the ML Regulation 2007. For example, in the case of a trust550 a 
beneficial owner is an individual who is entitled to a ‘specified interest’ in at least 25 percent of 
the capital of the trust property. This includes an individual who is the beneficial owner in a body 
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 For example, the JMLSG Guidance Note and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Senior 
Management Arrangement Systems and Control Sourcebook (SYSC).  
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 P. Hynes et al International Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A UK Perspective (London, 
Thomson Reuters (Legal) Ltd 2009) p. 90.  
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 See the interpretive note to Recommendation 10 of the FATF, 2012. In the case of an individual 
customer the nature of what is meant by CDD is clear. As the JMLSG point out, the obligation with an 
individual is in a sense stricter as the nature of verification is prescribed –JMLSG Guidance 5.3.8.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Regulation 6(3).  
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corporate, which is entitled to a specified interest in the capital of the property.551 As far as the 25 
per cent control requirement is concerned, Regulation 6 makes it clear that ‘control’ means legal 
control (and not merely influence). Regulation 9 provides that the verification of the identity of 
the customer and, where applicable, the beneficial owner must take place before the establishment 
of a business relationship.  
The third requirement is obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship. The term ‘business relationship’ is defined at Regulation 2(1) of the ML 
Regulation 2007 as meaning “a business, professional or commercial relationship . . . which is 
expected by the relevant person when contact is established to have an element of duration”. This 
appears to exclude one-off transactions, and weaker definition than the previous definition under 
the ML Regulations 2003.552  In addition, Regulation 8 requires relevant persons to conduct 
‘ongoing monitoring of the business relationship’. This is defined by Regulation 8(2) as meaning 
the scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship (including the 
source of funds) to ensure that the transactions are consistent with the relevant person’s knowledge 
of the customer, his business, and risk profile; and ensuring that the documents, data and 
information held are kept up to date.682 It was observed that the use of the term ‘monitoring’ 
implies that the scrutiny is intended to be less intensive than if the term ‘due diligence’ had been 
used.553 The latter is the term used in the FATF Recommendation 10.  
 Regulation 13 (following Article 11 of the third EC ML Directive) provides for a simplified due 
diligence (SDD) procedure to be adopted where the relevant person has  
‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the customer, product, or the transaction relating to the 
product satisfies certain criteria. This simplified procedure follows the Interpretive Note 9 of the  
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 Regulation 6(5) (a).  
552
 Regulation 2(1) there defined a business relationship as ‘any arrangement the purpose of which is to 
facilitate the carrying out of transactions on a frequent, habitual or regular basis where the total amount of 
any payments to be made by any person to any other in the course of the arrangement is not known or is 
capable of being ascertained at the outset’. 682  W. Blair and R. Brent supra note 377, p. 249.  
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2003 FATF 40 Recommendations, which is now the Interpretive Note 21 of the 2012 FATF 
Recommendations.  The underlying concept is that, there are circumstances where the risk of ML 
is lower, or where information on the identity of the customer is publicly available, or where 
adequate checks and control already exist, with the result that in each case the full rigour of the 
standard due diligence procedures need not be applied.554 Specifically, Regulation 13(1) of the 
ML Regulation 2007 removes the requirements in these circumstances for identification and 
verification (but not ongoing monitoring). The EC, under Article 40 of the third EC ML Directive, 
has the power to adopt directives specifying technical criteria for establishing whether situations 
represent low risks of ML. The purpose of this delegation is to introduce a degree of flexibility in 
specifying these situations so that the EC can respond more rapidly to new situations.  
 Lastly, without prejudice to any other policy or procedure, the following must be included as a 
minimum:555  
• provision for the identification and scrutiny of complex or unusually large transactions; 
unusual patterns of transactions which have no apparent economic or visible lawful 
purpose; and any other activity which the relevant person regards as particularly likely by 
its nature to be related to ML;   
• specific measures designed to prevent ML where services or products favour anonymity;  
• the ability to determine properly whether any person is a PEP. PEPs are defined in 
Regulation 14(5) and paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 as consisting of individuals who have 
been entrusted with prominent public functions (including members of parliament, the 
senior judiciary, and members of the administrative, supervisory or management bodies 
of state-owned enterprises), together with their family members and known close  
associates.556  
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 Ibid.  
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 Regulation 20(2) (a)-(d) of the ML Regulation 2007.  
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 These include persons who are known to have joint beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal 
arrangement or any other close business relationship with the PEP and persons who have sole beneficial 
ownership of a legal entity or arrangement which is known to have been set up for the benefit of the PEP: 
see the Regulations, 2, para 4(1)(d).  
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• regulation 16 also prohibits credit institutions, in any event, from carrying on a 
correspondence banking relationship with a shell bank. Regulation 16(5) defines a shell 
bank as a credit or equivalent institution incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no 
physical presence involving meaningful decision-making and management and which is 
not part of a financial conglomerate or third-state financial conglomerate.557   
Suspicion Reporting  
The ML Regulation 2007 require firms to ensure that any serious transactions identified are 
reported internally by staff to the firm’s Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO), or 
nominated officer, who must then determine whether there are grounds for suspicion.558 Where 
grounds of suspicion are considered to exist, the MLRO must report such suspicious activity to 
the SOCA.559 This must be done on a risk-sensitive basis. Specifically, financial institutions must 
not make customers or third parties aware that such reports have been filed. Both an employee’s 
obligation to report his knowledge or suspicion of ML to a firm’s nominated officer and that 
person’s obligation to report to a relevant authority are statutory requirements.   
A useful tool in this area is the JMLSG Guidance. The JMLSG Guidance is, by definition, 
not mandatory. It is, however, not without legal effects. This is for three principal reasons. First, 
HM Treasury has approved the earlier 2006 Guidance for the purpose of section 330 and 331 of 
POCA 2002. As a result, compliance with the 2006 JMLSG Guidance is a matter that a court has 
to take into account when deciding whether a person has committed an offence under either of 
those sections. The offences in question are those of failing to disclose knowledge or suspicion 
(or the existence of reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting) that another is engaged in ML 
where either the information or other matter giving rise to that knowledge or suspicion has come 
to him in the course of business in the regulated sector. This will also be the case where it has 
come to him in his capacity as a person nominated to receive such a disclosure.690 Secondly, the 
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 See Regulation 16(6) for definitions of financial conglomerate and third-state financial conglomerate. 
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 Regulation 14.  
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 The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) is the UK version of the Egmont Groups of FIUs.  690  
POCA 2002, sections 330(8) and 331(7). 691  SYSC 3.26EG.  
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JMLSG 2006 Guidance has likewise been approved for the purpose of the equivalent offences 
under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000. Lastly, whether a firm has complied with the 
JMSLG Guidance is also a matter that the FSA will take into account when deciding whether the 
firm is in breach of the FSA’s own Handbook Rules relating to ML.691 By these means, therefore, 
the JMLSG Guidance is a form of soft law, given its non-binding nature and reliance on other 
statutory bodies for compliance. It is nonetheless a useful tool in preventive AMLC.  
Thus, the decision of whether to report internally to a nominated officer is matter for 
individual judgment. Although a firm may establish internal consulting systems relating to such 
decisions, as the JMLSG Guidance makes clear, they do not absolve an individual of his 
responsibility under the legislation, and such consultation procedures should not be at the expense 
of speed or confidentiality.560 Likewise, the need for a nominated officer to review all relevant 
information, including known connected accounts or other commercial relationships, should not 
be at the expense of a timely notification: an appropriate balance has to be struck.561 All decisions, 
including decisions not to notify, should be properly documented or recorded electronically and 
retained with the relevant internal suspicion report.562  
The JMLSG suggests563 that where an activity or transaction that gives rise to concern is 
already within an automated clearing or settlement system, and where delay would lead to a breach 
of contract or of market settlement and clearing rules, a nominated officer may have a legitimate 
excuse within the meaning of the relevant section of POCA 2002.564 Where consent is required to 
proceed with a transaction, a firm cannot tell the customer why the transaction is being (or has 
been) delayed, with the result that a customer may make a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman 
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Service (FOS). In that case, it is appropriate for the firm in question to inform the FOS legal 
department about the report to SOCA on the basis that the information will be kept confidential.565  
Record Keeping  
The ML Regulations 2007 require firms to make and keep records relating to their CDD  
measures, that is, customer identification and verification procedures, and transactions carried out 
by the firm, as evidence that they have complied with their legal and regulatory obligations.566 
Such evidence may also be used in any investigations conducted by the law enforcement bodies. 
The general rule is that all records must be retained for the ‘prescribed period’ of five years from 
the date the file is closed.567 Normal banking practice is to maintain ledger entries for longer than 
this (six years for accounting purpose).568  
  The purpose of record-keeping (from a firm’s point of view) is to enable it to  
demonstrate that it has satisfied its obligations in any subsequent investigation.569 The records 
kept should cover customer information; transactions; internal and external suspicion reports; 
MLRO reports; information not acted upon; training and compliance monitoring; and information 
about the effectiveness of training.570 Records can be kept in the form of original documents, 
photocopies, on microfiche, in scanned form, or in computerised or electronic form.571 As the 
JMLSG Guidance notes, whatever form the records are in, the overriding objectives is for firms 
to retrieve the relevant information without undue delay.572  
Staff Training  
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The ML Regulations 2007 require firms to take appropriate measures to ensure that all employees 
are all aware of the risks of ML, the relevant legislation, and their obligations under that 
legislation. They must also be aware of the identity and responsibilities of the firm’s nominated 
officer (and MLRO), trained in the firm’s procedures and on how to identify and deal with 
suspicious transactions.573  
The JMLSG Guidance emphasises the importance of training, so that staff are aware of 
their and the firm’s statutory and regulatory obligations; the firm’s internal systems for  
mitigating risks; and, most importantly, how the firm’s products and services may be used as a 
vehicle for ML and circumstances that may indicate that a transaction is unusual or suspicious.574 
In doing so, the JMLSG Guidance stresses both the regulatory and statutory obligations of senior 
management to establish and maintain effective training arrangements and the penalties that 
individual members of staff may face if they do not report their suspicions of ML.  
Cooperation with Relevant Authorities575  
International cooperation is crucial for both repressive and preventive AMLC. As noted above, 
this takes the form of government-to-government cooperation, notably in the areas of mutual legal 
assistance and extradition, and agency-to-agency cooperation, in particular between national 
regulators and law enforcement agencies. Cooperation must therefore be extended, within the 
parameters defined by law, to law enforcement agencies in the investigation of suspected ML. 
The role of international cooperation in soft law technique for repressive and preventive AMCL 
will be examined in the next chapter.  
Responsiveness to International Findings  
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The requirement here is that, financial institutions must take account of information made 
available from reliable sources, which is relevant to their assessment of ML risk. For example, if 
a state appears on the list of NCCT issued by the FATF then financial institution should reassess 
and amend their risk control procedures accordingly.708  
Conclusion  
One of the benefits of soft law, as noted in chapter one, is that it lessens sovereignty costs. States 
can limit sovereignty costs by expanding the range of available institutional arrangements  
along a more extensive and general line. The relevance of soft law in preventive AMLC is that, 
most of the measures are informal non-binding arrangements, under general international law, 
and they offers the needed flexibility for states to work out problems over time through 
negotiations shaped by capacity to modify and adapt the commitments into domestic laws.  
Unlike traditional treaty based obligations that must be transposed by signatory states for 
them to generate a binding legal effect, the preventive AML measures, like those developed by 
the Basel Committee Principles on Banking and the Supervision of Banks, the Wolfsberg 
Principles and the FATF Recommendations, are legal non-binding and have been implemented 
using different means. For example, in the case of the Basel Principles 1988, this includes formal 
agreements among banks and regulators committing them to comply with the provisions or even 
administrative sanctions, in some cases.   
As noted above, a unique aspect of the FATF Recommendations is the emphasis on their 
implementation through mutual evaluations undertaken by the FATF and assessments undertaken 
by the IMF and the World Bank. Essentially, whilst the FATF Recommendations are not binding, 
the focus of their implementation, particularly through mutual evaluations and assessments, has 
meant that they have had supranational influence over the development of preventive national 
AML laws and practice around the world. Moreover, the FATF’s Recommendations are now co-
opted into World Bank and IMF conditionalities for borrowing from these agencies, which further 
creates a basis for their crystallisation into domestic law.   
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The EC ML Directives have similarly had direct and indirect impact well beyond the 
common external frontier, which was made possible due to their impact on all relevant institutions 
operating within the EU and inclusion as a basis for negotiation even in European  
Agreements.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CHAPTER FIVE  
I.       International Cooperation and Role of FIUs  
  
The international effort to control ML (soft law) has provided an impetus for harmonisation in the 
area of repressive and preventive AMLC. This was perceived as instrumental for enhancing the 
effectiveness of AML law and international cooperation.576577 International cooperation is crucial 
for AMLC as the cross-border nature of the crime of ML allows the launderer substantial benefits 
and time to move the laundered money, which allows the offender to place the assets beyond the 
jurisdiction of the state where the predicate offence was committed. International cooperation is 
thus the mainstay of international efforts against ML and is referred to in many of the repressive 
AML conventions, which contain provisions designed to mandate or encourage it.578 The FATF, 
aware of the cross-border nature of ML dedicated Recommendations 36 to 40 to the question of 
strengthening international cooperation.  
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 Soft law has been identified as one of the vehicles for harmonisation of law and according to  
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From a strictly international law point of view, international cooperation is necessitated 
by the concept of sovereignty, which limits powers of a state to take investigatory, provisional 
and enforcement measures to its own territory.711 Thus, under international law, enforcement 
jurisdiction is strictly territorial in nature. A state seeking assistance from abroad may obtain it by 
formal means (mutual legal assistance) or informal means (mutual assistance). Mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) is that part of international cooperation that permits the use of compulsory 
measures in the requested state to obtain or produce evidence that is required in the requesting 
state.579 In contrast, the term ‘mutual assistance’ refers to the provision of informal assistance 
between states. This is often done through police-to-police cooperation or between agency to 
agency.  
It follows that, conceptually, international cooperation in criminal matters is mostly 
intended to deal with the lack of enforcement jurisdiction on the side of the requesting state. In 
the context of the international AMLC, the lack of enforcement jurisdiction may take two forms. 
First, information required to prove the ML offence/or the predicate offence will often be located 
in the territory of another state than the state which intends to prosecute the ML offence. Second, 
criminally derived proceeds may be located in the territory of another state than the one, which 
intends to prosecute the ML offence or the predicate offence.580   
International treaty-based cooperation between judicial authorities was traditionally 
portrayed as the sole mode of gathering evidence abroad. It will be shown in this chapter that in 
the context of the international fight against ML, new modes of international evidence gathering 
have become increasingly important. On the one hand, administrative or non-formal cooperation 
is expanding and have partly taken over the function of formal mutual legal assistance (judicial 
assistance). In this respect, the exchange of information between FIUs has obtained a very 
important role and conditions under which this type of mutual administrative assistance takes 
places, merit to be scrutinised. This new development in the field of international evidence 
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gathering makes it necessary to investigate the exact position, and limits, of treaty-based 
cooperation in ML.  
Thus, international cooperation in criminal matters in the context of ML is geared towards 
two goals: the gathering of information, which can be introduced as evidence in the requesting 
state and the tracing of criminally derived proceeds with a view to their seizure and confiscation. 
Confiscation, together with the criminalisation of ML, as a tool for repressive AMLC was 
examined in chapter three. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the informationgathering role of 
FIUs (informal assistance) as a national focal point for processing suspicious transaction reports 
with the view to identifying instances where further action is required in order to provide relevant 
information for AMLC.  
 Again as with other aspects of this thesis, the approach here will be to examine the international 
law-making processes that have been engaged in response to the threat of ML by looking at the 
information-gathering role of FIUs through informal assistance. The focus here, as with other 
chapters, is not to give account of the sources of international law but the aim is to identify the 
instruments, participants and processes employed in responding to a request for assistance and 
international cooperation. This is done by looking at the limits of current international practice in 
the area of mutual legal assistance and the basis or benefits for informal assistance through FIUs. 
The chapter does this by illustrating the limits of compulsory measures through formal legal 
assistance, in the requested state to produce evidence that is required in the requesting state, and 
the benefit of using informal measures through FIUs in the case of AMLC.  The chapter will 
therefore do two things. First, it examines existing forms of  
international cooperation, and the limits. Second, it considers the information-gathering role of 
the FIUs through informal assistance.   
I.I.  The Bases for International Cooperation  
The AML regime, comprising the formal and informal AML obligations to repress and prevent 
the crime, and the national laws that implement these obligations is, in part, a regime for the, 
investigation of ML and international cooperation in this regard; with the ultimate goal of more 
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effective AMLC and pursuit of funds to be used for, or proceeds of, crime. The introduction to 
the new 2012 version of the FATF recommendations makes it clear that one of the purposes is to 
“establish powers and responsibilities for the competent authorities (for example,  
investigative, law enforcement and supervisory authorities).”  
 ML and related offences often involve a transnational element and in such cases, investigators 
and prosecutors may need to obtain information or evidence from outside their jurisdiction. 
Evidence may be obtained from abroad through informal (mutual assistance) or formal (mutual 
legal assistance)581 means. A formal letter of request is usually required if another state is being 
requested to exercise a coercive power (for example search and seizure) or to obtain an order of 
the court.582 The extent to which states are willing to assist with formal request does vary greatly. 
In many cases, it will depend on a particular state’s own domestic laws, on the state of the 
relationship between that state and the requesting state and, it has to be said, the attitude and 
helpfulness of those on the ground to whom the request is made.  
  From law enforcement, perspective information or evidence gathering has many  
attractions, as it allows law enforcement to repress or prevent the activities of those who provide 
laundering services or activities. It can also lead back to the criminals who organise and commit 
the predicate offence. In addition, findings from such investigations can be used as a surrogate 
charge for the predicate offence when the predicate offence cannot be proved or as one of multiple 
charges. 583  It also allows states to establish jurisdiction over ML within their territories in 
situations where they do not have jurisdiction over predicate offences that take place outside their 
territories. For all these reasons, it is particularly useful to have international cooperation between 
states in the fight against ML.  
                                                     
581
 MLA.  
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 Section 6 of the current United Kingdom Central Authority (UKCA) Guidelines on MLA contains a 
useful description of what information, such as intelligence, is available from the UK authorities on an 
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 N. Abrams, ‘The New Ancillary Offences’ Criminal Law Forum (1989) at 1and 2 cited in Boister infra 
note 720, p.100.  
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 In criminal matters, there is no universal instrument or treaty, which governs the gathering of 
evidence abroad. However, the framework for formal requests is the conventions, schemes, and 
treaties that states have signed and ratified. For example, in an anti-corruption related aspect of 
ML investigation, the UNCAC584 and the OECD Convention718 each make specific provision for 
mutual legal assistance and the encouragement of international cooperation. In the UK, the Crown 
(International Cooperation) Act 2003 (C (CI) A 2003) is the principal statutory provision in 
relation to mutual legal assistance. Part 1 provides for both the making of requests from the United 
Kingdom and the receiving by the United Kingdom of requests from authorities of other states.  
As noted above, under international law, enforcement jurisdiction is strictly territorial in 
nature. Therefore, state (the requesting state) requiring evidence or other investigative assistance 
needs to seeks assistance from and obtain the authorisation of the requested state. Below are some 
of the applicable treaties or conventions in this area.  
Regional Instruments  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, regional treaty obligations were developed to remove 
the formality from legal assistance while at the same time making it obligatory to give such 
assistance. The Council of Europe’s 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters719 played a formative role. Its chief innovation was to establish an obligation on parties 
to grant mutual legal assistance, but the provisions it made for the scope of legal assistance, 
conditions for legal assistance, exceptions to legal assistance, and procedure for legal assistance 
provided a model for subsequent treaties.   
Various other regional treaties have been adopted, including the 1992 Inter-American 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters720 and the 2004 ASEAN Treaty on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters.721 The EU has built on pioneering early steps in regional legal 
cooperation722 with the 2000 EU Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters723 
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and the 2008 European Evidence Warrant (a warrant for objects, documents, and data enforceable 
in other EU member states without further formality).724 It also proposes a  
European Investigation Order (EIO) (which provides for enforcement of investigative measures  
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 20 April 1959, ETS 30, in force 12 June 1962. See also the Additional Protocol, 17 March 1978, 
ETS 99, in force 12 April 1982, and Second Additional Protocol, 8 November 2001, ETS182, in 
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specified by the issuing EU member),585  which would replace the existing legal framework 
applicable to the gathering and transfer of evidence between the member states.  
Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties  
The United States has taken the lead in the development of bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties (MLATs), usually with states hesitant to give such cooperation. The MLAT between the 
United States and Switzerland signed on 25 May 1973586587 broke new grounds in legal assistance 
relation between common law and civil law states. It was followed by a proliferation of MLATs 
with strategic transnational crime suppression partners. The Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation 
Treaty between the United States and Mexico, signed on 9 December 1987,727 is just one of many 
relationships and they permit states to choose their treaty partners, thus avoiding obligations to 
provide information to unfriendly or untrustworthy states. The UN Model Treaty on Mutual 
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Assistance in Criminal Matters 1990588 is an attempt to standardise provisions in bilateral treaties. 
In the absence of such treaties, the US has been forced to conclude case-specific mutual legal 
assistance agreements (MLAAs).589  
 Thus, individual states are free to develop mutual legal assistance treaties on a bilateral basis. 
This is done to enable the provision of assistance between states of a different legal tradition. Here 
two states formally agree to MLAT, which enables them to extradite criminals or those suspected 
of crime and/or to provide assistance in the investigation or prosecution of crime or the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime. The bilateral treaty permits them to set out precisely the 
circumstances in which assistance will be granted.  
Multilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties  
There are varying kinds of multilateral treaties relating to mutual legal assistance (or extradition). 
Although multilateral extradition and mutual assistance treaties have the same general benefits as 
bilateral treaties, the obligations they contain are generally the subject of more exceptions than 
would be the case in bilateral treaty. The reason for this is that the treaty needs to reflect the 
negotiating position of a large (or relatively large) number of parties, each of whom must have 
included in the document the position it is prepared to adopt in respect of the state to whom it is 
prepared to grant the least benefit.590  
 Perhaps the most influential instrument in the development of mutual legal assistance was the 
Vienna Convention 1988. This enables State Parties to seek and provide a broad range of 
assistance in evidence gathering in cases involving drug trafficking aspect of ML.591 More recent 
multilateral treaties places parties under a general duty to provide legal assistance in regard to the 
convention’s crime, much as in bilateral and regional MLATs. Thus, for example, in terms of 
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article 46(1) of the UNCAC, the parties promise to “afford one another the widest measures of 
mutual legal assistance”. 592  These general obligations have been imposed to overcome the 
reluctance of parties that otherwise take a very rigid (and negative) view of what they see as 
‘fishing expeditions’ by other parties, and oblige them to provide assistance.593  
However, the mere existence of such general obligations does not imply a guarantee that 
all requests for assistance will be met. They are to be realised in accordance with the domestic 
law of the requested party, and if the conditions, procedures etc are not adhered to, they may be 
refused.594  
The Commonwealth Approach  
At a broader level, the 1986 Commonwealth Scheme for Mutual Legal Assistance595 provides an 
agreed set of recommendations for legislative provision for mutual legal assistance in  
Commonwealth states rather than a treaty. The Scheme itself does not constitute a treaty.  
However, as it has been adopted by consensus within the Commonwealth and it is expected that 
Commonwealth member states will enact or amend domestic law as necessary in order to render 
assistance in accordance with the Scheme.   
  The purpose and scope of the Scheme is set out in paragraph 1:  
 “(1) The purpose of this Scheme is to increase the level and scope of assistance rendered between 
Commonwealth Governments in criminal matters. It augments, and in no way derogates from 
existing forms of cooperation, both formal and informal; nor does it preclude the development of 
enhanced arrangements in other fora.”  
The 54 Commonwealth member states share the view that they must have in place 
effective cooperation procedures, which ensure that global and national interests in making the 
world a safer place are capable of being achieved by facilitating the trial of criminals in the place 
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where the offence was, or was alleged to have been, committed.596 An equally important element 
of the Commonwealth perspective on international cooperation is that member states ought to be 
able to deal with mutual assistance (or extradition) requests from other member states of the 
Commonwealth in the absence of treaties and to do this on the basis of laws which are as much in 
harmony with each other as possible. Within the Commonwealth’s shared legal values, member 
states can deal with extradition or mutual assistance requests in a way that places between member 
states minimal procedural obstacles.   
Types of Legal Assistance Available  
The range of types of legal assistance available depends on the particular convention or treaty. 
Some provide for special types of assistance. The European Cybercrime Convention,597  for 
example, makes provision for mutual assistance in a range of highly specialised areas such as the 
expedited preservation of store computer data738 and the expedited disclosure of preserved traffic 
data.598 Article 46(3) of the UNCAC provides an example of the full range of normal types of 
legal assistance that may be requested:  
a. taking evidence or statement from persons;  
b. effecting service of judicial documents;  
c. executing searches and seizures, and freezing;  
d. examining objects and sites;  
e. providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;  
f. providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including 
governments, bank, financial, corporate or business records;  
g. identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for 
evidentiary purposes;  
h. facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting state party;  
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i. any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested state 
party;  
j. identifying, freezing and tracing proceeds of crime in accordance with the provisions of 
chapter v of this conventions;  
k. the recovery of assets, in accordance with the provisions of chapter V of this convention.  
Accordingly, two broad kinds of assistance are covered: assistance in gathering the 
evidence of crime and assistance in recovering the proceeds of crime. The former is discussed in 
further detail below, as it touches on the subject of international evidence gathering and the role 
of the FIUs; the latter touches on the subject of asset recovery and confiscation and is outside the 
scope of this section. Some of the examples of assistance in gathering the evidence of crime are 
further discussed below.  
Statements from witnesses  
Provision for assistance in the taking of statements or evidence from witnesses and experts located 
in foreign states is a critical element of the international effort to repress and prevent ML. States 
may request that statements be taken from witnesses in the requested party. Section  
7(1)(a)-(c) of Australia’s Foreign Evidence Act 1994, for example, makes provision for an 
Australian court to order the examination of any person abroad when it “appears in the interests 
of justice to do so”. It takes into consideration factors such as whether the person is willing to 
come to Australia, whether the evidence is material, and the interests of the parties. The court can 
order that the person be examined under oath before a judge in the foreign court or by a 
commission from Australia or simply in response to a letter of request to the foreign state’s judicial 
authorities.599 Parties may also request assistance in enabling the voluntary appearance of the 
witness to give evidence in the requesting party. Giving evidence by video links makes this 
process much easier, and more recent multilateral treaties encourage this process.600   
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Appearance of witness in the requesting party   
Requesting states may also require that a witness appear personally in court. Witnesses may not, 
however, always be willing to give evidence in foreign states or employers may not be willing to 
let them go.601 In these situations, the requesting party may wish to serve a subpoena on a witness 
to appear in the requesting party. Some multilateral treaties, like the Palermo Convention, permit 
such service.602 The position is more complicated when a requesting party wishes to enforce such 
a subpoena through measures of compulsion such as the application of a penalty for a failure to 
appear.   
While bilateral treaties do make provision for enforced appearance at the request of 
another,603 and while they allow the service of documents to contain a penalty for nonappearance, 
they will not compel presence, and such penalties are without force. In terms of article 18(27) of 
the Palermo Convention, for example, witnesses and experts must consent to appear, and if they 
do so they are given immunity for fifteen days.604 Persons in custody in the requested party must 
also freely consent to transfer to a requesting party to give evidence605 and are not open to 
prosecution in the requesting party unless the requesting party agrees.606  
Records  
The communication of judicial and official records on request is important to reveal vital 
information such as the previous convictions of the person being prosecuted. Some of the 
repressive AML treaties oblige requested parties to convey publicly available government record 
documents and information to requesting parties but leave it to the discussion of requested parties 
to make available records not publicly available.607  
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Conditions for and Exceptions to Legal Assistance  
Requests for legal assistance are usually subject to limited conditions and exceptions borrowed 
from the law of extradition. The repressive AML obligations have tried to limit these conditions 
and exceptions, as legal assistance is not as serious an inroad into human rights as extradition. 
Some exceptions common in extradition treaties, such as the nationality exception, are simply 
inappropriate to legal assistance. Repressive AML treaties have specifically removed some 
reasons for refusal, such as bank secrecy.608 The precise conditions and exceptions involved 
concerning any particular cross-border crime will depend on the contents of the convention or 
MLAT on which the requesting party is relying. Invoking these conditions and exceptions is a 
matter for the requested party, acting in good faith. For example, in Djibouti v. France609 the 
French decision not to grant assistance was made by an investigating magistrate on grounds of 
national security, which could not be challenged by Djibouti.   
Condition of Double Criminality  
Legal assistance, like extradition, usually requires double criminality (the requirement that the 
conduct be criminal in both requesting and requested states). However, this may not always be 
the case, as some states do not require double criminality, unless the other party insists on its 
inclusion in an MLAT. 610  The definition of ‘offence’ in section 2 Canada’s Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Acts 1985, for example, refers to the relevant treaty, which will 
either require double criminality or not. Article 11(3) of the Canada–US MLAT provides that 
“assistance shall be provided without regard to whether the conduct under investigation or 
prosecution in the Requesting State constitutes an offence or may be prosecuted by the Requested 
State”. In effect, a Canadian judge can order the issue of an arrest warrant under section 12 or 
order evidence gathering under section 18 without considering double criminality.  However, this 
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may not be this case with other states, especially when the request for assistance relates to a cross-
border crime or a crime not recognised in another jurisdiction. In  
Thailand, for example, section 9(2) of the Act on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters611provides that, unless the specific MLAT provides otherwise, “the act which is the cause 
of the request must be an offence punishable under Thai laws”. Under regional MLATs, such as 
the 1959 European Convention, dual criminality is not generally required612 except in regard to 
more serious inroads into personal liberty such as search and seizure of property.754  Under the 
proposed new European Investigation Order, police in the requested EU member state will have 
to investigate upon request from another state, and it does not matter if it is a crime in the receiving 
state or not. More recent bilateral US MLATs also require assistance without regard to dual 
criminality, and the new FATF Recommendation 37 provides that “[states] should render mutual 
legal assistance, notwithstanding the absence of dual criminality, if the assistance does not involve 
coercive actions.” In the Commonwealth Scheme, however, it is a discretionary condition for 
assistance. 613  Similarly, article 18(9) of the Palermo Convention permits a party to decline 
assistance on the basis of dual criminality if it chooses to. The UNCAC is in similar terms, but 
does provide in article 46(9) (b) that parties shall provide assistance of a non-coercive nature even 
in the absence of dual criminality.  
Lastly, if double criminality is a requirement, the question becomes whether the formal 
legal elements or only the underlying conduct need to be the same in both parties. The trend is 
thought to be towards the latter. Article 25(5) of the European Cybercrime Convention, for 
example, provides that if parties require dual criminality, the sole condition shall be if the conduct 
underlying the offence is criminal in its laws.  
Condition of Specialty  
                                                     
611
 Act on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, B.E. 2535 (1992).  
612
 Article 1(1) of the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance available at  
≤http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/030.htm≥ last visited on 9 October 2014. 754  
 Article 5 and 6.  
613
 Paragraph 7(1) (a).  
      215  
  
Application of the doctrine of specialty (strictly a limitation on, rather than a condition of, legal 
assistance) to requests for the provisions of documents means that documents can only legally be 
used for the request for which they are handed over. For example, article 42(1) of the 2005 Council 
of Europe Convention against Money Laundering permits the requested party to make the 
“execution of a request dependent on the condition that the information or evidence obtained will 
not, without its prior consent, be used or transmitted by the authorities of the requesting Party for 
investigations or proceedings other than those specified in the request.” Specialty conditions of 
this kind can also be found in article 12(3) of the 2002 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter STF Convention) and in article  
18(19) of the Palermo Convention.  
 By obliging financial institutions to cooperate in the fight against ML, an enormous pool of 
financial intelligence is tapped. Mostly this intelligence ends up in databases controlled by 
FIUs.614 One of the moot points of the law surrounding the fight against ML is whether this 
information should also be made available for other purposes than fighting ML. Even if one 
restricts the use of information to the fight against ML, the question may arise as to the scope of 
the ML offence (and in particular its predicate offences), especially in those states where the 
definition of ML in the preventive legislation differs from the criminal legislation.615  
 Apart from ML prosecution, the information supplied by financial institutions can also prove to 
be very useful in other prosecutions, notable those regarding the predicate offence. Perhaps even 
more important, however, is the question as to whether information supplied by financial 
institutions in the context of the prevention of ML can also be used for non-judicial, notably tax, 
purposes. If tax administrations are allowed to have access to the information databases held by 
FIUs, tax administrations can circumvent the legal impediments to accessing bank files and the 
legislation on the prevention may turn out to be a very powerful device for combating criminal 
tax evasion.  
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 However, a specialty condition defines and at the same time limits the purposes for which 
information can be used, often the same as those for which the information was  
gathered.616   
Exceptions  
Political offence exception  
As in extradition, there has been steady pressure to remove the application of the political offence 
exception to legal assistance in regional MLATs. The UN Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance 
retains the discretion of the requested party to refuse on political grounds,759 position followed in 
the Commonwealth Scheme,617 although it makes it clear that transnational crimes are not to be 
considered political offences.618 However, terrorism convention like the STF  
Convention are clear that none of the offences in the treaty are to be regarded “as a political 
offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political 
motive” and thus a request for legal assistance cannot be refused on these ground alone.619  
Fiscal offence exception  
Older regional MLATs still permit parties to refuse a request where the party considers that it 
concerns a fiscal offence or an offence connected with a fiscal offence, but this condition is also 
under pressure.620 However, recent conventions like the repressive AML obligations provide that 
a request may not be refused on fiscal grounds.621  
Military law exception  
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Some MLATs retain the exception that mutual assistance cannot be requested for military offences 
that are not crimes under general criminal law. 622  
Sovereignty, security, and public order  
Following the position in most MLATs,623 the repressive AML obligations commonly contain a 
provision entitling the requested party to refuse if it considers “the execution of the request is 
likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, order public or other essential interests”. 624 
Prohibition from carrying out the requested action in national law  
Some states possess much broader investigative powers than others do. As a result, article  
46(21) (c) of the UNCAC  entitles the requested party to refuse: “(c) If the authorities of the 
requested State Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the action 
requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or 
judicial proceedings under their own jurisdiction. . .”  
Human Rights  
States are reluctant to refuse requests for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that such 
assistance may result in an unfair trial in the requesting state because of the need for comity on 
certain crimes and a reluctance to involve the courts in executive competency in foreign policy.625 
Interestingly, while non-discrimination clauses are found in some MLATs626 they have been 
omitted as a ground for refusing legal assistance in most of the repressive AML obligations. Yet 
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human rights obligations can be a valid ground for refusing legal assistance not necessarily 
contemplated in an MLAT.627  
Legal assistance is costly and complex and thus of necessity states tends to restrict its 
application to serious offences, although in Europe and in relations between the United States and 
Canada, where the systems are more integrated, more trivial offences are subject to cooperation. 
While some regional treaties make legal assistance available for any offence,628 the obligations to 
provide legal assistance in the foregoing multilateral treaties are limited to the particular crime in 
the treaties. The obligation may also be limited to serious offences within a convention rather than 
all offences, so as to avoid requests for assistance in regard to trivial offences.629  
I.I.I.  Informal Cooperation and the Role of Financial Intelligent Units   
Whereas international cooperation in criminal matters was traditionally the province of judicial 
authorities, new forms of mutual assistance have come to light, in particular mutual police 
assistance and mutual administrative assistance. Thus, a wide range of information or evidence 
can be readily obtained directly from another state without any need for a formal mutual legal 
assistance request. If the enquiry is a routine one and does not require the requested state to seek 
to use coercive powers, then it may be possible for the request to be made and complied with 
without a formal letter of request.630   
Over the past years, specialised governmental agencies have been created as states 
developed systems to deal with the problem of ML and other financial crimes. These entities are 
commonly referred to as ‘financial intelligence units’ or ‘FIUs’. The FIUs play an important role 
in the fight against ML, and in order to fulfil their role, they mutually exchange information. The 
international cooperation between FIUs takes place almost completely outside the framework of 
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traditional judicial cooperation in criminal matters and they offer law enforcement agencies 
around the world an important avenue for information exchange.   
ML investigations conceivably touch a number of law enforcement agencies within a 
particular jurisdiction. This means that a completely effective, multi-disciplined approach for 
combating ML is often beyond the reach of any single law enforcement or prosecutorial authority, 
which accounts for the hybrid nature of the FIUs as seen in the types of FIUs below. Combating 
ML therefore requires the expertise of specialised law enforcement agencies. The setting up of 
specialised FIUs designed to receive and process financial information from financial institutions 
(and possibly other institutions) should be seen against the background of the larger phenomenon 
of an increasing proliferation of specialised law enforcement agencies. 631  Some of the 
international instruments on repressive and preventive AMLC have alluded to the role of the 
FIUs,632 but none has hinted on the nature of this body.     
Since money may transfer hands in a matter of seconds or be relocated to the other side 
of the world at the speed of an electronic wire transfer, law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies that investigate financial crimes must be able to count on a virtually immediate exchange 
of information. This information exchange must also be at an early point after possible detection 
of a crime – the so–called ‘pre-investigative’ or intelligence stage. At the same time, the 
information on innocent individuals and businesses must at all time be  
protected.633  
 Under the auspices of the Egmont Group634 (a loosely organised group of national FIUs), a 
general definition of a financial intelligence unit was drawn up which was later also formally 
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inserted into the CICAD Model Regulation635 (formally Article 8 now Article 13). The following 
definition is intended to function as the lowest common denominator:  
“A central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), 
analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i) 
concerning suspected proceeds from crime, or (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, 
in order to counter Money laundering. . .”636    
The above definition contains three basic functions that are attributable to almost any type 
of FIU. First is that, any FIU has a ‘repository function’; meaning that the unit is called upon to 
be a centralised point of information on ML. Not only does it receive disclosed information on 
financial transactions, it also yields at least a certain degree of control over what  
happens to that information. The second function is the ‘analysis function’. In processing the 
information it receives, the unit is said to normally provide added value to the information. Thus, 
value to information would of course be dependent on the source of the information, which would 
further tell on a possible onward judicial investigation. The last function is the  
‘clearing house’ function; and this allows the unit to serve as a conduit for facilitating the 
exchange of information on unusual or suspicious financial transactions. The exchange relates to 
information in various forms (individual or general) and can take place with various partners: with 
domestic regulatory agencies, with domestic judicial authorities, or with foreign FIUs.637  
An FIU is therefore a central office that obtains financial reports information, processes 
it in some way and then discloses it to an appropriate government authority in support of a national 
AML effort. FIUs have attracted increasing attention with their ever more important role in AML 
programs. They are able to provide a rapid exchange of information (between financial institutions 
and law enforcement/prosecutorial authorities, as well as between jurisdictions), while protecting 
the interests of the innocent individuals contained in their data.  Accordingly, states have chosen 
                                                     
635
 Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission.  
636
 Available at ≤www.egmontgroup.org/≥last visited 9 October 2014.   
637
 G. Stessens supra note 11, p.184.  
      221  
  
to set up a central reporting unit to receive all the reports made by financial institutions.638 The 
choice of setting up a central FIU, rather than having the reports made to (local) law enforcement 
agencies, is grounded in various reasons.     
First is the need to have specialised expertise pooled in one institution, which may not be 
present within all law enforcement agencies. Secondly, centralising all reports and their 
processing in one specialised unit allows the authorities to move quickly, which is apt for the 
purpose of reducing the period during which suspicious transaction can be kept. Thirdly, FIUs 
have an economic function: on the one hand, they allow a much more efficient collection and 
analysis of information (by matching the information with intelligence) and on the other hand, the 
processing and analytical tasks of the FIUs are said to alleviate the work of the investigating police 
and judicial authorities who can then concentrate their attention on files which have already been 
scrutinised or even documented by an FIU official. Fourth, the establishment of an intermediary 
between financial institutions and law enforcement authorities is in many cases intended to foster 
a climate of trust between financial institutions and authorities, since those institutions do not have 
to report their suspicions directly to the police or judicial authorities.  
They can instead report to FIUs that will first analyse the institutions’ reports; which may decrease 
significantly the risk that ‘innocent’ customers may face in the case of police or judicial 
investigation.   
One unique feature about the FIU is that its scope in the investigation and use of 
information passed on to it is also governed by a ‘specialty principle’, which defines and limits 
the purposes for which information can be used.  The purpose here is often the same as those for 
which the information was gathered. For example, a tax authority in another jurisdiction cannot 
use information gathered for a serious crime in any one jurisdiction, since that would be contrary 
to the purpose for which the information was obtained in the first place.   
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An interesting aspect of the FIU, as noted above, is that most of the agreements are entered 
via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and this is general between the respective 
government agencies in the various states. However, an area of concern is the weight to be 
attached to the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties, given the fact that the 
exchange of information is done between government agencies. It may thus be concluded that, 
given the origin and nature of the agreement (MOU), parties may not have intended any form of 
binding legal obligation under international law, and this is the case where the ‘specialty principle’ 
applies.   
Unless the domestic law of either the state providing the information  or of the state 
receiving the information contains a requirement to the effect that exchange of information with 
foreign FIUs can take place only on the basis of a formal agreement, mutual assistance of this type 
can also take place in the absence of an agreement. Even in the absence of such a statutory 
requirement, many FIUs prefer to cooperate only on the basis of MOU.   
When there is an MOU, the question may arise as to whether the restrictions it imposes 
on exchange of information between the FIUs concerned are in any way judicially enforceable.  
In practice, this problem will pose itself only if information that was exchanged is being 
introduced as evidence into criminal proceedings. The problem is rather novel and no case law on 
the topic is known. The apparent lack of case law is probably in great part due to the fact that 
these MOUs are usually not made public. Unlike treaties, MOUs are not concluded between states 
but between national government authorities, notably between FIUs. The FIU is therefore part of 
the informal law-making process to control the crime of ML.  
FIU and Types  
Two major influences are thought to shape the creation of the FIUs. First, is the need to implement 
AML measures alongside already existing law enforcement systems, and second is the need to 
provide a single office for centralising the receipt and assessment of financial information and 
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sending the resulting disclosures to competent authorities.639 FIUs can therefore be classified by 
their nature: administrative, Judicial, Law Enforcement and hybrid models.   
The Judicial FIU Model640  
The Judicial Model is established within the judicial branch of government wherein ‘disclosure’ 
of suspicious financial activity are received by the investigative agencies of a state from its 
financial sector such that the judiciary powers can be brought into play, e.g. seizing funds, freezing 
accounts, conducting interrogations, detaining people, conducting searches, etc. This type of FIU 
is established within the judicial branch of the state and most frequently under the prosecutor’s 
jurisdiction.  Instances of such an arrangement are found in states with a continental law tradition, 
where the public prosecutors are part of the judicial system and have authority over the 
investigatory bodies, allowing the former to direct and supervise criminal investigation.  
 Under this arrangement, disclosures of suspicious financial activity are usually received by the 
prosecutor’s office, which may open an investigation if suspicion is confirmed by the first 
inquiries carried out under its investigation. The Judiciary’s power (for example, seizing funds, 
freezing accounts, conducting interrogations, detaining suspects, and conducting searches) can 
then be brought into play without delay. Judicial and Prosecutorial FIUs can work well in states 
where banking secrecy laws are so strong that a direct link with the judicial or prosecutorial 
authorities is needed to ensure the cooperation of financial institutions. It may be noted that the 
choice of the prosecutor’s office as the location of an FIU does not exclude the possibility of 
establishing a police service with special responsibility for financial investigation. In addition, in 
many states, the independence of the judiciary inspires confidence in financial circles.641  
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 Supra p. 184.  
640
 Example here includes the Cyprus Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS) and 
Luxembourg’s, Cellule de Renseignement Financier (FIU-LUX).  
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 P. Gleason and G. Gottselig Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview, IMF and World Bank Working 
Paper (Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 2004), p.16 available at ≤www.imf.org≥ last visited 
on 27/11/2012.  
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 The principal advantage of this type of arrangement is that disclosed information is passed from 
the financial sector directly to an agency located in the judiciary for analysis and processing.  
The Law Enforcement Model642  
The Law Enforcement Model of FIU implements AML measures alongside already existing law 
enforcement systems. This is done by supporting the efforts of multiple law enforcement or 
judicial authorities with concurrent or sometimes competing jurisdictional authority to investigate 
ML. Operationally, under this arrangement, the FIU will be close to other lawenforcement units, 
such as a financial crimes unit, and will benefit from their expertise and sources of information. 
In return, information received by the FIU can be assessed more easily by law-enforcement 
agencies and can be used in any investigation, thus increasing its usefulness.   
  In addition, a law-enforcement-type FIU will normally have the law-enforcement  
powers of the law-enforcement agency itself (with specific legislative authority being required), 
including the power to freeze transactions and seize assets (with the same degree of judicial 
supervision as applies to other law-enforcement powers of the state). This is likely to facilitate the 
timely exercise of law-enforcement powers when this is needed.  
The Administrative Model643  
The Administrative Model is a centralised, independent, administrative authority, which receives 
and processes information from the financial sector and transmits disclosures to judicial or law 
enforcement authorities for prosecution. It functions as a ‘buffer’ between the financial and the 
law enforcement communities. Administrative-type FIUs are usually part of the structure, or 
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 Example here includes Gursney Financial Intelligence Service (FIS), Jersey, Jersey States of Jersey 
Police-Joint Financial Crimes Unit and the United Kingdom’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 
Originally, National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was the UK’s FIU but SOCA was established 
by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) as a result of a merger of NCIS with related 
agencies (the National Crime Squad) and department of the Home Office (those with responsibilities for 
organised immigration crime) and HM Customs and Exercise (those dealing with drug trafficking).   
643
 Example includes the Australian Transaction Report and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) and the United States Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN).  
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under the supervision of, an administration or an agency other than the lawenforcement or judicial 
authorities. They sometimes constitute a separate agency, placed under the substantive 
supervision of a ministry or administration (‘autonomous’ FIUs) or not placed under supervision 
(‘independent’ FIUs). The main rationale for such an arrangement is to establish a ‘buffer’ 
between the financial sector (and, more generally, entities and professionals subject to reporting 
obligations) and the law-enforcement authorities in charge of financial crime investigations and 
prosecutions.644   
Often, financial institutions facing a problematic transaction or relationship do not have 
hard evidence of the fact that such a transaction involves criminal activity or that the customer 
involved is part of a criminal operation or organisation. They will therefore be reluctant to disclose 
it directly to a law-enforcement agency, out of a concern that their suspicion may become an 
accusation that could be based on a wrong interpretation of facts. The role of the FIU is then to 
substantiate the suspicion and send the case to the authorities in charge of criminal investigations 
and prosecutions only if the suspicion is substantiated.788  
The actual administrative location of such FIUs varies: the most frequent arrangements 
are to establish the FIU in the ministry of finance, the central bank, or regulatory agency. A few 
have been established as separate structures, independent of any ministry, for example, the 
Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF/CFI).  In most cases, the decision to 
establish the FIU outside the law-enforcement system also leads to the decision that the FIU’s 
powers will be limited to the receipt, analysis, and dissemination of suspicious transaction and 
other reports, and that they will be given investigative or prosecutorial powers. Administrativetype 
FIUs may or may not be responsible for issuing Anti-Money Laundering Regulations or for 
supervising compliance with relevant laws and regulations on the part of reporting  
institutions.645  
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 Supra note 784, p. 10. 788  Ibid.  
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 Ibid.  
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Hybrid Type FIU  
This last category of FIU encompasses FIUs that contain different combinations of the 
arrangements described previously. This hybrid type of arrangements is an attempt to obtain the 
advantages of all the elements put together. Some FIUs combine the features of administrativetype 
and law-enforcement type FIUs, while others combine the powers of the customs office with those 
of the police – for some states, this is the result of joining two agencies that had been involved in 
combating ML into one.646    
 It may be noted that in some FIUs listed as administrative-type, staff from various regulatory and 
law-enforcement agencies work in the FIU while continuing to exercise the powers of their agency 
of origin. Examples of ‘hybrid’, FIUs are the Denmark State Prosecutors for Serious Economic 
Crime/Money Laundering Secretariat and The National Authority for Investigation and 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime –The Money Laundering  
Unit.    
Administrative Character of the International Exchange of Information between FIUs  
According to Stessens, administrative assistance can generally be defined as international 
assistance that takes place between administrative government authorities, that is, outside the 
judicial framework, with a view to the application of or compliance with specific administrative 
rules.647 It differs from judicial assistance both in terms of authorities concerned and of objectives.  
  As far as the exchange of information between FIUs is concerned, however, two  
remarks need to be made on the administrative nature of this type of assistance. First, not all FIUs 
are administrative authorities.  The discussion of the types of FIUs revealed that in some state 
police or even judicial authorities have been charged with collecting and analysing information 
transmitted by financial institutions. As far as judicial FIUs are concerned, these are excluded 
from the international exchange of information that takes place between FIUs, as they cannot 
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 Ibid.  
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 G. Stessens supra  note 11, p. 262.  
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guarantee the limited and confidential use of information unless there is a specific statutory 
provision, which allows them to retain confidential information received from foreign 
FIUs.648Police authorities – such as a constable under the UK SOCA649– do, however, take part 
in the international information exchange. However, this does not necessarily preclude this type 
of information exchange from being classified as administrative assistance, since police assistance 
can also be considered as a type of administrative assistance, that is, assistance between non-
judicial government authorities.   
  A second remark pertains to the objectives of administrative assistance between  
national FIUs. As was already pointed out, this assistance serves a clearly repressive goal, given 
the important role that FIUs play in the domestic enforcement of AML laws: they mostly act as 
an intermediary between the financial institutions and judicial authorities. Even though most of 
the FIUs have no proper law enforcement tasks,650 their mission is nevertheless clearly geared 
towards criminal law enforcement.   
 Thus, the exchange of information between FIUs can be best classified as mutual administrative 
assistance. In many cases, the authorities are not police services and even if police services are 
involved, the exchange of information takes place outside the mainstream of international police 
cooperation. Stessens has argued that, it would be impracticable and unwise to bring this type of 
sui generis cooperation under the heading of police or judicial cooperation.651   
Many states have therefore opted to create an administrative FIU as an interface between 
financial institutions and criminal justice system (i.e. the police and judicial authorities). This 
choice is especially motivated by the need to create a climate of trust and imposition of a specialty 
principle, and the need to have a centralised reporting unit. In addition, administrative FIUs are 
very suitable for dealing with reports made by financial institutions, as they are flexible   
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 Ibid.  
649
 SOCA Officers can be designated the powers of a constable, customs officer or immigration officer and/ 
or any combination of these three sets of power.   
650
 Whilst all administrative FIUs enjoy a considerable degree of independence, some are attached to a 
supervisory authority and hence are not completely independent. The American Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), for example, is a part of the US Department of Treasury and regards itself 
as a law enforcement service.   
651
 Supra note 11, p. 263.  
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  In the view of the undeniable law enforcement background of the exchange of  
information between FIUs, the question is whether this type of cooperation could not take place 
through the channel of police assistance, or even via judicial assistance. As far as judicial 
assistance is concerned, such a movement would be in keeping with the more general trend of 
blurring borders between the various types of FIUs so that judicial cooperation can nowadays also 
include cooperation with administrative authorities. Nevertheless, several arguments can be 
invoked against exercising such an option.  
 The stringent specialty principle to which some of the administrative FIUs are subjected makes 
it impossible for them to forward information to foreign judicial FIUs, as these would not be able 
to safeguard this specialty principle. Apart from this specific obstacle, the procedural context of 
judicial assistance differs from that of administrative assistance. Whereas, the former is concerned 
with exchanging evidence in the context of a criminal investigation that is often already centred 
on identified suspects, administrative FIUs assistance consists mainly of exchanging of 
information on suspicious transactions. Although this type of information may obviously also 
contain information on individuals, these individuals will not (yet) have the status of suspects. In 
fact a substantial part of the so-called suspicion transactions that are scrutinised by FIUs will 
eventually turn out not to be related to ML operations.   
 The administrative concept of a suspicious transaction, as operated by (administrative and police) 
FIUs is therefore wider than the judicial concept of a suspicious transaction. This, in turn, also 
has implications for international cooperation and some states even go as far as to require a prima 
facie case for the purpose of accommodating a request for judicial assistance.652It is obvious that 
such a requirement cannot possibly be met at the preliminary stage during which FIUs exchange 
information on suspicious transaction. Moreover, it will often not be possible to assess other 
requirements that are generally posed in the context of judicial cooperation, not would the above 
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 For example, requests for cooperation that are intended merely to confirm ungrounded suspicions are not 
allowed.   
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exceptions listed in the case of formal legal assistance be applicable in such preliminary stages of 
an investigation.   
  Thus, it may in practice be impossible to ascertain whether condition of double  
criminality is met as it will not be clear from what type of predicate offence (if from an offence at 
all) the funds are derived.   
Conclusion  
Traditionally, international cooperation in a criminal matter is treaty-based and between judicial 
authorities, as the sole mode of gathering evidence abroad. However, the emergence of 
profitoriented crimes (as separate from the suspect-oriented perspective to crime) has resulted in 
further law-making in the context of the international effort to repress and prevent ML. As the 
international cooperation develops further, we see that emergence of binding and non-binding co-
operative techniques in this field is not disconnected from a surge or increase in new waves of 
crimes that are profit-oriented.   
 As a matter of legal certainty, the effectiveness of preventive/repressive AMLC would in part 
depend on an effective international co-operation in criminal matters, whether binding or non-
binding. This is because the attainment of the goals of a domestic criminal justice system would 
in part be contingent upon international co-operation. In the end, the result is an emergence of 
new co-operative techniques, separate from the traditional principles of international co-operation 
in criminal matters, which was suspect and generally treaty based.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
I.  Jurisdictional Role of the Money Laundering Law  
The international nature of ML requires an international response. International harmonisation 
efforts in respect of the obligations to repress and prevent ML were set out in chapters three and 
four. In addition to this harmonisation of substantive repressive and preventive AML measures, 
an effective fight against ML also requires that jurisdictional problems that are likely to arise in 
an international ML context be solved. Often it will be unclear which state has jurisdiction to 
investigate ML offences and to prosecute and try alleged money launderers to seize and order the 
confiscation of alleged proceeds from crime.    
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There are substantial jurisdictional problems, as a result of the international character of 
ML, part of which has to do with exercising jurisdictional competence with respect to the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime, extradition, and even dealing with so-called tax haven, 
where secrecy and anonymity is commonplace. The problem of confiscation arises where a state 
has jurisdiction over a ML offence but not the predicate crime653 that generated the crime in the 
first place. As a rule, the criminal law is generally territorial, therefore the question of whether a 
state has jurisdiction to provide for the confiscation of criminal proceeds, and to criminalise ML, 
corresponds to the question as to whether the courts of that state can issue confiscation orders and 
try alleged ML offence.   
  As Fisher noted, the process of extradition in the case of ML is somewhat  
anachronistic,654 and in terms of jurisdiction, this presents various legal obstacles for states. The 
general rule in international law is that, because of sovereignty, states do not have a legal 
obligation to extradite criminals to another state.655 The duty to surrender arises from extradition 
treaties or agreements.800 A state can only extradite an individual to another state if it has an 
extradition treaty with that state, and in the absence of such an agreement, a state has no obligation 
to extradite an alleged money launderer. For example, one of Nigeria’s wealthiest politicians, 
James Onanefe Ibori, was convicted and jailed for thirteen years by a London court for ML. This 
was following a successful extradition request made by the UK to Dubai, where he was living as 
a fugitive from Nigeria.801 The process leading to his arrest, trial and conviction was made possible 
as a result of an existing extradition treaty between the UK and United Arab Emirate.802   
There is also the problem of financial secrecy jurisdictions and offshore financial centres 
(OFCs), which emphasis the strength of the provisions in their banking laws guaranteeing 
anonymity of customers in order to reap the benefits through licensing fees. The laws in these 
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 See supra pp. 116–120 for the concept of the predicate crime.   
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 K.R .Fisher ‘In Rem Alternative to Extradition for Money Laundering’ (2002-2003) 25 Loy. L.A Int’l 
& Comp. L. Rev at 409.  
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 As O’Connell indicates, until the nineteenth century “surrender of fugitive was the exception rather than 
the rule, and a matter of grace rather than of obligation” – D. P. O’Connell, International Law cited in M. 
Radomyski ‘What Problems has Money Laundering Posed for the Law Relating to  
Jurisdiction?’ (2010) Cov. L.J at 3.  
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jurisdictions establish a right to anonymity for foreign nationals or residents who keep their 
property within that state, a right directed at investigations conducted by other states. An 
unreported judgment of the High Court of Cook Islands’ Civil Division803 confirmed, memorably 
for example, that the purpose of the Cook Island’s financial secrecy law was to make it as difficult 
as possible for creditors to exercise their rights. Financial institutions benefit from such 
arrangement because they sell secrecy to individuals who want to deposit, hold, transfer, and 
withdraw money without any official awareness of this movement either in that  
                                                      
800
 For example, the European Convention on Extradition 1957 (member states of the EU); Pact of 
the League of Arab States (Egypt, Iraq, Trans Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen); the Benelux 
Extradition Convention ( Belgium and Luxembourg, and Belgium and the Netherlands); The 
Commonwealth Scheme (the Commonwealth); Convention between the UK, Australia, New Zealand,  
South Africa, India, and Portugal, supplementary to the extradition treaty of October 17, 1892;  
Montevideo Convention on extradition ( Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El  
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States); The Nordic States Scheme 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden); the O.C.A.M Convention (twelve of the fourteen former 
French territories in Equatorial and West Africa). Such treaties may be bilateral or multilateral.    
801
 The Economic and Financial Crime Commission of Nigeria (hereinafter EFCC) estimates the 
funds taken by Mr Ibori at USD 290 million: leaked Wikileaks cables put the sum at between USD 3 and 
4 billion –J. Hatchard et al supra note 509 p. 285.  
  
Case No 208/94, 6 November 1995, Judgment on Appeal 20 December 1995 cited in N. Boister supra note 
720, p. 187.  
jurisdiction or in any other.656 They use various products, including numbered bank accounts 
(originally accounts where the name of the beneficial owner was unknown to the bank but more 
recently where it is a closely guarded secret), and shell banks (banks that have no physical 
presence in the jurisdiction in which they operate).805 Thus, the unusual nature of these 
arrangements, and skills required to use them to engage in ML, forces cross-border criminals to 
rely on financial professionals, which presents a problem to law enforcement agency.   
Accordingly, ML criminalisation in national law will be of limited practical effect unless 
the state enacting the crime establishes an adequate criminal jurisdiction for the crime. Although 
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 R. Murphy, ‘Out of Sight’ (2011) 33(8) London Review of Books at 21 cited in Boister. 805  In this 
category are companies and trusts where no information is kept on the public registers and owners or 
beneficiaries are not identifiable.    
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this chapter underlines the central role that the principle of territorial jurisdiction plays in response 
to the crime of ML, “a rigid territorial allocation of jurisdictional competence creates an impunity 
umbrella for those who act from abroad to achieve their illegal domestic objectives”.657 The 
chapter is therefore concerned with the internationalisation of ML and the jurisdictional role of 
the obligations to criminalise. The chapter explore this development by looking at the relative 
importance of criminalisation as a treaty-based initiative and the subsequent development of the 
law as the legal basis for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. It argues that, criminalisation has 
numerous implications, part of which is the need for states to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction 
in view of the territoriality of the criminal law and the crossborder nature of ML.   
 Again as with other aspects of this thesis, the approach here will be to examine the international 
law-making processes that have been engaged in response to the threat of ML by looking at the 
jurisdictional role of the ML law in light of the obligations to repress and prevent ML. The focus 
here, as with other chapters, is not to give account of the sources of international law but the aim 
is to identify the instruments, participants and processes employed in responding to the threat of 
ML by extending the jurisdiction of the law through existing international arrangements. This is 
done by looking at the extra-territorial application of the law through the repressive and preventive 
AML controls.  
The chapter will accordingly do two things. First, it examines the bases for asserting 
jurisdiction in international law; second, it will examine the jurisdictional role of the ML law and 
the subject of extra-territorial application of ML. In order to provide a clear answer to these 
questions, it is necessary to distinguish between various forms of jurisdiction in international law.  
I.I.  Jurisdiction and Competence in International Law  
Jurisdiction is a form of legal power or competence. It is a competence to control and alter the 
legal relationships of those subject to that competence through the creation and application of 
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 R. A. Falk, ‘International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order’ (1959) 32 
Temple Law Quarterly at 295 and 303 in N. Boister supra note 720, p. 135.  
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legal norms.658 States that have consented to the exercise of the so-called compulsory jurisdiction 
of the ICJ can have some of their legal relationships adjudicated upon by the Court since it has a 
competence to determine the rights and obligations of states that have consented to its 
jurisdiction.659 At the heart of this concept therefore is the question of competence, because 
jurisdiction is identified as a type of competence in international law.  
 The starting point for understanding how jurisdictional competences are allocated between states 
over individuals is the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ) 
in 1927 concerning the collision of the French mail steamer, the Lotus, and the Turkish collier, 
the Boz-Kourt.660 The Lotus Case, is said to have introduced a theory of jurisdiction based upon 
what Brierly described as a “highly contentious metaphysical proposition of the extreme positivist 
school, that law emanates from the free will of sovereign independent States”,661 (which has also 
been referred to as a permissive system of allocation of jurisdictional powers.662).  The following 
section from the Courts decision explains this point:   
 “International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common ends. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. Now, the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that– failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary– it may not 
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived 
from international custom or from a convention.”  
 However, despite the above rule on jurisdictional competence in light of the Lotus case, the law 
relating to asserting jurisdiction appears to follow a different prohibitive approach, whereby states 
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 W. Hohfeld ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning’ in (19131914) 23 
Yale Law Journal 16 at 49.  
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 See Articles 36(1) and (2) of the Statute of the ICJ.  
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 The S S Lotus case (1927) PCIJ Reports Series A No. 10.  
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 J. L. Brierly ‘The ‘Lotus” Case (1928) 44 LQR 154 at 155.  
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 P. Capps et al Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Oregon US, Hart 
Publishing, 2003) p. xx.  
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are prohibited from asserting jurisdiction unless they are permitted to do. The Cutting Case in 
1887663 clearly illustrates this point.  
 In this case, Augustus K Cutting, a US national, was arrested and imprisoned by a Mexican court 
for committing libel against a Mexican citizen. The libellous acts were committed in Texas, 
United States. T F Bayard, the Secretary of State for the United States  
Government, challenged the right of Mexico to assert jurisdiction and demanded the release of  
Cutting. Bayard claimed that “. . . the judicial tribunals of Mexico were not competent under the 
rules of international law to try a citizen of the United States for an offense committed and 
consummated in his own country, merely because that person offended happened to be a 
Mexican”.664  
Mexico attempted to justify the right to assert jurisdiction on two grounds: first, that the 
assertion of jurisdiction by Mexico was in accordance with rules of international law and the 
‘positive legislation of various states’665 and, secondly that it was for Mexican courts to decide 
the scope of Mexican legislation. Bayard rejected both of these grounds arguing initially that there 
was little evidence, which supported the Mexican claim that their assertion of jurisdiction was 
consistent with international law and states practice. Whilst states can prosecute their own citizens 
for acts committed extraterritorially, to extend its jurisdiction to acts committed by foreigners 
outside the territory would impair (a) the independence of states and (b) amicable relations 
between states. Secondly, he argued that if a Government could set up its own municipal law as 
the final test of its international rights and obligations, then the rules of international law would 
be but the shadow of a name and would afford no protection either to States or to individuals.  
 Whilst it is fairly clear what is meant by jurisdiction as a legal concept in international law, state 
practice highlights somewhat of an opposing approach in the area. Combining these positions, it 
was concluded that there was no principle of international law that justifies such a pretension, and 
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 Foreign Relations of the United States (1887-1888) 751-869 and (1888-1889) 1133-1134. See also J. B. 
Moore, Digest of International Law (Stevens, London, 1906-11) 225-42 (Cited in P Capps et al p. 8).  
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that “any assertion of jurisdiction must rest (as an exception to the rules), either upon the general 
concurrence of nations or upon express conventions”.”815  
 Perhaps a useful instrument in this regard is the work of The Harvard Research Draft 
Convention.666 The Harvard Research, remains useful in highlighting the circumstances where 
states may be justified in asserting jurisdiction; an approach that still require states to justify a link 
which is recognised by international law between itself and the subject over which it seeks to 
assert jurisdiction. Five heads of jurisdiction have been identified according to the Draft 
Convention.   
The first, territorial, is accepted as of primary importance and of fundamental character.  
Territorial jurisdiction is the ground on which the vast majority of offences are prosecuted. All 
crimes alleged to have been committed within the geographical territory of a state can be heard 
before the municipal courts of the state in question. In the case Compania Naviera Vascongado  
v. Cristina SS,667 Lord Macmillan stated that:  
 “It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign independent states, 
that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits and in all 
causes civil and criminal arising within these limits”.  
The principle is applicable notwithstanding the fact that the defendants are foreign 
nationals. Thus, territorial jurisdiction extends not only to crimes committed wholly within the 
territory of the state, but also to cases in which only part of the offence occurred in the state. 
Where a crime is a continuing one insofar as the perpetrator of the criminal act extends to two or 
more states, all states involved may claim jurisdiction.668   
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 Harvard Research on Jurisdiction of Crime: Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime 29 
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 This is because the territoriality principle may be divided into two parts:  State in which the acts taken 
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is thought to be the normal meaning of the term ‘territorial jurisdiction’ States in which injury takes place 
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 The second, nationality, is thought to be universally accepted, though there are said to be striking 
differences in the extent to which it is used in different national systems. Thus, the nexus 
established between a state and its citizens by the concept of nationality is the basis for the exercise 
of jurisdiction, even when the nationals in question are outside the territory of the state itself.669 
In such circumstances, jurisdiction is said to be founded on the nationality principle.   
 The nationality jurisdiction is a constitutional rule in many civil law states. They consider their 
nationals responsible to the state wherever they are because they benefit from its protection, owe 
it a duty of allegiance, and their actions may injure its reputation. Its importance is thought to be 
increased by the fact that civil law states generally refuse to extradite their nationals.670 Civil law 
states usually make a condition of establishing nationality that the offence the national is accused 
of is also an offence in the domestic law of the territory where it occurs (dual criminality). Article 
5 of the Netherlands Criminal Code provides for jurisdiction over  
Dutch nationals, for example, but only if the offence is also “punishable under the law of the   
State in which it has been committed”.  
 States from all legal traditions have begun to increase their use of nationality jurisdiction in order 
to ensure that egregious transnational crimes, such as sex tourism, committed wholly outside their 
territories do not go unpunished. For example, Article 10 of  
Japan’s Law for Punishing Acts Relating to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and for 
Protecting Children671672673 provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over Japanese nationals who 
commit child sex offences. In United States v. Clark,822 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that the nationality principle justified jurisdiction for offences under the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 2003823 
for the offence of a United States national apprehended having sex with minors in Cambodia.   
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 However, nationality is useful against a range of extraterritorial transnational crimes. Section 7A 
of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, for example, applies nationality to extraterritorial terrorism; 
dealing in people under 18 for sexual exploitation, removal of body parts, or engagement in forced 
labour; participation in organised criminal groups; smuggling migrants; human trafficking; ML 
and corruption of officials.674 The option to establish nationality jurisdiction is now common in 
the repressive AML conventions,675 a few (mainly European) treaties make is obligatory.676 Some 
states limit its use to serious offences only.827  The principal weakness of nationality as a basis for 
criminal jurisdiction is that there are no agreed rules for the award of nationality; international 
law only requires a genuine link between state and individual,677 and states are free to adopt 
whatever conditions they choose.  
Usually they award it to natural persons on the basis of birth, parentage, or naturalisation or some 
other criterion. Common law states tend to confer nationality on juristic persons such as 
companies on the basis of where they were incorporated, civil law states on where they are 
managed.678  The presumption that nationals are familiar with their state’s law serves as the 
rationale for the legality of nationality jurisdiction, but global mobility and multiple nationalities 
undermines this rationale.  
 A modern development of nationality jurisdiction that overcomes some of these problems is the 
permissive establishment of jurisdiction over habitual residents. This is especially useful in the 
case of the repressive AML conventions, since Article 15(2) of the  
Palermo Convention provides that parties may establish jurisdiction when: “(a) The offence is 
committed by a . . . stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory”. 
Somewhat more broadly, Article 4(2) (b) of the Vienna Convention 1988 also permits states to 
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establish jurisdiction over habitual residents, but does not require they be stateless, which means 
that parties may establish jurisdiction on the basis over the nationals of other parties.  
 Thirdly, protective, is claimed by most states (and regarded with misgivings by a few), and is 
generally ranked as the basis of an auxiliary competence. This extensive principle of jurisdiction 
would permit jurisdiction to be exercised over foreign nationals whose conduct threatens the 
security of a state. This allows states to punish acts threatening to undermine national security 
such as plotting to overthrow the government, spying, forging currency and conspiracy to violate 
immigration regulation.679  
 Protective jurisdiction is broader in scope than objective territoriality in that it allows the 
establishment of jurisdiction over conduct that poses a potential threat,680 broader than nationality 
in that it applies to nationals and foreigners, and broader than passive personality in that it covers 
a more diffuse range of threats. It has usually been limited, however, to crimes that occur outside 
of any state’s territorial jurisdiction – on the high seas or in international airspace.  
 The offence must affect directly or indirectly on the state’s interests. States are in the best position 
to assess their own interests and they have usually established protective jurisdiction to suppress 
threats to their security (although some states have expanded the scope of the principle beyond 
security to include economic interests). Not surprisingly, there has been a growing tendency to 
characterise a number of transnational crimes as threats to security, particularly when other 
principles of jurisdiction are not available. The United States took the lead in this regard in 1980, 
enacting the Marijuana on the High Seas Act,832 which in section 955(a) prohibits “any person on 
board a vessel of the United States, or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States on the high seas” from possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute it.   
 In US v. Gonzales833 the United States Court of Appeals held that the United States had protective 
jurisdiction for a violation of the Act over a Honduran Vessel found 125 miles east of  
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Florida, carrying 114 bales of marijuana, which United States officials had boarded with 
Honduran permission. According to the Court, the protective principle allowed the establishment 
of jurisdiction “over a person whose conduct outside the nation’s territory threatens the nation’s 
security or could potentially interfere with the operation of its governmental functions”.834   
 The United States has not been alone in using protective jurisdiction. The German 
Bundesgerichtshof established jurisdiction over a Dutch cannabis dealer operating in Netherlands 
on the basis of the protective principle on the condition that a direct domestic link to Germany 
could be established.835 The Court held that the dealer had violated German interests by having 
sold over many years a considerable amount of hashish to German nationals who had taken the 
drug to Germany to consumer or resell it.   
 The protective principle appears in many forms in more recent multilateral conventions. For 
example, Article 4(1) (b) (ii) of the Vienna Convention 1988 provides for a special form of  
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protective jurisdiction over vessels on which drug trafficking offences have occurred and the party 
has been “authorised to take appropriate action pursuant of Article 17”. An even more unusual 
form of protective jurisdiction is provided for by the 1985 European Convention on Offences 
Relating to Cultural Property, which obliges parties under Article 13(1) to establish their 
jurisdiction when “any offence relating to cultural property is committed outside its territory when 
it was directed against cultural property originally found within its territory”. Here the party 
establishes it jurisdiction to property originally found within its cultural property. Article 5(1) (c) 
of the Hostage Taking Convention, somewhat more orthodoxy, obliges parties to establish 
jurisdiction over hostage-taking when the offence is “committed . . . (c) in order to compel that 
state to do or abstain from doing any act.” The protective jurisdiction is triggered by  
the fact the state, and its interests, are actually the target of the hostage-taker’s pressure.  
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The fourth, Universal, widely thought by no means universally accepted, as the basis of 
an auxiliary competence except for the offence of piracy681 (and War crimes682 and War-related 
crimes683), with respect to which it is the generally recognised principle of jurisdiction. The basis 
for jurisdiction in accordance with the universality principle is that the state exercising jurisdiction 
has custody of a person accused of perpetrating an offence recognised by international law as an 
international crime.   
 In some repressive AML conventions, however, the provision to establish jurisdiction is still only 
permissive. Thus, while Article 4(2) (a) of the Vienna Convention 1988 obliges parties to establish 
jurisdiction when the alleged offender is present and the party does not extradite the alleged 
offender because that party has territorial or nationality jurisdiction, Article 4(2) (b) provides that 
a party may establish jurisdiction when the party’s failure to extradite is on some other ground. In 
the former case, the party has a strong jurisdictional connection and thus must establish 
jurisdiction; in the latter, it may not have such a strong jurisdictional connection so the provision 
is permissive. The state in question may have entirely valid grounds for refusing extradition or 
taking jurisdiction. These may include insufficiency of evidence, the previous conviction or 
acquittal of the alleged offender.  
Lastly, is the passive personality, (asserted in some form by a considerable number of 
States and contested by others) which is admittedly auxiliary in character and is probably not 
essential for any State if the ends served are adequately provided for on other principles.684 The 
principle grants jurisdiction to a state to punish alleged offences committed abroad against 
nationals of that state. An illustration of an exercise of jurisdiction on this basis was the request 
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by the United States to Italy for the extradition of Palestinian nationals responsible for the murder 
of an American national aboard the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro in 1985.685  The passive 
personality principle was included as an optional provision in the UNCAC and Palermo 
Convention, where its use is not as easily justified.686 It is not immediately apparent why organised 
criminals would commit a crime against someone because of their nationality; Boister is of the 
opinion that perhaps an attack on a foreign judicial or law enforcement official may be what the 
authors of the Palermo Convention had in mind.842  
I.I.I.  Criminalisation and Extraterritorial Application of the Law  
 The crime of ML presupposes the occurrence of a ‘predicate offence’, whose proceeds are being 
laundered. This is only logical since ML is a separate offence from the predicate offence, and 
consequently independently gives rise to separate jurisdictional claim. The Vienna Convention 
1988, whilst imposing a duty on the parties to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of drug-
related offences is, however, silent on the question of the location of the predicate offence. 
According to the commentary, “it would accord with recent practice if implementing legislation 
were to reflect the possibility that the predicate offence was located in a State other than the 
enacting one”687 – either the state enacting the ML offence.    
Unlike the Vienna Convention 1988, the 1990 Money Laundering Convention  
established the extraterritorial application of the ML offence. After imposing the obligation on 
each Party to establish ML as a criminal offence, the 1990 Money Laundering Convention goes 
on to stipulate that: “it shall not matter whether the predicate offence was subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Party”.688 Of similar effect is Article 6 of the Palermo Convention, which 
reinforced the approach in the 1990 Money Laundering Convention and extended the focus 
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beyond targeting laundering of proceeds from drug-related activities to that of all serious offences. 
Under this convention, states were required to apply the offence of ML to broad range of predicate 
offences, including all serious offences as well as the offences of participating in an organised 
criminal group.845 The ML offence can therefore, fulfil its jurisdictional function only if it is not 
required that the state concerned should also have jurisdiction over the predicate offence. This is 
especially important in cases of states that – because of their limited geographical contour – are 
mostly confronted with proceeds from a foreign offence that, as such, have no connecting point 
with the state.  
Thus, a ML offence that takes place purely on the territory of one state poses no problem 
of jurisdiction. However, since most ML operations at one point or another would generally entail 
a cross-border element, the question is likely to arise as to what degree a ML operation may have 
involved a violation of the legal order of a given state before the courts of that state can apply 
their criminal law. This relates, in general, to the question of applying the domestic AML 
legislation to the particular ML offence in question.   
Two prevalent theories are relevant in this respect and are argued to be unique and 
appropriate in their specific mode of application – ubiquity theory and the effects doctrine.  
While the former is a prevalent international law theory and applies in a continental law system, 
the latter is stated to have been developed in the context of American competition law and is 
widely accepted in the United States, and has since been the subject of fierce criticism in Europe.  
Ubiquity Theory   
Under this theory, an offence is deemed to have taken place on the territory of a state as soon as 
a constituent or essential element of this offence has taken place on that territory.689 The pressure 
of a mobile social and economic reality is evident in the now classic definition of the territoriality 
principle in criminal law. According to Article 3 of the Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
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with Respect to Crime, “A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed within its 
territory”.690 A crime is committed in whole within a state’s territory when all its constituent parts 
(the conduct and the criminal result) have taken place within that  
territory.  
Some crimes, however, start within the territory of a state but are consummated outside 
that territory. Alternatively, a crime could start outside the territory of a state but produce its 
criminal result within the territory of the state. The latter two cases fall within the jurisdiction of 
the state based on the territoriality principle as crime committed in part within its territory.  
Traditionally, English courts are said to have claimed jurisdiction on the basis of the so-called  
‘last act’ rule, according to which English courts had jurisdiction if the last relevant act took place 
in the UK.848 However, this has often resulted in an unsatisfactory situation in which the English 
courts had to decline to accept jurisdiction.  In order to solve this problem the Criminal Justice 
Act (CJA) 1993 introduced a new rule under which English courts can try an offence as soon as 
a relevant act that is any act or omission or other event691 has taken place on the territory of the 
United Kingdom. Even the American concept of the subjective territoriality principle, which 
gives a state jurisdiction over offences that were initiated on its territory but which were completed 
or consummated on the territory of another state,692 can sometimes be categorised under the 
heading of the ubiquity doctrine, in that the preparatory acts concerned constitute constituent 
elements of the crime.  
Given the broad scope of most ML criminalisation,693 many acts can give rise to criminal 
liability. Whenever one transaction takes place on the territory of a state, even if the broader ML 
scheme is located abroad, that state will be able to assume jurisdiction. The combination of the 
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very broad character of criminalisation ML and the ubiquity doctrine is therefore likely to result 
in a multiplication of jurisdictional claims over the same ML scheme. Apart from this 
jurisdictional effect of the ML offence, some applications of the ubiquity theory may also result 
in far-reaching jurisdictional claims. For example, it may suffice for a single accomplice to 
commit a ML act on the territory of a state in order for that state to be able to claim jurisdiction 
over all other acts of ML committed abroad– not only by that person but also by all other persons 
involved in the same offence. Similarly, courts have accepted extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
other offences by the mere connection of the offence, with the offence with which it had 
jurisdiction – either invoking unity of procedure because of the close connection among the 
offences.  
The French Supreme Court, on this note, have accepted jurisdiction over the offence of 
handling stolen goods on the grounds that the offence was connected with a swindling offence 
that had taken place in France.694 The only problem being that while the case is said to have been 
justified by the facts, it might generally have a far-reaching effect. This is because it could allow 
a state on whose territory the predicate offence took place to claim jurisdiction over any 
subsequent ML transaction carried out abroad by invoking such a connection.  
Although application of the ubiquity doctrine appears to have its origin in unilateral state 
practice and not in an express treaty obligation, the doctrine is nevertheless relevant for the 
purpose of establishing jurisdiction in the case of ML.  
Effects Doctrine  
Expanding on ubiquity doctrine, certain states establish jurisdiction when no element of the 
offence occurs within the territory, but where a significant harmful consequence of the offence is 
felt within the state’s territory (or on one of its vessels).695 Originating in the establishment of US 
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jurisdiction over transnational anti-trust violations (agreements between non-US companies 
operating outside the US to fix prices, etc) on the basis of adverse territorial effects in the US,696697 
it has been adopted by US criminal law. For example, in the United States v. Neil855 the US Court 
of Appeals established jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine over the sexual violation of 
a 12-years-old US minor on board a non-American vessel in the territorial waters of another state. 
The basis for asserting jurisdiction is simply because the cruise began and ended in the US and 
the victim had sought counselling in the US.   
 While many states are comfortable with establishment of jurisdiction where a harmful 
consequence of the crime is actual felt in the territory of the state establishing jurisdiction, the less 
substantial this consequence the more likely other states are to object to it. This limits its scope as 
a legitimate interpretation of the obligations to establish territorial jurisdiction in the case of the 
obligations to repress ML. In particular, difficulties have arisen with the establishment of 
jurisdiction over inchoate conduct such as attempts and conspiracies that occur abroad and which 
are intended to be completed in the state establishing jurisdiction, but where no actual effects is 
felt. In the United States v. Ricardo856 the US District Court determined it had jurisdiction over 
defendants charged with conspiracy to import marijuana, even though the conspiracy took place 
outside the US and was thwarted before any marijuana was imported. The court ruled that US 
drug conspiracy laws had exterritorial reach, inter alia, as long as the defendant intended to violate 
those laws and to have the effects occur within the US.698 Reliance on an expanded version of 
objective territoriality to establish jurisdiction over transnational criminal conspiracies that do not 
actually have a harmful impact in the establishing states territory has been subject to criticism 
because the jurisdictional hook – effect – is only potential.699 Article 4(1) (b)(iii) of the Vienna 
Convention 1988 provides that each party may establish its jurisdiction over article 3(1)(c)(iv) 
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offences – inchoate drug related laundering offences and complicity in those offences – if the 
offence “is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission, within its territory . . .” 
of the drug supply and ML offences in Article 3(1). Article 4(1)(b)(iii) is therefore permissive 
because of the difficulties some parties will have with establishing jurisdiction when the 
conspiracy takes place abroad and is wholly frustrated before any negative effects occurs within 
the territory.   
 However, states practice show an increasing using of jurisdictional competence in such case. 
700For example, in Liangsiriprasert v. US 701a Thai national arrested in Hong Kong pending 
extradition to the US appealed to the Privy Council on the basis that the US did not have 
jurisdiction. He had allegedly entered a conspiracy in Thailand with an undercover US agent to 
import drugs into the US (Thailand did not extradite drug offenders to the US) he was arrested at 
the request of the US. He argued inter alia that Hong Kong law followed English law and did not 
apply to conspiracies entered into abroad where there was no impact in that territory and he had 
not performed any act that had an impact in the US. Lord Griffiths reasoned that inchoate actions 
are criminal in England, so there was no reason why extraterritorial actions should be required to 
be inchoate. According to the law Lord, “unfortunately in this country crime has ceased to be 
largely local in origin. Crime is now established on an international scale and the common law 
must face this new reality”.  
 The potential affront to the sovereignty of states where the conduct actually occurs may provide 
some break on the application of this potential effects doctrine, but not if the affronted state is a 
party to repressive AML conventions, where the permission to establish this jurisdiction is now 
common.702  
Regulatory Extraterritoriality   
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The repressive and preventive AML control, apart from fulfilling an initial jurisdictional role 
through the criminalisation, also performs a rather regulatory function. This was achieved using 
two methods. One is by direct imposition of the regulatory requirements on institutions that are 
not subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the State concerned; and the other is by exerting 
pressure on another State to implement AML regulatory requirements even though it does not 
perceive them to be in its best economic interest. The current FATF Forty Recommendations 
envisaged both methods.  
 Recommendation 18 provides that, “Financial institutions should be required to ensure that their 
foreign branches and majority own subsidiaries apply AML measures consistent with the home 
country requirements implementing the FATF Recommendation . . .” By imposing the above 
requirement on the financial institutions in states that apply the FATF Recommendations, the 
FATF is actually extending the scope of the Recommendations extra-territorially. It also provides 
in Recommendation 19 that financial institutions should be required to apply enhanced due 
diligence measures to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, and 
financial institutions from states for which this is called for by the FATF. In view of the 
interdependence of financial markets, strict application of this Recommendations results in 
placing pressures on states to implement the Recommendations in order to maintain their access 
to the global financial market.  
 The United States serves as an illustrative example of the extraterritorial reach of AML 
regulations. The US Bank Secrecy Act applies equally to US banks and to foreign banks operating 
within the jurisdiction. US regulators, unless denied access by the host nation, will examine 
branches of US banks that are operating abroad.703 US banks may be denied the authority to open 
a branch in a state that is uncooperative and does not have a satisfactory AML mechanism. The 
criminalisation of ML extends the regulatory framework further to cover financial institutions that 
are neither branches of US banks nor operating within the US. The US criminal jurisdiction 
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extends to offences that are committed in whole or in part within its borders. Given the very fluid 
nature of the actus reus in ML, this territorial link to the US jurisdiction can be stretched very far. 
For example, if illicit money was wired through a US bank as part of a cross-border process of 
laundering, this transit will be sufficient to give the US criminal jurisdiction over the whole 
process of laundering. Any foreign bank involved in this process will be subjected to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the US.  
 The case of Banque Leu is an illustrative example of the extraterritorial reach of the US criminal 
law–and how it leads to the extension of its regulatory system extraterritoriality.704 Banque Leu 
was a Luxembourg bank that had no offices in the US. In 1993 it was said to have entered a guilty 
plea to ML in the US and agreed to forfeit USD 2.3 million to the US and USD 1 million to 
Luxembourg. The bank was charged with ML under US law because it accepted deposits of USD 
2.3 million in the form of cashier checks drawn on banks operating in the US, which formed part 
of ML operation initiated in the US. The bank sent the checks to the US to clear them and on basis 
of this action fell under the country’s criminal jurisdiction. This clearly demonstrates how the 
loose definition of the actus reus in ML can result in extending the territorial reach or jurisdiction 
of the state.  
 In addition to entering into a forfeiture agreement with the US Government the Luxembourg 
bank, in this case, submitted to a three-year US audit specifically for ML. It also agreed to produce 
an AML monograph that should be updated annually for two years. Such regulatory requirements 
were imposed as a form of sanction for criminal conduct on a bank that was not regulated by the 
United States; hence extending the US regulatory jurisdiction extraterritorially. While the 
extension of regulatory jurisdiction in the above case was temporary and specific, the 
extraterritoriality of the criminal law of ML had a more durable effect on the scope of AML 
regulations. Thus, foreign institutions and states wishing to avoid prosecution for criminal ML 
and its devastating effects must show a good institutional record of fighting against ML.  
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  A recent example of regulatory extraterritoriality is the example of Standard Chartered  
Bank and the New York regulators. In 2012, Standard Chartered Bank PLC agreed to pay USD 
340 million to a New York regulator to settles allegations that the bank broke US ML laws in 
handling transactions for Iranian customers. The sum is said to be the largest fine ever collected 
by a single US-regulator in a ML case. The bank was accused of scheming transactions totalling 
USD 250 billion for Iranian clients. The settlement led the New York regulator to call off a hearing 
on the allegation.705  
Conclusion  
One of the common attributes of the internationalisation of the offence of ML is that, it extends 
the reach of the criminal law beyond the territorial boundaries of the state. The repressive and 
preventive AML arrangements provide vehicles for the reasonable extension of parties’ 
jurisdiction through criminal and regulatory law. Thus, by adopting existing AML conventions, 
the parties make reciprocal grants of special competence on the jurisdictional principles listed in 
the conventions and in doing so waive their rights to object to the establishment of  
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of these principles.  
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CONCLUSION  
The complexities of contemporary international relations and the changing international landscape 
has generated arguments in favour of expansion of law-making processes. Indeed as noted in 
chapter one, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change called for the development 
of international regimes and norms, and of new legal mechanisms where existing ones were 
deemed inadequate for responding to the threats to collective security that it had identified.706 The 
inadequacy of international law in changing conditions is a perennial concern, as are claims for a 
dynamic international legal system commensurate to the demand upon it.707   The requirements of 
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contemporary international law-making have involved diverse participations. In some instances, 
demand for international regulation has come from civil society that perceive its interests as in 
conflict with those of states, especially in contexts such as human rights, disarmament and the 
environment. Non- state actors purport to speak on behalf of diverse interests.708 In areas like ML, 
and indeed cross-border crime, national legal systems face obstacles in exercising effective 
jurisdiction over entities that operate across state borders while international law, based upon the 
regulation of state behaviour, is ill-equipped to respond to corporate behaviour, or that of other 
non-states actors.709   
 The role, for example, of customary international law in this area is problematic as such law is 
derived from existing state practice and reliance cannot be placed on it as a means of regulating 
the problem of ML. The other traditional method of creating binding international law historically 
has been by means of treaties. Although, as the introductory part of this thesis noted, there is scope 
for international treaties in this area and they have indeed been much used, and because of the 
need for compromise to obtain agreement between states, such treaties tend to be vague in form 
and uneven in implementation.710   
This is the case with the international response to ML, as the treaty obligations to 
criminalise ML, for example, define the offence broadly and allows for local variations in relation 
to the predicate crime. There is thus considerable variation in the way in which signatory states to 
these conventions have approached the definition of predicate offences when criminalising the 
offence of ML. This approach to criminalising the offence of ML has since been adopted by a 
range of states in their domestic legislation, such as Canada’s Criminal Code and New Zealand’ 
Crimes Acts; this is not to mention the approach under POCA 2002. A variation in this approach 
concerns the scope of the predicate offence, where some states have adopted a broader approach 
by defining predicate offences to include either all criminal offences or criminal offences 
punishable by a term of at least twelve months and/ or an unlimited fine, such as in Sweden’s 
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Penal Code and the UK’s POCA, 2002. Others have defined predicate offences by setting out a 
list of relevant offences or by combining a list of specific offences with a more general definition 
of predicate offences punishable by a certain level of punishment. Examples here are in Greece’s 
Law 2331/1995 ‘on the Prevention and Combating of the Legislation on Income from Criminal 
Activities’ and in China’s Penal Code.  
In addition, a notable difference with the approach to the definition of the ML offence in 
the Palermo Convention and 1990 Money Laundering Convention is that ML is no longer limited 
to laundering drug proceeds and is now applicable to a broader range of predicate offences. This 
approach was also endorsed in the FATF 40 Recommendation 3, which requires states to 
criminalise ML on the basis of the Vienna Convention 1988 and the Palermo Convention. With 
respect to the financial sector, the Palermo Convention required states to institute a comprehensive 
domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, 
where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to ML.711  This is an obligation also 
emphasised by the various preventive AML instruments (FATF, Basel Principles 1988, Wolfberg 
Principles, and the EC ML Directives) and it is intended to deter ML by emphasising CDD, 
suspicious transaction reporting, and record-keeping obligations and  
related requirements.   
 Given the cross-border nature of the crime of ML, and the problem of the territoriality of the 
criminal law, the traditional approach to international law-making is limited and less effective as 
a method of creating an international response to the problem of ML. The consequence of the 
combination of a non-traditional subject matter with the limitations of traditional international 
law instruments has meant that lawmakers, seeking international solution to the problems of ML 
have had to innovate. This innovation has found three forms of expression in particular.  
 First, soft law plays an increasingly important role in this area –which refers to both formal and 
informal obligations. Traditionally, soft law obligation has left states a considerable degree of 
discretion as regards implementation. However, in the case of soft law concerned with ML the 
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reverse has been the case. For example, informal soft law, in the area of preventive AMLC, (in 
relation to CDD requirements) is in fact often quite detailed and prescriptive. The advantage of 
soft law in this area for state is that, because it is non-binding and does not require a wide 
international consensus for its adoption, it has enabled a group of (largely) Western states in 
particular to promote what they regard as ‘best practice’ in the area as a ‘guide’ for other states to 
follow. The leading promulgator of such law is the FATF, set up under the auspices of the OECD. 
However, this is not the only promulgator of this category of soft law. Other (largely Western-
led) international groups and institutions, such as the Wolfberg Group of global banks and the 
Basel Committee also publish international standards.  
 Secondly, states have chosen legalisation of the problem of ML through the adoption of treaty 
obligations (formal soft law) to legislate for new crimes and treaty obligations to provide for 
international cooperation in the control of ML. Commentators question why this choice was made, 
given the enormous cost to develop and maintain them, the length of time they take to bring into 
operation, and weakness and flexibility of their provisions.712 The answer is complex.  
Hard law is credible but only if its obligations are clear and precise, and substantive power is 
delegated to a third party to supervise the system.713  The architects of the repressive AML 
conventions, individuals with experience of different crimes – faced what they considered similar 
problems and they used familiar solutions: hard treaty obligations using a mixture of inflexible 
form of a treaty and flexible treaty provision. The main barrier to be overcome was harmonisation 
of national criminal law, and once this could be settled through a broad and allinclusive definition, 
AML obligations via the various conventions was implemented.  
 Thirdly, states have become increasingly innovative in making such ‘soft law’ binding both on 
their fellow states and, in the guise of meeting their international commitments, on their citizens. 
An example is the role that the EU has played in this area. Thus, one of the principal purposes 
underlying the third EU ML Directive is to implement the then revised FATF Recommendations. 
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At the national level, the UK itself also gives effect to international soft law, independently of its 
membership of the EU. For example, the JMLSG Guidance has been approved by HM Treasury 
as a result of which a court may have regard to it for the purpose of deciding whether an offence 
has been committed under sections 330 and 331 of the POCA,  
2002. The guidance in turn refers, as evidence of ‘best practice’, to the recommendations issued 
by the FATF, the Basel Committee and the Wolberg Group of global banks.  
 It is therefore right to conclude that harmonisation and approximation of existing AML 
arrangements through soft law is a cornerstone of existing international efforts to control ML, 
which inevitably results in the process of domestic law convergence and international cooperation. 
Domestic laws look more alike and are able to work together without as much friction as they 
would have been if there was no unified response through soft law. Describing the Palermo 
Convention and its protocol to a United States Committee an official explained  
that:  
 “[T]his growing array of cooperative initiatives was designed to create a platform for law enforcement, 
customs, and judicial cooperation that would function irrespective of the particular predicate criminal 
activity to which such initiatives would be applied. Although some of them had arisen in response to a 
particular problem, such as international drug trafficking, tax evasion, or computer crime, in general the 
initiatives were designed for general application regardless of the problem they would address”.714  
I.  Towards a Uniform Codification of Money Laundering Law  
Current international effort to combat ML is still fragmented (as evident in the enormous variety 
of law-making processes), despite the role of soft law. Part of the problem is the divergent nature 
of domestic criminal legislation, which is reflected in the choice of predicate crime and a lack of 
procedural rule to identify and enforce the law at state level. To address the limit of current efforts, 
the thesis will propose a uniform codification of AML law directed by a more representative body 
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or commission of experts offering means of restating, clarifying and revising the law 
authoritatively and systematically. This could come under the aegis of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law,715 which in effect will be a forum for international unification and 
progressive development of AML law. Part of the mandate for such an enterprise will be to 
modernise, harmonise and coordinate domestic AML law by incorporating new and emerging 
typologies and domestic predicate offences in a new convention. The new convention should be 
a progressive unification of AML law based on common grounds, which involves finding agreed 
rules to issues such as AML law and typologies, predicate offences, jurisdiction of the courts and 
applicable law. The foregoing approach will eventual lead to the creation of a binding AML 
procedural rule that could become enforceable at the state level.  
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